D v London Borough of Bromley and Ors (Special Restrictions – Refusal of Adoption Order)

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court. Mr Justice MacDonald: INTRODUCTION

1. In In Re C (A Minor) (Adoption: Illegality) [1999] 2 WLR 202 , Johnson J recognised the tension that arises in an application for an adoption order that is said to meet the best interests of the subject child but is made in the context of a failure to comply with laws put in place by Parliament to protect children in the context of cross-border adoption: “At least superficially, and I appreciate that there are compelling considerations the other way, there is an immediate humanitarian instinct to disregard the niceties of the statutory procedures. Under section 6 of the Adoption Act 1976 welfare is to be the first but not the only, still less the paramount, consideration. If the statutory procedures are there to protect British children, why should these disadvantaged children be denied the same protection? If it was not proper for this applicant to adopt a British child is there to be one set of criteria for the British child and another and lower set for this brown Mayan Indian child? Indeed a cynical observer might question the point of compliance with proper procedures if the court is to be perceived as always granting applications such as the present. Counsel's researches disclose only one reported case in which adoption was refused after breach of the procedures and that was a case in which there was the alternative of a claim by the natural family. Mr. Jackson asked me to give a firm indication that the procedures are there to be followed and must be followed. Such exhortations may I suspect be of little practical effect if followed lamely by the making of an order regardless of the breaches of the process. There is thus a tension between, on the one hand, the need to achieve the least disadvantageous result for the particular child; and, on the other hand, the need to ensure that regardless of race or cultural background children generally do receive the protection that Parliament intended.”

2. In this matter I am concerned with the welfare of FD (hereafter “F”), a 17 year old girl born in May 2008 in Nigeria. F is represented through her Children’s Guardian, Jayon Phillips, by Ms Elpha LeCointe of counsel. The first applicant is DD (hereafter “D”). D applies for an adoption order in respect of F under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (hereafter “ the 2002 Act ”), having purported to adopt her under Nigerian law in 2019. D asserts that she is not related to F. She is represented by Ms Marisa Allman of counsel. BD, D’s husband, was discharged as an applicant by an order dated 1 September 2025 in circumstances where he and D have now separated. D has issued a fresh adoption application as a single adopter pursuant to s.51 of the 2002 Act in place of the application under s.50 of the 2002 Act that she and her husband originally pursued as a couple.

3. The first respondent to the application, AF (hereafter “the father”) is said to be F’s father. He lives in Nigeria. He is represented by Ms Paula Angelique Thomas of counsel. F’s mother is asserted to be RF (hereafter “the mother”) and is said to be deceased. She also lived in Nigeria. There is difficulty regarding the information available in respect of the death of the mother, as there is with much of the documentation from Nigeria.

4. The application is opposed by the London Borough of Bromley (hereafter “the local authority”), which has filed two Annex A reports. The local authority is represented by Ms Jaqui Gilliatt of counsel. Given the issues raised in this case, the Secretary of State for Education accepted an invitation to intervene in these proceedings. Mr William Tyzack of counsel appears on behalf of the Secretary of State. Whilst neutral on the merits of the application, through Mr Tyzack the Secretary of State made submissions on the legal framework that she contends applies to cases where the country of origin is subject to special restrictions on adoptions from abroad pursuant to s.9 of the Adoption and Children Act 2006 (hereafter “ the 2006 Act ), as Nigeria currently is.

5. In determining the application, I have had the benefit of a court bundle, an agreed bundle of authorities and Skeleton Arguments from Ms Allman, Ms Thomas, Ms Gilliatt, Ms LeCointe and Mr Tyzack. I heard oral evidence from D, the allocated social worker and from the Children’s Guardian. In light of the issues raised in this case, I reserved judgment. I now set out my decision and my reasons for it. BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE

6. The background to this matter requires to be set out in some detail in order to place D’s application in its proper context. Regrettably, this will result in a judgment that is longer than ordinarily desirable.

7. D was born in December 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. D came to England in 2004 and holds British citizenship. She married BD in 2014. Speaking to the social worker, D described her marriage, which subsisted at the time that she and her husband decided to adopt F in Nigeria and whilst F was living her in this jurisdiction, in the following terms: “It was like a forced relationship; it was about him getting his papers; he was the one who suggested getting married. Even when I got my own passport, he wanted me to change my name; I just followed him, but it was all about him; he had his own plans for his own life; he didn’t plan to have children together. He knew about the money I got from my husband (meaning her first husband who died in 2010); we had a house that had to be sold, and his children got a share of it; then I bought this house with my share of the money. I didn’t see all this from the beginning; the minute I married him it was me and him for 8 years; he took me away from my friends and family; so that no one would be able to advise me for anything; he just came into my life to take; not to contribute anything to my life. I was isolated; just me and him; everyone that came close to me he spoiled them; he didn’t want anyone near me”. And: “For the past 2 years he was just coming and going as he pleased; he was not living here; he stayed at his work. In the end I realised he was controlling me a lot; he never contributed to the house; financially or practically. He would send me requests to buy him things online; then once he found out he cannot use me anymore he started to get angry. When he got his indefinite leave to remain, he started to change; he started sleeping with other women and all that. He was violent; the way he talks; there is no calm in the house with him around; he would be shouting; smoking weed; drinking. Everything is a big mess; I wish I never met him.”

8. F is said to have been born to the mother and the father in Nigeria. As to F’s original birth certificate, in her statement dated 8 August 2025 D asserts that this was in the father’s possession and she had requested that he locate it. Exhibited to D’s statement of 17 October 2025 is a photocopy of a photograph of a birth certificate that D describes as “F’s birth certificate (pre-adoption)”. That certificate is numbered 5970096 and describes the registration centre as “State Hospital”. It gives F’s date of birth as 3 May 2008. However, the certificate itself is dated 6 September 2017 and is thus not contemporaneous with F’s birth date. The post-dated birth certificate gives the names of F’s father and mother as her parents. The father purports to provide an explanation for the backdating of the certificate centred on it not being usual to have birth certificates in “interior villages” in Nigeria and F’s certificate having been prepared when she started school and was the subject of an inoculation programme. However, the birth certificate records F’s place of birth as Akure, which is a city (the word ‘village’ is expressly crossed out on the certificate) and is dated when F was nearly 10 years old.

9. In the bundle is a photograph of a birth certificate purportedly made following the adoption and dated 15 November 2019. It also records F’s date of birth as 3 May 2008. There is also in the bundle a different version of a 2019 birth certificate in the form of a further photocopy of a birth certificate dated 19 March 2019. It has a different reference number, 20052867 as compared to 197558702 on the first 2019 certificate, and a different registration centre, “Basic Health Centre” as compared to “State Hospital”. It names F’s mother and father as her parents. There is no explanation for the existence of two different 2019 birth certificates or why the second 2019 birth certificate contains different information to that set out in the 2017 certificate.

10. D and the father contend that F’s mother is deceased. In the bundle there is a photocopy of a photograph of a photocopy of a photograph of a Nigerian death certificate issued on 30 June 2010, provided by the father. That death certificate states that the date of the mother’s death was 27 May 2010, when the mother was aged 32. However, the affidavit produced by the father in the Nigerian adoption proceedings and dated 19 July 2019 gives the mother’s year of death as 2016. D told the social worker that the mother had died in 2019 (as I will come to, when certain of the statements D had made to the social worker were put to her in cross-examination she resorted to asserting that the social worker was a racist and was lying). In a statement taken by the social worker from the father on 1 July 2025, the father stated the mother had died “about 5 or 6 years ago”, a date broadly consistent with the 2019 date provided by D to the social worker. In her report, the Children’s Guardian states that F reports that her mother died in 2010 and that the father cannot remember the date of the mother’s death.

11. Following the alleged death of F’s mother, the father remarried and had further children, who are said to be the half-siblings of F. There is considerable uncertainty as to the identity of F’s full and half-siblings.

12. In his statement dated 15 November 2025, the father states that he had four children with F’s mother. Namely, E, F, T and L. He states that E passed away around a year after F’s mother died, later stating that E passed away in 2016, again calling into question the date on the mother’s alleged death certificate. However, the father later stated that E passed away six months before D adopted F in Nigeria, which took place in 2019. The father further states that L passed away in 2021. In his statement, the father refers to E as a ‘daughter’ and uses the pronoun ‘she’. The gender of L is unclear. Against this, the father told the Children’s Guardian that he had three children with F’s mother. Namely, F, E and L. The father informed the Guardian that E died of Typhoid, and that L died suddenly after a fever, but her specific cause of death was unknown. In the Guardian’s report, it is recorded that both the father and F refer to E as a boy, not a girl. D states that she met F’s “brother” prior to his death. It would appear that she is referring to E.

13. The father informed the Children’s Guardian that he has two children with his second wife. A daughter named T, who is now aged 13 or 14, and a son named O, who is now aged 11 or 12. The father gave an estimation of their ages and said it is difficult for him to keep track of such things. F told the Guardian that she does not have much of a relationship with her stepmother but maintains twice weekly phone contact with her half-siblings and father.

14. With respect to the circumstances in which D came to adopt F in the jurisdiction of Nigeria, in her statement of evidence D asserts that she met F and the father for the first time in Nigeria in 2015. Her account, however, has varied over time.

15. In her first Annex A report, dated 25 June 2025, the allocated social worker records that D said she grew up in Akure, where F’s birth family lived, which she contended was a 20 minute drive from Lagos. In her statement dated 8 August 2025, D states that she lived in Lagos and the father and F lived in Akure, about a four hour drive from Lagos. When it was put to her that the journey was in fact over 4 hours, D again stated the social worker had made up her account and that the social worker is a racist.

16. D asserts that she met F’s father through mutual family friends, and that she became close to the family thereafter. D told the social worker that she knew F’s mother “briefly”: “I have been living here since 2004; but I go back to Nigeria every year; that is where I met them (F’s birth parents); they live about 20 minutes’ drive from my house. I met them in the community; saying hello; the connection was there; we started chatting. I knew mum briefly, but I was not close like the way I know dad. I started talking to them about 2015”.

17. In her oral evidence, D contended that she had never met F’s birth mother. Once again, when her previous inconsistent statements to the social worker were put to D in cross-examination she resorted to asserting that the social worker was a racist and was lying. However, in his statement to this court, the father says that when the mother passed away in 2010 D “came to visit me and give condolences”, suggesting D was in contact with the family at that point. Further, an affidavit in her name and signed by her that D recovered from Nigeria in September 2025 states that D knew F’s mother and that F lived with her maternal uncle. D now asserts that the affidavit is a forgery. Likewise, the social enquiry report recovered from Nigeria by D in September 2025 states that D knew F’s mother and was the niece of the father. Both D and the father now say this information is incorrect.

18. By D’s account, F and her family were struggling at the point at which she met them and she had concerns for F’s health, welfare and education. In her statement of 8 August 2025, when explaining why she agreed initially to support F, D states that “I felt sorry for [the father] and F following her mother’s death and I initially supported him as a friend and supported F financially”. D asserts that, in 2015, F’s father made clear that he felt unable to care for F and raised the possibility of D adopting F. D asserts that she did not agree to adopt F at this stage, as she felt it was not right whilst F’s father remained alive, but stayed in touch with the family through daily video calls and from 2015 onwards sent money to fund F’s education: “I would like this court to understand that when I met F I had no intention of adopting a child. So far as I was concerned, although F had lost her mother, her father was alive and well and very present in her life, and I had absolutely no thoughts of adoption, and it would never have occurred to me to adopt a child who had a father who was present and involved.”

19. D contends that the father continued to press the issue of adoption and by late 2018 or early 2019 the adoption of F by D was the subject of serious discussion. D asserts that she had grown to love F and wanted to provide long-term care for her. At this point, F was 11 years old. In his statement, the father says as follows: “The discussions that I had with [D] regarding the adoption were for her to assist me so that F has a good life and that F is well educated and looked after. [D] was to adopt F to alleviate the economic burden on me and the social pressure on me to look after F.”

20. There are numerous issues with the evidence concerning the purported subsequent adoption of F by D in Nigeria in 2019.

21. Upon D agreeing to adopt F in Nigeria, she contends that the father made arrangements for this to take place. In her statement of 17 October 2025, D says that “it was F’s birth father who took the lead at every stage with arranging the adoption.” D’s account of the father being the instigator of the adoption is contradicted by an affidavit purportedly signed by F’s father and recovered from Nigeria by D in September 2025. It states that D “has approached me and subsequently applied to the Ondo State Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (Child Development Department) for the adoption of my daughter, F.”

22. Notwithstanding that the father is illiterate and, on her case, impecunious, D asserts that it was the father who had the assistance of a lawyer to instigate the adoption process in Nigeria and to represent him before the Nigerian court whilst D, who has means, was not legally represented. The father states that his brother assisted him with completing documents for the adoption. It is not possible to interrogate either the lawyer or the father’s brother as the father now claims that both have since passed away.

23. On D’s account she was thus not involved in the adoption process in Nigeria, save when she was asked to provide information or documentation. In her statement she asserts that “I simply provided information when it was requested, or signed documents when requested.” Specifically, a letter from herself and her husband addressed “To Whom it May Concern”, a medical report, bank statements and a completed written questionnaire/adoption form. D states that “I was not told what the legal requirements are for an adoption in Nigeria”. She likewise asserts that “I did not approach the Ministry of Women and Affairs ( sic ) myself about the adoption.” Rather, D contends that the Ministry contacted her at the instigation of the father and “I did what was asked of me”.

24. In his statement to this court, the father asserts that there were three hearings before the Nigerian court. None of the documents record a lawyer acting for the father. The Enrolment of Order dated 14 November 2019 records only the Social Enquiry Officer making submissions. The father asserts that he has no documents relating to the Nigerian adoption. D states that she signed an Adoption Form on 14 July 2019. In that adoption form, in explaining motivation for seeking to adopt F, D stated “Because I love female children and I have genuine interest and capacity to educate the would be adopted child.” In oral evidence, she said this was one of the documents that she had not completed or signed herself.

25. Thereafter D travelled to Nigeria. She again contends that an appointment “was arranged for me” at the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development. D told the social worker that she had one visit to an office where she signed some papers and where F was asked about her wishes and feelings regarding the adoption.

26. D states that she was present when an adoption order was made in her favour on 14 November 2019. Although D alleges that both she and her husband sent documents to effect the adoption in Nigeria (the implication being that they were both applicants), only D travelled to Nigeria to complete the adoption process. The Nigerian adoption order records D alone as F’s adoptive parent. D asserts that she was “confused” about this. At the time of the adoption, D says that she received copies of the following documents: i) A “Bond by Adopter”. The “Bond by Adopter” (of which there is only a photograph in the court bundle) is dated 14 November 2019 and is expressed to be made under s.134 and 138 of Ondo State Child Rights Law 2007. The document appears incomplete in that it does not include the amount of the bond in question. It purports to have been signed by both D and F. ii) A final “Adoption Order” dated 14 November 2019 issued by the “Family Court of Akure in Ondo State”. The order is not sealed. Whilst the adoption order names only D, as noted, one of the two birth certificates dated 15 November 2019, that it is said was made following the adoption, names both D and her husband as F’s parents. iii) An “Enrolment of Order” recorded as issued by the “Family High Court of Justice Ondo State of Nigeria in the Akure Judicial Division”. The enrolment of order is not sealed. This document is likewise dated 14 November 2019 and records a hearing before the Hon. Justice Aderemi Adegoroye and two assessors, with the assistance of a Social Enquiry Officer.

27. In September 2025, D travelled to Nigeria in order to obtain further documentation. It is not clear why this documentation was not already in her possession. The documentation further confuses and obscures the circumstances by which D purportedly adopted F in Nigeria. D contends that she had not seen many of the documents she managed to obtain whilst in Nigeria and that, as I have referred to at points above, they contained inaccurate information. In particular: i) D obtained a document entitled “Affidavit verifying intension ( sic ) to adopt a female child” written in D’s name and signed by her. In addition to stating that D knew F’s mother, it says that F lived with her maternal uncle. D now asserts that the signature on the document is a forgery and that she was not in Nigeria at the time the document was prepared and signed in April 2019. She relies on photographs of date stamps in her passport, although a photograph of the picture page, demonstrating the photos come from her passport, is omitted. D again denies having met F’s mother, notwithstanding her statement to the contrary to the social worker, and asserts she did not know that F lived with her maternal uncle. ii) An adoption form obtained by D lists Mr O, F’s maternal uncle, and Mrs O, F’s maternal aunt, as guarantors to the adoption of F by D. Separate letters accompanying the adoption form purport to show that consent to the adoption was given by Mr O and Mrs O. D says she has never heard of Mr O and knew nothing about him giving his consent. iii) Five of the documents recovered from Nigeria state that D intended to take F with her to the UK. Namely, the affidavit in D’s name, an affidavit purporting to be from the father, the social inquiry report and two letters dated 20 July 2019 from persons identifying themselves as F’s maternal aunt and paternal uncle respectively. They each state that “I also consent to the fact that Miss F may be taken to the United Kingdom to stay with [DD] and her husband, [BD], as their adopted child”. iv) The affidavit purporting to be from the father is written in English, notwithstanding that he is illiterate and cannot read or write in English. There is no statement in the affidavit that the father had had it read to him and that he understood it, or any certificate of translation. v) The Social Enquiry Report does not make clear whether the Social Enquiry Officer spoke to D. D asserts she had not seen a copy of the social enquiry report before she travelled to Nigeria. In addition to denying she told him that she knew F’s mother and was the niece of F’s father, D further denies that she told the Social Enquiry Officer that “she intended to take F to England”.

28. In seeking to explain what he contends are errors and inaccuracies in the foregoing documents, the father again states that the documents were completed by his lawyer and read to him by his brother. In explaining why he did not seek to correct information he knew to be incorrect, the father states that “It may be that I was not read all of the documents”. Again, it is not possible to interrogate either the lawyer or the father’s brother on this point in circumstances where the father now claims that both have since passed away.

29. Following the purported adoption, D left Nigeria immediately without taking F with her. In her statement of 17 October 2025, compiled after this court had directed evidence as to the issue of whether F was brought into the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption, D states as follows regarding her intentions at the time of the purported adoption in Nigeria: “When I adopted F I did not intend to bring her to England initially. I regarded my responsibility as being financial and to look after her welfare and wellbeing. I spoke to her everyday, sometimes more than once a day. I had already been making payments to support F before I adopted her. I wanted to do the very best by F and believed that she would want to stay in Nigeria so I did all I could to provide for her emotionally and financially from the time I met her in 2015.”

30. D states that she continued to fund F’s education in Nigeria. In the bundle there is a photograph of a photograph of a letter dated 7 February 2020 from the J High School stating that D is F’s parent and responsible for her fees and expenses. D asserts that in January 2020, F moved to an international school in Lagos and lived with members of D’s family in that jurisdiction, although in her statement D contends that F would stay with her when D visited Nigeria. The bundle contains a photograph of a photocopy of a letter from the K International School dated 24 May 2021 stating that F was a student at the school for two months between January 2021 and April 2021. Of the two receipts provided, only one is dated and signed.

31. D denies that the payments she made to Nigeria were payments made to enable her to adopt F. She also refutes the concern of the social worker that this situation created a dynamic in which F feels indebted to D. In his statement, the father says as follows regarding payment: “[D] did not pay me any money to adopt F. It was agreed that she would adopt F in order to give her a better life. It was not a financial arrangement by any means but a friend helping another. The only money that I received from [D] for F was to help pay for the costs of her education prior to the adoption.”

32. D brought F to the United Kingdom on 11 April 2021. D asserts that F originally came to the United Kingdom for a holiday and with the expectation that she would return to school in Nigeria. In her statement of the 17 October 2025, D states that “F came to visit me in England in 2021 and I had no intention of this being a permanent visit I had thought it was for a holiday only but F was adamant she wished to remain with me”. This account, however, is contradicted by F’s statement to the social worker set out in the second Annex A report regarding what she had been told by D and her father in 2021 (emphasis added): “When asked about her trip to London in 2021, F told me that: ‘They said I was going to be adopted , I was told it’s for me to live a good life because he was struggling. All I know is I’m going to live a good life and have everything I’ve dreamt of’”.

33. F entered the jurisdiction on a 180 day visa. The visa application stated that both F’s biological parents were deceased. D says that this untrue information did not originate from her, and that the mistake was that of her immigration solicitors, declaring herself in her statement to have been “shocked and upset” to see such a mistake. There is no evidence, however, that D sought to correct the mistake, either with her immigration solicitors or with the Home Office. The visa application contained in the bundle also contains no mention of an adoption having taken place in Nigeria. No application for an exception to the restrictions on adoptions from abroad operative in respect of Nigeria pursuant to s.9 of the Children and Adoption Act 2006 (hereafter “ the 2006 Act ”) was made by D.

34. D contends that, in August 2024, over four years after F had entered the jurisdiction, she learnt that the Nigerian adoption order that she asserts was made in November 2019 was not recognised in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. D gave notice to the local authority of her intention to apply to adopt F under the 2002 Act and on 20 September 2024, D and her husband made an application for a child arrangements order under s.8 of the Children Act 1989 (hereafter “ the 1989 Act ”). On 23 October 2024, D and her husband were granted a child arrangements order providing for F to live with them and for them to have parental responsibility for F. On 15 January 2025, F was granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom outside the immigration rules until 15 July 2027.

35. On 20 February 2025, D and her husband applied for a domestic adoption order in respect of F. The application form incorrectly states F’s nationality as British. On the same day, F reported an incident of alleged domestic abuse in the home. She told police that D’s husband had been violent towards herself and D and that he was regularly violent within the home. The police attended and arrested D’s husband on suspicion of causing actual bodily harm. Both F and D received treatment at hospital. The ‘Merlin’ police report describes the incident on 20 February 2025 as follows: “Domestic Incident where historical events of child abuse was disclosed... Officers attended [the address] as the subject had called police stating that her adoptive father was beating up her adoptive mother. The call handler stated that a disturbance was heard and that the subject stated she believed her adoptive mother was going to be killed by the adoptive father. F then stated to officers that the adoptive father regularly assaults the subject, she explained that on the same day she was pushed down the stairs and had hurt her back and her shoulder as a result. She went on to add that she is regularly kicked, slapped, punched, elbowed and pinned down on a regular basis, Police are going to video interview the suspect to account for all prior incidents that took place as it appears to have been ongoing for years. The adoptive father was arrested for ABH against the adoptive mother and ABH against the subject.”

36. A referral was made to the local authority, which placed F on a Child in Need plan before closing the case on 1 May 2025. However, the Annex A report details that the local authority continued to have concerns about the situation for F. In particular, the Annex A report details the following matters, which were not challenged: i) Despite advice from police, D did not change the locks on her property as she feared how her husband would react if he could not get into the property. ii) D alleged that her husband had used other people to place pressure on her to withdraw her statement to the police with respect to the events of 20 February 2025, telling the social worker that five people had come to speak to her to pressure her into dropping the case. iii) D and her husband are in dispute regarding their property, with D’s husband wanting the property sold and the proceeds divided between them.

37. Following the incident on 20 February 2025, D confirmed that she had separated from her husband and intended to pursue the application to adopt F as a sole applicant. Thereafter, a further child arrangements order was made under the 1989 Act providing for F to live with D only and removing parental responsibility for F from D’s husband. On 26 August 2025, D issued and served a new adoption application. The Annex A report details that she did not tell her husband that she had done so as she feared his reaction to that news as he was “a very angry man”. That application again incorrectly asserted that F’s nationality was British. In her statement dated 18 August 2025, D states as follows: “I note that there has been some suggestion that my application for an Adoption Order was made only for immigration purposes. I confirm that this is not correct; I would wish for an order recognising F as part of my family and what is happening on the ground however I do of course recognise that F’s immigration status plays a big role in her life in the UK and that it is a huge consideration that I do not consider has been properly dealt with within the local authority assessment.”

38. The Annex A reports to which I have referred were authored by the allocated social worker, Davina Barker. Ms Barker gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. She was an impressive and considered witness. Ms Barker brought an appropriate degree of forensic analysis and professional scepticism to the case having regard to the obvious forensic difficulties summarised above. The Annex A reports are the product of three home visits, on 14 May, 21 May and 10 June 2025. In her Annex A reports Mrs Barker concludes that she cannot recommend a domestic adoption order be granted in favour of D.

39. Finally, the court has before it the report of the Children’s Guardian. The Children’s Guardian also gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. Her report recommends that an adoption order be made in favour of D. As I will come to, and as I expressed during the hearing, in the context of the matters set out above, I have significant concerns about the analysis carried out by the Children’s Guardian in this case. RELEVANT LAW

40. As I noted recently in B v B and Ors ( Section 83 ACA 2002 and Step-Parent Adoption) [2026] EWHC 97 (Fam) , procedurally and legally, the domestic adoption process comprises two key stages. First, the legal and administrative requirements contained within the relevant primary and secondary legislation must be met. Subject to the dispute over whether the case comes within s.83 of the 2002 Act , the parties are agreed this court has jurisdiction to make an adoption order. Second, an adoption order must be in the best interests of the subject child throughout her life, having regard to the matters set out in s.1 of the 2002 Act : “ 1 Considerations applying to the exercise of powers (1) Subsections (2) to (4) apply whenever a court or adoption agency is coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child. (2) The paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child’s welfare, throughout his life. (3) The court or adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare. (4) The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters (among others)— (a) the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding), (b) the child’s particular needs, (c) the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person, (d) the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant, (e) any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41)) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering, (f) the relationship which the child has with relatives, with any person who is a prospective adopter with whom the child is placed, and with any other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant, including— (i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so, (ii) the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs, (iii) the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child. (5) In placing a child for adoption, an adoption agency in Wales must give due consideration to the child’s religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background. (6) In coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child, a court or adoption agency must always consider the whole range of powers available to it in the child’s case (whether under this Act or the Children Act 1989 ); and the court must not make any order under this Act unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so. (7) In this section, “coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child”, in relation to a court, includes— (a) coming to a decision in any proceedings where the orders that might be made by the court include an adoption order (or the revocation of such an order), a placement order (or the revocation of such an order) or an order under section 26 or 51A (or the revocation or variation of such an order), (b) coming to a decision about granting leave in respect of any action (other than the initiation of proceedings in any court) which may be taken by an adoption agency or individual under this Act , but does not include coming to a decision about granting leave in any other circumstances. (8) For the purposes of this section— (a) references to relationships are not confined to legal relationships, (b) references to a relative, in relation to a child, include the child’s mother and father. (9) In this section “adoption agency in Wales” means an adoption agency that is— (a) a local authority in Wales, or (b) a registered adoption society whose principal office is in Wales.”

41. As to the dispute in this case over whether s.83 of the 2002 Act is engaged, Chapter 6 of the 2002 Act , which incorporates s.83 , deals with adoptions with a foreign element. As this court observed in Re S (Domestic Adoption of Child of Foreign National) [2025] EWFC 288 at [41]: “[41] Chapter 6 of the 2002 Act is titled “Adoptions with a Foreign Element”, with the chapter sub-heading being “Bringing children into and out of the United Kingdom”. The term ‘adoptions with a foreign element’ is not defined in Chapter 6 nor in the glossary contained in Schedule 6 of the 2002 Act . However, it is plain from the wording of ss.82 to 87 that Chapter 6 of the 2002 Act governing adoptions with a foreign element is concerned with children brought into the jurisdiction for the purposes of adoption ( s.83 ), conferring parental responsibility prior to adoption abroad (s.84), children taken out of the jurisdiction for the purposes of adoption (s.85), overseas adoptions (s.87) and adoptions proceeding under the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (hereafter “the 1993 Hague Convention”) (ss.88 and 89).”

42. The restrictions on bringing children into the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption are set out in Chapter 6 at s.83 of the 2002 Act as follows: “ 83 Restriction on bringing children in (1) This section applies where a person who is habitually resident in the British Islands (the “British resident”)— (a) brings, or causes another to bring, a child who is habitually resident outside the British Islands into the United Kingdom for the purpose of adoption by the British resident, or (b) at any time brings, or causes another to bring, into the United Kingdom a child adopted by the British resident under an external adoption effected within the period of twelve months ending with that time. The references to adoption, or to a child adopted, by the British resident include a reference to adoption, or to a child adopted, by the British resident and another person. (2) But this section does not apply if the child is intended to be adopted under a Convention adoption order. (3) An external adoption means an adoption, other than a Convention adoption, of a child effected under the law of any country or territory outside the British Islands, whether or not the adoption is— (a) an adoption within the meaning of Chapter 4, or (b) a full adoption (within the meaning of section 88(3)). (4) Regulations may require a person intending to bring, or to cause another to bring, a child into the United Kingdom in circumstances where this section applies— (a) to apply to an adoption agency (including a Scottish or Northern Irish adoption agency) in the prescribed manner for an assessment of his suitability to adopt the child, and (b) to give the agency any information it may require for the purpose of the assessment. (5) Regulations may require prescribed conditions to be met in respect of a child brought into the United Kingdom in circumstances where this section applies. (6) In relation to a child brought into the United Kingdom for adoption in circumstances where this section applies, regulations may— (a) provide for any provision of Chapter 3 to apply with modifications or not to apply, (b) if notice of intention to adopt has been given, impose functions in respect of the child on the local authority to which the notice was given. (7) If a person brings, or causes another to bring, a child into the United Kingdom at any time in circumstances where this section applies, he is guilty of an offence if— (a) he has not complied with any requirement imposed by virtue of subsection (4), or (b) any condition required to be met by virtue of subsection (5) is not met, before that time, or before any later time which may be prescribed. (8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— (a) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both, (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or a fine, or both. (9) In this section, “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations and “regulations” means regulations made by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Assembly.”

43. It is also necessary to set out the relevant parts of Part 2 the 2006 Act . Part 2 of the 2006 Act is also entitled “Adoptions with a Foreign Element” (and, likewise, does not define the term). Section 9 of the 2006 Act provides as follows with respect to the power of the Secretary of State for Education to declare that, for public policy reasons, special restrictions are to apply for the time being in relation to the bringing in of children to the United Kingdom for the purpose of adoption from a particular country: “ 9 Declaration of special restrictions on adoptions from abroad (1) This section applies if the Secretary of State has reason to believe that, because of practices taking place in a country or territory outside the British Islands (the “other country”) in connection with the adoption of children, it would be contrary to public policy to further the bringing of children into the United Kingdom in the cases mentioned in subsection (2). (2) The cases are that a British resident— (a) wishes to bring, or cause another to bring, a child who is not a British resident into the United Kingdom for the purpose of adoption by the British resident, and, in connection with the proposed adoption, there have been, or would have to be, proceedings in the other country or dealings with authorities or agencies there, or (b) wishes to bring, or cause another to bring, into the United Kingdom a child adopted by the British resident under an adoption effected, within the period of twelve months ending with the date of the bringing in, under the law of the other country. (3) It is immaterial whether the other country is a Convention country or not. (4) The Secretary of State may by order declare, in relation to any such country or territory, that special restrictions are to apply for the time being in relation to the bringing in of children in the cases mentioned in subsection (2). (5) Before making an order containing such a declaration the Secretary of State must consult— (a) the National Assembly for Wales, and (b) the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety in Northern Ireland. (6) A country or territory in relation to which such a declaration has effect for the time being is referred to below in this section as a “restricted country”. (7) The Secretary of State must publish reasons for making the declaration in relation to each restricted country. (8) The Secretary of State must publish a list of restricted countries (“the restricted list”) and keep the list up to date. (9) The restricted list and the reasons are to be published in whatever way the Secretary of State thinks appropriate for bringing them to the attention of adoption agencies and members of the public. (10) In this section— (a) “British resident” means a person habitually resident in the British Islands, and the reference to adoption by a British resident includes adoption by a British resident and another person, (b) “the Convention” means the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption, concluded at The Hague on 29th May 1993, (c) “Convention country” means a country or territory in which the Convention is in force.”

44. On 12 March 2021, pursuant to s.9 of the 2006 Act , special restrictions were imposed on adoptions from Nigeria by the Special Restrictions on Adoptions from Abroad (Nigeria) Order 2021 (hereafter “the 2021 Order”). Paragraph 2 of the 2021 Order provides that special restrictions are to apply for the time being in relation to the bringing of children into the United Kingdom from Nigeria in the cases mentioned in section 9(2) of the Children and Adoption Act 2006 , i.e. where a British resident wishes to bring, or cause another to bring, a child who is not a British resident into the United Kingdom for the purpose of adoption, and, in connection with the proposed adoption, there have been, or would have to be, proceedings in Nigeria or dealings with authorities or agencies there, or wishes to bring, or cause another to bring, into the United Kingdom a child adopted under the law of Nigeria within a period of twelve months ending with the date of entry.

45. The reasons for the imposition of restrictions under the 2021 Order are set out by the Department for Education in Adoptions: Restricted List – list of countries where special restrictions are in place under the , dated April 2023, as follows: Children and Adoption Act 2006 “ Reasons The Order has been made in response to significant child safeguarding concerns due to issues affecting the Nigerian intercountry adoption system. This is based on evidence received through international partners including Central Adoption Authorities and diplomatic missions. The specific areas of concern included: • difficulties confirming the background and adoptability of children; • unreliable documentation; • concerns about corruption in the Nigerian adoption system; • evidence of organised child trafficking within Nigeria; and • concerns about weaknesses in checks completed by Nigerian authorities in relation to adoption applications from prospective adopters who are habitually resident in the United Kingdom and therefore are likely to in fact be intended to be intercountry adoptions. This includes weaknesses in pre and post adoption monitoring procedures. There is an absence of checks as to whether the adoption is intended to be an intercountry adoption in light of the habitual residence of applicants and accordingly whether prospective adopters have been assessed and approved by a UK adoption agency and issued with relevant UK authority documentation (e.g. certificate of eligibility to adopt) to proceed with an intercountry adoption from Nigeria. Such practices are contrary to the principles of the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (‘the Hague Convention’) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. There is therefore a lack of confidence that adoptions from Nigeria meet the requirements expected in regard to the adoption process and to ensure adoption is the best outcome for the children. As a result of this evidence the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, in the name of the Secretary of State, is of the view that it would be contrary to public policy to further the bringing of children into the United Kingdom from Nigeria as specified in section 9 (2) of the Children and Adoption Act 2006 .”

46. The special restrictions that are to apply pursuant to s.9 of the 2006 Act , and which now apply to Nigeria pursuant to the 2021 Order are detailed in s.11 of the 2006 Act : “ 11 The special restrictions (1) The special restrictions mentioned in section 9(4) are that, except as mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the appropriate authority is not to take any step which he or it might otherwise have taken in connection with furthering the bringing of a child into the United Kingdom in the cases mentioned in section 9(2) (whether or not that step is provided for by or by virtue of any enactment). (2) But nothing in sub section (1 ) prevents the appropriate authority from taking those steps if, in any particular case, the prospective adopters satisfy— (a) the appropriate authority, or (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, in a case which is not a Convention case, the Secretary of State, that the appropriate authority should take those steps despite the special restrictions. (3) The Secretary of State may make regulations providing for— (a) the procedure to be followed by the appropriate authority (or, if subsection (2)(b) applies, the Secretary of State) in determining whether or not he or it is satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2), (b) matters which the appropriate authority (or the Secretary of State) is to take into account when making such a determination (whether or not he or it also takes other matters into account). (4) In this section— “the appropriate authority” means, in a Convention case, the Central Authority in relation to England, to Wales or to Northern Ireland (as the case may be), and in any other case— (a) in relation to England and Wales, the Secretary of State, (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State (for the purposes of steps which he takes) or the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety in Northern Ireland (for the purposes of steps which it takes), “Central Authority” is to be construed in accordance with section 2 of the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 (c. 18) (“ the 1999 Act ”) or, in relation to Northern Ireland, section 2 of the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act (Northern Ireland) 2001 (c. 11 (N.I.)) (“the 2001 Act”), “Convention case” means a case where— (a) the child is intended to be adopted under an adoption order which, by virtue of regulations under section 1 of the 1999 Act or section 1 of the 2001 Act (as appropriate), is made as a Convention adoption order, or (b) the child is intended to be adopted under an adoption effected under the law of a Convention country outside the British Islands and certified in pursuance of Article 23(1) of the Convention, and “the Convention” and “Convention country” have the meanings given by section 9(10) .”

47. In certain cases, the Secretary of State may promulgate regulations that impose extra conditions in certain cases, pursuant to s.12 of the 2006 Act , which provides as follows: “ 12 Imposition of extra conditions in certain cases (1) The Secretary of State may make regulations providing— (a) for him to specify in the restricted list, in relation to any restricted country, a step which is not otherwise provided for by or by virtue of any enactment but which, by virtue of the arrangements between the United Kingdom and that country, the appropriate authority normally takes in connection with the bringing in of a child where that country is concerned, and (b) that, if such a step has been so specified in relation to a restricted country, one or more conditions specified in the regulations are to be met in respect of a child brought into the United Kingdom in either of the cases mentioned in section 9(2) (reading the reference there to the “other country” as being to the restricted country in question). (2) Those conditions are in addition to any provided for by virtue of— (a) section 83 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (c. 38) (restriction on bringing children in), or (b) Article 58ZA of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 (S.I. 1987/2203 (N.I. 22)) (restriction on bringing children in), or under or by virtue of any other enactment. (3) A person who brings, or causes another to bring, a child into the United Kingdom is guilty of an offence if any condition required to be met by virtue of sub section (1 )(b) is not met. (4) Subsection (3) does not apply if the step specified in the restricted list in relation to any country had already been taken before the publication of the restricted list. (5) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (3) is liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court (in England and Wales) or 6 months (in Northern Ireland), or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both, (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both. (6) In relation to an offence committed before May 2022, the reference in subsection (5)(a) to the general limit in a magistrates’ court is to be read as a reference to 6 months. This subsection does not extend to Northern Ireland. (7) In this section— (a) “the appropriate authority” has the meaning given by section 11(4) , (b) “restricted country” and “restricted list” have the same meanings as in section 9 .”

48. It would not appear that regulations have been made imposing extra conditions in addition to the restrictions imposed in respect of Nigeria by s.11 of the 2006 Act .

49. Under the Foreign Element (Special Restrictions on Adoptions from Abroad) Regulations 2008 (hereafter “the 2008 Regulations”), a request can be made to treat a case as an exception to the special restrictions imposed by s.11 of the 2006 Act . In deciding whether or not a case is exceptional, the Secretary of State for Education will consider all the information provided which is relevant to the individual facts and circumstances of the case. Regulation 6 of the 2008 Regulations lists the matters which must be taken into account when exceptional cases are being considered as follows: “ Matters to be taken into account

6. —(1) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of regulation 4, the matters that the relevant authority is to take into account, whether or not the authority also takes other matters into account, are as follow. (2) Where the prospective adopters wish to adopt a particular child, the matters are— (a) the circumstances leading to the child becoming available for adoption, including whether any competent authority in the State of origin has made a decision in relation to the adoption or availability for adoption of the child, (b) the relationship that the child has with the prospective adopters, including how and when that relationship was formed, (c) the child’s particular needs and the capacity of the prospective adopters to meet those needs, and (d) the reasons why the State of origin was placed on the restricted list. (3) In any other case, the matter is the reasons why the State of origin was placed on the restricted list. (4) In this regulation, a “competent authority” means a court or a person who performs functions which correspond to the functions of an adoption agency or to the functions of the Secretary of State in respect of intercountry adoption, and “adoption agency” has the meaning given in section 2 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (2).”

50. The Department for Education has published non-statutory guidance entitled Exception Requests: Adoptions from countries with special restrictions – Information for prospective adopters . Paragraph 4 of that guidance provides as follows: “4. By virtue of the fact that a country is on the restricted list, adoptions of children from that country by British residents are not permitted unless an exception request is approved by the Secretary of State. For any application to proceed where a special restriction is in place, the relevant authority will need to be satisfied that the facts of a particular case are sufficiently exceptional to override the restrictions imposed on adoptions from the particular country.”

51. The Department for Education non-statutory guidance states the following principles of application with respect to the making of exception requests under r.6 of the 2008 Regulations: i) The Secretary of State for Education can only consider exception requests and authorise intercountry adoption applications to be processed in circumstances where s.83 of the 2002 Act applies. ii) Prospective adopters who are making an exception request to adopt from a country or territory where special restrictions are in place should not proceed with making any arrangements to adopt a child until they have been both assessed and approved to adopt by an adoption agency and subsequently had an exception request granted by the Secretary of State for Education. iii) In deciding whether or not a case is exceptional, consideration will be given to all the information provided which is relevant to the individual facts and circumstances, including the ‘matters’ which must be taken into account when exception requests are being considered. That list is non-exhaustive. All the listed matters must be considered but matters other than those listed in the regulations may also be taken into account depending on the circumstances of the case.

52. Turning finally to the relevant authorities, it has been held that in circumstances where a child was brought to the United Kingdom more than twelve months after an external adoption, s.83(1) (b) of the 2002 Act is not engaged (see Re B and C and others [2023] EWFC 18 ). That is the position in this case.

53. Section 83(1) (a) may nonetheless be engaged depending on the findings of the court as to whether the child was brought into this jurisdiction “for the purposes of adoption”. With respect to the meaning of that phrase, in Re A and B (Adoption: [2024] EWHC 2837, Section 83 ACA 2002 ) [2025] Fam 11 , Cobb J Cobb J (as he then was) considered that question and held as follows: “[32] There is no statutory guidance on what is meant by “for the purpose of adoption” in section 83(1) (a) of the ACA 2002 . The word ‘adoption’ in this context refers, in my judgment, to the process of obtaining an adoption order through the English Courts...” And “[35] What about phrase ‘for the purpose of…’? This phrase should, in my view, be given its ordinary meaning. It conveys the reason or intent behind an action or decision; the phrase designates an action with a specific objective. Of course, very often people act with more than one ‘purpose’, but I regard it as neither appropriate nor necessary to import the word ‘sole’ or ‘dominant’ before ‘purpose’; generally, it will be clear from the evidence in a case involving children being brought from abroad what the ‘purpose’ is of bringing children into this country. It will be for that child to become – through English court process – an adopted, and therefore full and legally secure, member of the family bringing them here...”

54. As this court noted in B v B and Ors ( at [27] to [35], the case law makes clear that a failure to comply with the provisions of Section 83 ACA 2002 and Step-Parent Adoption) s.83 of the 2002 Act does not of itself prevent the court from making an adoption order if, having undertaken a careful analysis that takes into account considerations of welfare and of public policy, the court is satisfied that an adoption order would be in the child’s best interests.

55. As also noted in B v B and Ors ( , the authorities for that proposition start with Section 83 ACA 2002 and Step-Parent Adoption) In re Adoption Application (Non-Patrial: Breach of Procedures) [1993] Fam 125 . In that case, decided under the Adoption Act 1976 , Douglas-Brown J held that there was no power provided by statute to waive or dispense with or authorise breaches which have already taken place of s.11 of the 1976 Act and that, even in the absence of statutory provision, the court hearing an adoption application must take account of considerations of public policy when deciding the application and, if the application is founded on the illegal conduct of the applicants, the court should take that into account. The decision in In re Adoption Application (Non-Patrial: Breach of Procedures) was approved by the Court of Appeal in In re G (Adoption: Illegal Placement) [1995] 1 FLR 403 . In In re G (Adoption: Illegal Placement) , albeit in comments that were obiter in circumstances where the appeal concerned the correct venue of proceedings, Balcombe LJ held that where there had been a proved breach of the adoption legislation, the court was not prohibited from making an order notwithstanding the absence of a statutory dispensing and retrospective power. Balcombe LJ was clear that the court must take the breach into account and consider whether public policy required that the order should be refused because of the applicant’s wrongdoing, while giving first consideration to the welfare of the child.

56. In Re X [2008] EWHC 1324 (Fam) , Munby J (as he then was) was concerned with an application for an adoption order under the 2002 Act in a matter he was satisfied was “a case of an unlawful inter-country adoption” that breached English adoption law. Munby J held that the principles that could be derived from Re K (Adoption and Wardship) [1997] 2 FLR 221 , In Re C (Adoption: Legality) [1999] 1 FLR 370 and Re R (No 1)(Inter-Country Adoption) [1999] 1 FLR 1014 , Flintshire County Council v K [2001] 2 FLR 476 and Re M (Adoption: International Adoption Trade) [2003] 1 FLR 1111 , included the principle that where, after careful analysis, welfare and public policy point towards differing outcomes for the child, welfare will prevail.

57. In Re TY (Preliminaries to Intercountry Adoption) [2019] EWHC 2979 (Fam) , [2020] 1 FLR 739 , Cobb J (as he then was) considered the proper approach under the 2002 Act to an application to allow an adoption application to proceed in the context of a failure to comply with requirement in regulation 4(4) of the AFER 2005 to notify the Local Authority of the child’s arrival within the jurisdiction within two weeks and the failure to comply with the requirement in s.44(3) of the 2002 Act by issuing the adoption application less than 3 months after notifying the local authority. At [21], and having considered the authorities concerning the failure to comply with time limits in the context of applications for parental orders under s.54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (in circumstances where the breaches of the adoption legislation alleged in the case concerned time limits), Cobb J articulated the following principles: “... In considering the failures to adhere to these time-limits, Ms Cronin has urged me to take a purposive view of the statute, and to respect TY’s and Ms CM’s human rights. She has referred to a number of authorities including Re X (Surrogacy: time limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam) , [2015] 2 WLR 745 , [2015] 1 FLR 349 ; KB & RJ v RT [2016] EWHC 760 (Fam) ; and Re A & B (No.2 Parental Order) [2015] EWHC 2080 (Fam) . [2016] 2 FLR 446 . I further drew attention in argument to Sir James Munby P’s judgment in Re A & Others ( [2015] EWHC 2602, HFEA 2008 ) [2016] 1 WLR 1325 , [2017] 1 FLR 366 at [59]/[60]. From these authorities, I feel able to extract the following propositions: i) The focus of the court’s analysis should be upon the consequence of the non-compliance as opposed to the imperative wording of the provision ( Re X at [37]); “the emphasis ought to be on the consequences of non-compliance” (per Lord Steyn in Regina v Soneji and another [2005] UKHL 49 , [2006] 1 AC 340 , at [23]); ii) If there is a breach of a statutory procedural requirement, the modern approach is to look at the underlying purpose of the requirement, whether departure from it contravenes the letter of the statute and if so, whether it renders it a nullity; ( Re X at [39]/[41]); a “purposive” interpretation should be adopted ( Re X at [39]); iii) The consequences of making or not making the order (or in this case of allowing the application to proceed) should be considered; this would be particularly pertinent if the consequences could be lifelong and irreversible ( Re X at [54]); iv) The Human Rights Act 1998 requires an interpretation which gives effect to the rights enshrined therein ( Re X at [44]); v) Relevant to the exercise of discretion (in considering whether to adhere strictly to the letter of the statute or not) would be whether the parties had acted in good faith ( Re A & B at [45], [52], [65]); vi) Consideration should be given to whether any party suffer prejudice if the application is allowed to proceed (Re X [65], cited in KB & RJ at [38]).”

58. In Re A and B (Adoption: , Cobb J concluded that there had been no breach of Section 83 ACA 2002 ) s.83 of the 2002 Act . However, he further held that if he was wrong on either his interpretation of s.83 of the 2002 Act or in applying the law to the particular facts of that case, there would have been a legitimate route through s.83 of the 2002 Act and the AFER 2005 which would have permitted him to make the adoption orders. Having referred to the list of principles he had set out in Re TY (Preliminaries to Intercountry Adoption) , Cobb J held as follows: “[43] Could an adoption application proceed despite non-compliance with the requirements of the AFER 2005? Exceptionally, in my judgment, it could do so, where to refuse the application would be materially to deny the rights of the children and the applicant under article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”

59. The court also heard submissions as to the correct “test” to be applied in cases of non-compliance with the adoption legislation and, specifically, whether the “most exceptional circumstances” test articulated by HHJ Moradifar sitting as a High Court judge in Re X (Intercountry Adoption: Kafala: Non-compliance is appropriate. I deal with those submissions in detail below. s.83 ACA 2002 )

60. Finally, within the context of those persons said to be F’s father and surviving siblings remaining in Nigeria, and given the emphasis placed by D on the importance of securing F’s immigration status, in S v Bradford Metropolitan District Council and another [2016] 1 WLR 407 the Court of Appeal (in observations that were again obiter in circumstances where the issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the court had a basis for making an adoption order where the only identified benefit from that outcome would not be achieved) said as follows: “[28] Adoption is not a matter of purely material benefits and disbenefits: see e.g. In re IH (A Child) (Permission to Apply for Adoption) [2014] 1 FLR 70 , paras 92-99, per Pauffley J. The potential emotional impact upon a child (not just at the moment of adoption, but later in life as well) of the bringing to an end of one parent/child relationship and its replacement by another may be a highly significant factor. The significance of it may increase where the child is taken from a relationship in one country and made the subject of a new relationship in a different country. Had the application and appeal turned on the assessment of whether the conferral of British citizenship was a benefit of such weight as to justify the making of an adoption order, I would have wished to see a closer examination by the court at first instance of the context and of the non-material, emotional benefits and disbenefits which might be associated with the taking of such a step.” And (emphasis added): “[41] Parliament has made a deliberate change in section 1(2) in specifying the period in relation to which the impacts (both positive and negative) of adoption for a child should be brought into account for the purpose of determining what is for the welfare of the child as being “throughout his life”, by contrast with the more limited period specified in section 6 of the 1976 Act (“throughout his childhood”). Apart from this change, the basic structure of section 1(2) remains the same as for section 6 , namely that in relation to assessment by reference to the relevant period the child’s interests are treated as paramount or a first consideration and that all practical benefits and disbenefits for the child (including those which would accrue as a result of any automatic conferral of citizenship under section 1(5) of the 1981 Act) are treated as relevant matters. Like section 6 of the 1976 Act , section 1(2) of the 2002 Act cannot be construed as containing any artificial limitation on what types of benefit are capable of counting as a relevant matter when considering whether an adoption order should be made. Therefore, in my view, the points made by Lord Hoffmann in In re B by reference to the then relevant period under section 6 for bringing benefits into account (during childhood) at p 141C—F, set out above, apply with similar effect in relation to the new relevant period under section 1(2) (throughout the child’s life). [42] The result of this is that if, after taking account of the practical benefits of adoption for a child throughout his life , it can be seen that it best promotes the child’s welfare that he be adopted by a British citizen so as automatically to acquire British citizenship under section 1(5) of the 1981 Act, the court should ordinarily make the adoption order which is sought. Just as for the first of the periods considered by Lord Hoffmann in the context of applying section 6 of the 1976 Act in In re B, the state’s interest in maintaining effective immigration controls will have very little significance. It will not be appropriate for a court to refuse to make the order as some sort of indirect means of reinforcing immigration controls.” SUBMISSIONS The Secretary of State

61. It is convenient to deal first with the submissions of the Secretary of State, in circumstances where, whilst neutral on the merits of D’s application, the Secretary of State makes submissions as to the correct legal approach to be adopted when the court is determining the application.

62. The submissions of the Secretary of State are made in the context of her having overall responsibility for policy and regulation in respect of adoption. The Secretary of State is concerned that a recent increase in cases involving Nigerian adoptions have exposed the potential for the significant policy concerns which gave rise to Nigeria being subject to special restrictions pursuant to s.9 of the 2006 Act escaping express consideration by the court where the case proceeds as a domestic adoption or an application for recognition of the foreign adoption. The Secretary of State is concerned as to the possibility that a more relaxed approach might be perceived to exist under these routes, encouraging attempts to circumvent the strict requirements of intercountry adoption and the special restrictions controls. The Secretary of State invites the court, if appropriate, to provide guidance to address this situation.

63. With respect to cases falling within the scope of s.83 of the 2002 Act , and hence cases in which the restrictions imposed by s.9 of the 2006 Act apply, Mr Tyzack submits that whilst non-compliance with s.83 of the 2002 does not prevent the court from making an adoption order, the court should follow the approach in Re X (Intercountry Adoption: Kafala: Non-compliance s.83 ACA 2002 ) [2024] EWHC 3198 (Fam) . Namely that in cases of non-compliance an adoption order may only be made “in the most exceptional circumstances that are demanded by the child’s welfare interest throughout his or her life” and that, in circumstances where s.83 of the 2002 Act provides important safeguards for children and must be complied with on penalty of criminal sanction, non-compliance is “likely to lead to an adoption order being refused by the court.” Where, in addition to falling within the scope of s.83 of the 2002 Act , a case consequently engages restrictions imposed pursuant to s.9 of the 2006 Act , Mr Tyzack further submits that the court will also need to satisfy itself that the concerns leading to the special restrictions being imposed on the country in question have been addressed and allayed by the applicant, having regard to the list of the matters which must be taken into account pursuant to r.6 of the 2008 Regulations.

64. In respect of cases that fall outside the scope of s.83 of the 2002 Act , and hence outside the special restrictions regime having regard to the terms of s.9(2) of the 2006 Act , Mr Tyzack submits that, where the case nonetheless concerns a domestic adoption in respect of a child who is a national of a country on the Restricted List, it will remain incumbent on the court to satisfy itself that the concerns leading to the special restrictions have been addressed and allayed by the applicant. Mr Tyzack submits that in such cases a careful analysis must be undertaken with respect to the impact of the country of origin being subject to special restrictions, in line with analysis that would have been carried out by the Secretary of State had an exception request been made in accordance with r.6 of the 2008 Regulations. Mr Tyzack relied by analogy on a series of recognition decisions in which the fact of Nigeria being the subject of special restrictions had been taken account, even though s.83 of the 2002 Act was not engaged (see KN and BN v RN v TN and SSHD [2023] EWHC 712, Re G (Recognition of Nigerian Adoption) [2024] EWHC 2769, Re C (Recognition of Nigerian Adoption) [2025] EWHC 204 and KA and another v B [2025] 1 FLR 1120 ). DD

65. Ms Allman submits on behalf of D that the facts of this case do not come within s.83 of the 2002 Act , Ms Allman contending that s.83(1) (b) does not apply in circumstances where F entered the jurisdiction more than twelve months after her purported adoption in Nigeria and s.83(1) (a) is not engaged as the evidence demonstrates that D did not bring F to England for the purposes of adoption. With respect to the latter submission, Ms Allman contends that the evidence points to D having believed that she had already adopted F at the point at which F entered the jurisdiction. Ms Allman relies on the fact that D made an immigration application for F in the category ‘Family-child applicant’ and that notice of intention to adopt was not given by D until August 2024.

66. Ms Allman submits that in circumstances where the cases falls outside the scope of s.83 of the 2002 Act , and hence outside the application of the special restrictions regime having regard to the terms of s.9(2) of the 2006 Act , the court should reject the submissions of the Secretary of State as to the proper course to be followed where a case does not engage s.83 of the 2002 Act but the child is a national of a country on the Restricted List. Ms Allman submits that to impose the approach contended for by the Secretary of State in all cases involving an external adoption from a country on the Restricted List, regardless of whether s.83 of the 2002 Act is applicable, would be to exceed the limits of the restrictions scheme which Parliament has seen fit to impose by precisely aligning the terms of s.9(2) of the 2006 Act with the terms of s.83(1) of the 2002 Act . Ms Allman submits that it was open to Parliament to set a different threshold in adoption applications that do not infringe s.83 of the 2002 Act but involve countries on the Restricted List, but that it did not do so.

67. Rather, Ms Allman submits that in a case concerning a country on the Restricted List that does not engage s.83 , the welfare assessment which the court is required to undertake pursuant to s.1 of the 2002 Act is already broad enough to include taking into consideration all the circumstances of the individual child and how they came to be in the United Kingdom in circumstances where policy considerations do not become irrelevant just because a case falls out with s.83 of the 2002 Act . In this context, Ms Allman argues, by parity of reasoning with Re L (Commercial Surrogacy) [2010] EWHC 3146, that it will only be in the clearest case of the abuse of public policy that the court will be able to withhold an order if welfare considerations otherwise support it being made.

68. With respect to the question of welfare, Ms Allman submits that “F ... has a strong and loving relationship with the applicant.” Ms Allman submits that F is a mature and intelligent young woman who wishes to be adopted by the applicant, that the applicant is best placed to understand F’s cultural and identity needs and that F has a particular need for stability, security and permanence in light of her history of loss. Ms Allman emphasises what she submits will be the negative impact on F’s emotional wellbeing and sense of security of being left in a position where she knows that the only person who is legally her parent, namely her father, is unable to fulfil that role and did not want to continue to have that role. As to the negative impact on F of her ties to her family being severed, Ms Allman submits that this must be viewed through the lens of F having already been adopted by D in Nigeria. Ms Allman further emphasises the grant of British citizenship arising from an adoption order being made in favour of the applicant as a key aspect of F’s long term stability and security and that the order must be made before her 18 th birthday pursuant to s.1(5) of the British Nationality Act 1981 .

69. If, contrary to her primary submission, the court finds a breach of s.83(1) of the 2002 Act has occurred, or accedes to the Secretary of State’s submission as to the approach to be adopted where a domestic adoption is sought in respect of a child who is a national of a country on the Restricted List notwithstanding there being no breach of s.83 , Ms Allman submits that F’s best interests outweigh any public policy consideration against granting an adoption.

70. Finally, Ms Allman submits that the applicant and F enjoy de facto family life within the meaning of Art 8 and that a decision not to grant an adoption order would represent a disproportionate interference in those rights in circumstances where (a) it would fail to legally recognise the de facto relationship between the applicant and F, (b) it would result in F being in a state of “limping” parentage where her father’s parental responsibility has been removed in Nigeria but not in England and Wales, leaving her in “legal limbo”, and (c) the applicant and F would be separated after June 2027 when F’s immigration clearance expires. The Father

71. The father largely adopts the submissions made by Ms Allman on behalf of D. Namely, that the facts of this case fall outside the scope of s.83(1) of the 2002 Act but that, if they do not, the court should in this case grant an adoption order notwithstanding any non-compliance in circumstances where F’s best interests outweigh any public policy consideration against granting an adoption. The Local Authority

72. The local authority opposes an adoption order being made with respect to F in favour of D and relies on the Annex A reports assessing D as unsuitable to adopt F.

73. With respect to s.83(1) (a) of the 2002 Act , on behalf of the local authority Ms Gilliatt submits that documentary evidence that has been produced from Nigeria is so riddled with inconsistencies and so lacking in credibility that it calls into question how D could have thought she was participating in a legitimate process that led to her lawfully adopting F in Nigeria. Ms Gilliatt submits that, rather, the evidence demonstrates that D brought F into the United Kingdom “for the purposes of adoption”.

74. Mrs Gilliatt points to the evidence demonstrating that, whilst D now asserts she did not intend to bring F to England, five of the documents contained in the papers recovered from Nigeria by D state that D did intend to take F with her to the United Kingdom. Ms Gilliatt also relies on the social worker’s evidence that D stated to her that “It was always the plan to bring her here eventually” and the fact that her explanations evolved in the course of her oral evidence, D relying on difficulties regarding international travel during the Covid-19 pandemic some months before that pandemic affected international travel and then that she “was too busy” to make the required visa arrangements for F. Finally, with respect to its submission that there has been a breach of s.83(1) (a) of the 2002 Act in this case, the local authority rely on F’s own statement to the social worker that she had been told by D and her father in 2021 ahead of her travelling to England that “I was going to be adopted, I was told it’s for me to live a good life because he was struggling”.

75. The local authority concedes that the court may make an adoption order notwithstanding a failure to comply with s.83(1) of the 2002 Act . However, and whether the case falls within or without the scope of s.83 , the local authority relies on the conclusion of its Annex A reports to make good its case that D is not a suitable adopter for F.

76. In particular, in contending forcefully that an adoption order would not meet F’s best interests throughout her life, the local authority relies on what it submits are the egregious contradictions and deficiencies in the documentation in this case and the risk that F has been trafficked or exploited, the uncertainty regarding the identity and family history of F, D’s equivocal attitude to the adoption, D’s lack of insight into the emotional needs of F (including permitting F to share a bed with her) and the evidence of a domestically abusive home environment over an extended period of time which had not resulted in any protective measures being taken to safeguard F. Mrs Gilliatt submits that the court would not contemplate making a domestic adoption order with respect to a native child in these circumstances and that a foreign national child in such a situation should not be treated differently by reason of the court being presented by the proposed adopter with an apparent fait accompli . The Children’s Guardian

77. On behalf of the Children’s Guardian, Ms LeCointe submitted that it is in F’s best interests for an adoption order to be made in favour of D without further delay. The Children’s Guardian did not resile in oral evidence from the statement, set out in Ms LeCointe’s written submissions, that “there are no safeguarding concerns in this case”. On behalf of the Children’s Guardian, Ms LeCointe submits that the court can be satisfied on the evidence of the Children’s Guardian that F and D have a warm and affectionate relationship and that the evidence demonstrates that F regards D “as her mother”. In the foregoing circumstances, on behalf of the Children’s Guardian, Ms LeCointe submits that: “F’s welfare overwhelmingly supports the making of an adoption in favour of the Applicant. It also accords with her clearly stated wishes.” DISCUSSION

78. Having regard to the comprehensive submissions of counsel, and the evidence before the court, I am satisfied that D brought F into the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption within the meaning of s.83(1) (a) of the 2002 Act . As such, I am satisfied that the court must determine whether public policy requires that D’s application should be refused, while giving paramount consideration to the welfare of F throughout her life. I am further satisfied that having regard to considerations of public policy while giving paramount consideration to the welfare of F throughout her life, D’s application for an adoption order must be refused. My reasons for so deciding are as follows. Legal Framework

79. I deal first with the legal framework that falls to be applied in this matter. I am satisfied that there are four key operative principles having regard to the statute and case law set out above.

80. First, this case will fall within s.83 of the 2002 Act if one or other or both of the two limbs of s.83(1) are made out. With respect to s.83(1) (a), the limb will be met in this case if D, as a person habitually resident in the British Islands, brought F into the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption. With respect to the meaning of “for the purposes of adoption” I adopt the formulation set out by Cobb J (as he then was) in Re A and B (Adoption: . Namely, the phrase “for the purpose of adoption” in Section 83 ACA 2002 ) s.83(1) (a) conveys the reason or intent behind an action or decision. In this context, the action is entering the United Kingdom and the specific reason or intent is obtaining an adoption order in respect of F through the English courts. With respect to s.83(1) (b) of the 2002 Act , that limb will be met if D brought F into the United Kingdom within the period of twelve months after the external adoption in Nigeria was effected on 14 November 2019.

81. Second, if either limb of s.83(1) is made out in this case then, pursuant to s.9(2) of the 2006 Act , the special restrictions put in place by the Secretary of State on the grounds that it is contrary to public policy to further the bringing of children into the United Kingdom from Nigeria will apply in this case, and D will have been required to comply with the terms of those restrictions and to have sought an exception from the Secretary of State.

82. Third, if either limb of s.83(1) is made out in this case, and the special restrictions put in place by the Secretary of State under the 2006 Act therefore apply, the court is not precluded from making a domestic adoption order. In deciding whether to make an adoption order, the court must undertake a careful analysis of both public policy and welfare and determine whether public policy requires that D’s application should be refused, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of F throughout her life.

83. Fourth and finally, if neither of the limbs in s.83(1) are made out in this case and, in consequence, the special restrictions put in place by the Secretary of State under the 2006 Act do not apply, then in deciding whether to make an adoption order the court must have regard to matters set out in s.1 of the 2002 Act .

84. Two further legal issues arose in this case ancillary to the operative principles I have set out above. First, the extent to which the court should apply a “most exceptional circumstances” test when deciding whether to make an adoption order in cases where s.83(1) of the 2002 Act is engaged. Second, whether and in what manner, in a case in which the country in question is on the Restricted List, the court should factor that in when deciding whether to make an adoption order in cases where s.83(1) of the 2002 Act is engaged and in cases where it is not.

85. With respect to the first issue, I am not satisfied that there is a heightened test for making an adoption order in a case in which there has been non-compliance s.83 of the 2002 Act . Whilst in In Re X (Intercountry Adoption: Kafala: Non-compliance HHJ Moradifar, sitting as a High Court judge, held that in cases of non-compliance an adoption order may only be made in “the most exceptional circumstances”, I am not able to agree with that conclusion. s.83 ACA 2002 )

86. There is nothing in the statutory language of the 2002 Act that warrants importing a “most exceptional circumstances” test into s.1 of the 2002 Act when the court is considering whether to make an adoption order notwithstanding non-compliance with s.83 . Whilst HHJ Moradifar placed reliance on the observation of Cobb J (as he was) in Re A (Adoption: at [43] that, exceptionally, an order could be made in the context of non-compliance where to refuse the application would be materially to deny rights under Art 8, I do not believe that Cobb J intended thereby to introduce an exceptional circumstances test. Rather, the relevant passage makes clear that Cobb J was doing no more than re-stating the proposition that it is not open to the court to refuse relief if to do so would result in a breach of Art 8 that could not be justified by reference to Art 8(2). In the circumstances, Cobb J was simply describing the exception to the application of the statutory regime that s.83 ACA 2002 ) necessarily follows in such circumstances from the requirement of s.6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 .

87. I am, accordingly, not able to accept the submission of the Secretary of State that Re X (Intercountry Adoption: Kafala: Non-compliance sets out the proper approach to making an adoption order where there has been non-compliance of s.83 ACA 2002 ) s.83(1) of the Act . Rather, as made clear in the long line of authority set out above, the court must undertake a careful analysis of both public policy and welfare and determine whether public policy requires that D’s application should be refused, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of F throughout her life. Where welfare and public policy point towards differing outcomes for the child, welfare will prevail as it is paramount. The court will not refuse an order where to do so would be materially to deny the rights of the child and the applicant under Art 8. Each case will turn on its own facts.

88. With respect to the second issue, I am not satisfied the court is required to adopt a materially different approach to that set out in the last paragraph in a case where there has been a breach of s.83(1) of the 2002 Act and the country in question is on the Restricted List. The 2006 Act and the 2008 Regulations provide the legal framework for the decision of the Secretary of State to grant or refuse an exception request. Questions of the standard of review to be applied to that decision (whether “pay[ing] extra special attention” or applying “anxious scrutiny”, to use the phrases in Mr Tyzack’s Skeleton Argument, or otherwise) may fall for consideration in the context of a judicial review. In circumstances where the court is coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child, the legal framework the court is required to apply when deciding whether public policy requires that an adoption application should be refused, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of child throughout his or her life, is that contained in s.1 of the 2002 Act .

89. As such, in a case where there has been non-compliance with s.83 of the 2002 Act in a case involving a country on the Restricted List and, in consequence, special restrictions apply, the court’s task will remain to undertake a careful analysis of both public policy and welfare and determine whether public policy requires the application should be refused, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of child throughout his or her life. This approach is well able to accommodate the applicability of special restrictions, being as they are a specific incidence of public policy militating against the granting of an adoption order that falls to be placed in the balance accordingly. Again, where welfare and public policy point towards differing outcomes for the child, the child’s welfare will prevail. Again, the court will not refuse an order where to do so would be materially to deny the rights of the child and the applicant under Art 8. Again, each case will turn on its own facts.

90. Finally with respect to the legal framework, I am satisfied that the position will be different in a case where there has been no non-compliance with s.83 but the country involved is one to which the special restrictions have been applied by the Secretary of State. Where the facts of the case do not engage s.83 then, under the terms of s.9(2) of the 2006 Act , the restrictions imposed by the Secretary of State will not be operative in that case. In such circumstances, whilst facts arising from the difficulties that caused the restriction to be imposed by the Secretary of State may properly inform the welfare analysis (including but not limited to inconsistences in the evidence, unreliable documentation, difficulties with confirming the identity, background and adoptability of the child, concerns regarding the integrity of the foreign process and concerns regarding actions of the foreign authorities), it is difficult to see how the question of public policy, as opposed to a straightforward welfare analysis, can determine the outcome where Parliament has decided, by the terms of s.9(2) of the Act , that the restrictions only operate where s.83 of the 2002 Act is engaged.

91. In summary therefore, having regard to the legal analysis set out above, I am satisfied that within the legal framework I have described above the analytical stages in this case are as follows: i) Do the facts of the case bring it within s.83 of the 2002 Act by reason of one or other or both of the two limbs of s.83(1) being made out? ii) If the facts of the case bring it within s.83 of the 2002, does public policy require that D’s application for an adoption order should be refused, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of F throughout her life? iii) If the facts of the case do not bring it within s.83 of the 2002, having regard to the matters set out in s.1 of the 2002 Act , is it in F’s best interests for an adoption order to be made? Merits

92. Before applying this legal framework to the facts of the case, it is important to make clear that, save for the limited accounts provided by F, I have not been able to treat any of the evidence concerning the circumstances by which F came to be the subject of a domestic adoption application by D as reliable.

93. D’s oral evidence was unconvincing and I was left with significant reservations regarding her credibility. Time and again she dissembled or resorted to unjustified accusations of racism and dishonesty against the social worker when inconvenient prior statements were put to her. Over the course of her evidence D increasingly gave the impression of not being invested in adopting F, instead placing responsibility for that outcome solely on the father. At times, her evidence suggested someone who had been utilised to achieve the aims of others, who had little or no agency and who was fabricating matters after the fact to justify the current position. Where there is a difference in the accounts provided by D and the social worker, I unhesitatingly prefer the evidence of the social worker, which I found to be perceptive and considered. Whilst it was not possible for the father to give evidence and be cross-examined, his written evidence is self-evidently contradictory in places. Third parties who could shed light on those inconsistencies, in particular his brother and his lawyer, are now declared by the father to be dead. As can be seen from the account of the documentation from Nigeria set out above, there are manifest difficulties with the reliability of that evidence. There has been no application in this case for permission to adduce expert evidence to demonstrate the validity of the purported Nigerian adoption.

94. Accordingly, whilst relied on as established facts by D and the father, and seemingly taken at face value by the Children’s Guardian without any further enquiry, I am not able to proceed on the basis that it has been established to the satisfaction of the court that F is the daughter of the father, that F’s mother is deceased, that D lawfully adopted F in Nigeria, that D paid for F’s education or that it is D who desires for F to be adopted in this jurisdiction.

95. In the foregoing context, I turn first to whether the facts of the case bring it within s.83 of the 2002 Act . It is plain that F entered the jurisdiction more than twelve months after her purported adoption by D in Nigeria. In such circumstances, were the adoption order in Nigeria to be valid, I am satisfied that the case falls outside the terms of s.83(1) (b) of the 2002 Act . However, I am satisfied that D brought F to the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption and that, accordingly, s.83(1) (a) is engaged in this case.

96. As Cobb J (as he then was) made clear in Re A (Adoption: , in deciding whether Section 83 ACA 2002 ) s.83(1) (a) of the 2002 Act is engaged the court is examining whether D took a specific action, namely bringing F into the United Kingdom, for a specific purpose, namely to obtain an adoption order through the English courts. It need not be the case that this was D’s sole or dominant objective and it is the subjective intention of D that will be relevant. Whilst the argument is often made, as it is in this case, that the fact that the prospective adopter has already adopted the child in a foreign jurisdiction demonstrates that they did not bring the child into the United Kingdom, Cobb J further made clear in Re A (Adoption: that the existence of a prior adoption is not determinative either way in relation to Section 83 ACA 2002 ) s.83 , which requires a careful and holistic analysis of all the evidence.

97. The evidence from Nigeria in this case is unreliable. However, a clear pattern does emerge in the documents from that jurisdiction with respect to D’s intention that F would live with her in England as her adopted child. This is the position described in five of the documents recovered from Nigeria by D as described above. I accept that there is difficulty relying on that evidence by itself. However, it is important to take account of the fact that F herself, in respect of whom there has been no suggestion that she lacks credibility, told the social worker the following (emphasis added): “When asked about her trip to London in 2021, F told me that: ‘ They said I was going to be adopted , I was told it’s for me to live a good life because he was struggling. All I know is I’m going to live a good life and have everything I’ve dreamt of’”.

98. Ms LeCointe did not seek, on behalf of F, to challenge the accuracy of this record. I accept the account of the social worker. I acknowledge that D’s account of F coming for a holiday contradicts the documents from Nigeria. However, that account was given only after this court had directed evidence as to the issue of whether D had brought F into the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption. Finally, and in addition to the clear statement by F to the social worker, when the application was made for entry clearance, D contended both F’s parents were dead. I am satisfied that this was stated on D’s instruction and not because of a mistake on the part of her then solicitors. The visa application contained in the bundle also contains no mention of an adoption having taken place in Nigeria, by which D had purportedly adopted F in that jurisdiction.

99. Having regard to the foregoing evidence, and in particular to F’s clear and unchallenged statement to the social worker, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the subjective intention of D at the time she brought F to the United Kingdom was to obtain an adoption order through the English courts.

100. In circumstances where, accordingly, s.83(1) (a) of the 2002 Act is engaged in this case, I turn next to the question of whether public policy requires that D’s application for an adoption order in respect of F should be refused, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of F throughout her life? I begin with the question of public policy.

101. As this court observed in B v B and Ors ( at [54]: Section 83 and Step-Parent Adoption) “54. As recognised by Cobb J (as he then was) in Re A and B (Adoption: , Section 83 ACA 2002 ) s.83 and Part 2 of the AFER 2005 are targeted at potentially unsuitable carers seeking to bring unrelated infants to this jurisdiction to create a family by way of adoption. Section 83 of the 2002 Act and Part 2 of the AFER 2005 were enacted in the context of cases in which applicants pursued international adoptions in circumstances where the exchange of money risked the creation of a market in foreign children to adopt and the concomitant exploitation of women in often disadvantaged and vulnerable socio-economic positions. Parliament’s intention in creating and enacting s.83 of the 2002 Act was to address cases in which prospective adopters brought into the jurisdiction a child who was a stranger to them for the purposes of adoption, often having made payment to secure the child and without any or any adequate assessment of their ability to meet the needs of the child, after that child had been removed from his or her birth mother in circumstances that induced or pressured the mother to part with her child.”

102. The public policy reflected in s.83 of the 2002 Act is that of preventing harm to children arising out of cross-border adoptions that may involve exchange of money and the concomitant exploitation of women in disadvantaged and vulnerable socio-economic positions. Whilst a breach of s.83 of the 2002 Act does not prevent an adoption order being made, it is important, in circumstances where s.83 of the 2002 Act has been put in place by Parliament in order to protect children from exploitation and harm in the context of cross-border adoption, that this principle is kept within proper bounds so as not to undermine the protection afforded to children. In R (on the application of Thomson) v Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] EWHC 1378 (Admin) [2006] 1 FLR 175 , quoting the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Recommendation 1443(2000) – ‘ International Adoption: respecting children’s rights ’, Munby J (as he then was) observed that the purpose of international adoption must be to provide children with a parent or parents in a way that respects their rights and noted the Council’s concern that receiving countries perpetuate “a stubbornly prejudiced belief in the advantages for a foreign child of being adopted and living in a rich country.”

103. The importance of the strong public interest in ensuring that foreign children are not harmed through adoption by a British resident grounded in inadequate processes or exploitative circumstances abroad is further illuminated in this case by the 2006 Act . Parliament has expressly legislated to restrict adoptions involving Nigeria on the grounds that the Secretary of State has reason to believe that, because of practices taking place in Nigeria in connection with the adoption of children, it would be contrary to public policy to further the bringing of children into the United Kingdom from Nigeria in the cases that come within s.83(1) of the 2002 Act . In circumstances where s.83(1) (a) is operative in this case, the special restrictions imposed under the 2006 Act apply. D made no application to be granted an exception to those restrictions.

104. This case demonstrates each of the difficulties that caused the Secretary of State to impose restrictions on Nigeria, as set out in the list of countries where special restrictions are in place under the 2006 Act . There are difficulties confirming F’s background and her adoptability. The court has seen photographs of photographs of three different birth certificates, including one purporting to be original but not drawn until 9 years after the date of birth given for F. There is no reliable proof of F’s paternity and, therefore, of whether the person purporting to consent to her adoption was entitled to. There is no reliable information that the mother of F is in fact deceased. The accounts before the court provide at least three different dates of death and no original copy of the death certificate (I do note that F, about whom I am satisfied there are no concerns about her credibility, states that her mother died in 2010 but this must be viewed in the context of problematic evidence I have described). The documentation relating to the purported Nigerian adoption itself is unreliable. D contends that an affidavit in her name is a forgery and disputes a social enquiry report that states she is related to the father. At the same time she relies on an adoption certificate that names only her and is not sealed and an adoption bond that is not complete. The evidence as to consent refers to an aunt and uncle and not to the father. Concerns about child trafficking within Nigeria and corruption in the Nigerian adoption system are not only established to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State but are seen in other cases (see most recently Re EZ (A Minor)(Care Proceedings: Nigerian Fertility Clinic & Maternity Hospital) [2025] EWFC 122 ).

105. In the foregoing circumstances, I am satisfied that there exist strong public policy reasons for refusing to make an adoption order in favour of D, unless F’s welfare points in the opposite direction. Having regard to the matters set in s.1 of the 2002 Act , and holding F’s welfare throughout her life as my paramount consideration, I am satisfied that it does not.

106. The local authority concedes that F has expressed a wish to live with D and be adopted by her. I acknowledge that F has expressed this ambition. F and D share a national, tribal and cultural heritage. However, whilst the wishes and feelings of a 17 year old young person carry great weight, I also have regard to the fact that F’s ability to remain in this jurisdiction, and to continue her education here is, at least as she currently understands it, dependent on D adopting her. It is clear from the evidence of the social worker that F links her expressed wishes strongly to her ability to remain in the United Kingdom and continue with her education. I accept the evidence of the social worker that “The word “love” was not mentioned by F when asked about her wishes and feelings in respect of the adoption; the response was very much focused around her current immigration concerns.” Whilst the report of the Children’s Guardian records that F “loves living in the UK with her mum”, that exchange too centred on F’s work to get her grades, and the fact that “D takes care of her, she purchased her a phone, laptop and tablet so that she can do her homework and conduct research.” I of course bear in mind that F has stated that she will “hang myself” if the court does not make an adoption order. However, I also note there is no suggestion that F struggles with her mental health or been referred in respect of, or has taken medication in respect of, a mental health condition.

107. I accept that F needs stability and security throughout her life. F has remained in the United Kingdom since her arrival in May 2021. In the short to medium term F has the security of D sharing parental responsibility for her in this jurisdiction until she is an adult and has immigration clearance until November 2027.

108. On behalf of D, Ms Allman placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal in S v Bradford Metropolitan District Council and another . I accept that in that case the Court of Appeal held that a court is entitled to take into account in the current context the benefits of being adopted by a British citizen so as automatically to acquire British citizenship under section 1(5) of the 1981 Act . There would indeed be such benefits to F, including the continued company and support of D and a degree of certainty regarding the continuity of her education. However, in S v Bradford Metropolitan District Council and another the Court of Appeal made clear that the position falls to be evaluated in the context of what the Court termed “the practical benefits of adoption for a child throughout his life”. Thus, the immigration status conferred by adoption is not a trump card and falls to be evaluated as one factor amongst the other factors informing the court’s analysis (this being necessary to avoid the creation of a parallel immigration structure that cuts across the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Home Department).

109. With respect to the likely effect on F, throughout her life, of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person, Ms Allman seeks to downplay the significance of this factor in circumstances where F has already been adopted by D. However, there are a number of difficulties with that submission. First, and for the reasons I have given, the court cannot be satisfied that F has, in fact, been lawfully adopted by D in Nigeria or, indeed, that F is the daughter of the father or that F’s mother is, in fact, deceased. Second, and as I shall come to below, whatever the true legal and filial position in Nigeria, it is plain from her response to the social worker that F still regards those in Nigeria as her family. In the circumstances, the likely effect on F, throughout her life, of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person cannot simply be discounted by reference to the alleged Nigerian adoption.

110. Whilst the Children’s Guardian contends that “there are no safeguarding concerns in this case”, I am satisfied that F has, in fact, suffered and is at risk of suffering harm within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 .

111. I am conscious that I have not heard from BD. However, on the accounts provided by both D and F there is evidence that F was exposed to domestic abuse in D’s home, both by witnessing the abuse of D and by way of emotional and physical abuse from D’s husband. In the circumstances, despite D contending that F has a better life with her, F has been subjected to domestic abuse by her purported adoptive father and has witnessed her purported adoptive mother being subjected to domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour from the point of her being brought into the country in 2021 until the last known incident in February 2025. During the course of that last incident, F had to take protective action to safeguard D and herself by calling the police.

112. The fact that F was witnessing and being subjected to domestic abuse in D’s home, that was not brought to the attention of the authorities until F herself took action, also grounds a risk of future harm. Whilst D asserts that she is now seeking to divorce her husband, the court has seen no evidence of a divorce petition having been issued. I accept the evidence that, at a home visit on 5 November 2025, D was still wearing a gold ring on her wedding finger and that two wedding pictures on the wall in the living room that had been noted during earlier visits were still present. The GP report on D dated 28 November 2025 states “Reports current relationship abuse with [BD]” (emphasis added).

113. The Children’s Guardian rejected out of hand the possibility that F has been the victim of child trafficking. Indeed, the Children’s Guardian does not consider the import of the Nigerian documents at all in her report, simply stating that “I believe that this is a matter that the Local Authority should have spent more time exploring so that these questions could be answered rather than causing more unfounded speculation.” Leaving aside how an English local authority was to explore these matters in Nigeria, it is self-evident that the welfare analysis required by s.1 of the 2002 Act should include an examination of how and why a prospective adopter has come to care for the child.

114. As I have concluded, the documentation from Nigeria is so problematic in this case that the court is not able to proceed on the basis that it has been established that F is the daughter of the father, that F’s mother is deceased, that D lawfully adopted F in Nigeria, that D paid for F’s education in Nigeria or that it is D who desires for F to be adopted by her in this jurisdiction. I accept the evidence of the social worker that during her visit F appeared quiet, that she did not volunteer information and appeared guarded around questions in relation to her birth family and her feelings with respect to adoption. F’s school also describe her as “very quiet”. On D’s own account, she did not involve the police or safeguarding agencies during the period in which F was witnessing and being subjected to domestic abuse. F related that after the incident of 20 February 2025, D’s husband had continued to harass her by phone making demands that she does things for him. It has not been possible to examine the motivation of BD (who on D’s account is a violent and controlling man who married her to obtain immigration clearance) for wanting to adopt F. Some of the evidence suggests that BD is a friend of the father’s. As is clear from the matters set out above, F gives a different version of why she was brought to England (to be adopted) than that given by D (for a holiday). As I will come to, in oral evidence, D was not able to remember the names of the children who are said to be F’s half-siblings. The social worker is correct to remind the court in this context of the “huge imbalance of resources” as between D and F’s birth family. Again, concerns about child trafficking within Nigeria and corruption in the Nigerian adoption system are established to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State and are seen in other cases.

115. Given the matters summarised in the last paragraph, the criticism levelled by the Children’s Guardian at the social worker for raising the possibility of trafficking is not justified. I am satisfied that the local authority was right to examine the possibility of trafficking in this case and to bring it to the attention of the court. It is a matter of significant concern to the court that the Children’s Guardian did not do so. Whilst the matters set out above do not permit a finding on the balance of probabilities that F has been trafficked to this jurisdiction, in my judgement, in the context of the manifest difficulties with the evidence relied on by D from Nigeria, they further militate against a conclusion that it is in F’s best interests to be made the subject of an adoption order in favour of D.

116. Continuing with the matters set out in s.1 of the 2002 Act , F has a continuing relationship with the man who is said to be her birth father and his family. The likelihood of that relationship continuing, and the value of that relationship for F, is demonstrated clearly in the evidence of social worker. When she asked F to tell her about “family and home”, F referred to those she considered her family in Nigeria rather than D, stating that “They’re lovely but just poor.” In this way F immediately and without hesitation linked “family” to family in Nigeria. The social worker noted that F did not hesitate in answering this way, nor did she say that she views herself as having two families or that she has one family now with D being part of that. F maintains contact with the father and calls him regularly. I accept the evidence of the social worker that F told her that she views D as a “mother figure”, rather than describing her as like her mother, or that she considers herself to have two mothers. In light of this evidence, D’s claim that the father has no desire for F to return, “very much views F as my responsibility” and that if she is not adopted by D there are concerns about who will provide F with a secure environment in which she can develop takes on a different resonance. Whilst on behalf of D Ms Allman submits that if F is not made the subject of an adoption order in this jurisdiction, she will have different statuses in England and in Nigeria, that submission is predicated on there having been a lawful adoption in Nigeria, of which the court cannot be satisfied for the reasons I have given.

117. The Children’s Guardian concludes in her report that “F and D have formed a strong bond that appears to be getting them both through the difficult times together.” With respect to the relationship which F has with D, D contends that she provides F with a sense of security and that F is “very dependent on her”. D asserts that an adoption order would make F feel more secure and that not to make the order would deprive her of a mother and daughter relationship that is important to her, separating her from the person with whom she does everything and who she considers to be her mother. D told the social worker “She (meaning F) means a lot to me; she is like my daughter. When I saw her; from the day I saw her; she was 7 at the time; I just fell in love with her”. The difficulty with these assertions is that, from my assessment of D’s evidence, her views are in fact far more equivocal.

118. Whilst account must be taken of the stressful nature of the witness box, as D’s oral evidence developed the court became increasingly concerned that she was indifferent to the outcome of her own application for an adoption order. The genesis of this concern is to be found in the Annex A reports. I accept the evidence of the social worker that, when questioned on whether her inability to have children caused her to think of adoption, D replied that “Do you think I would go for F if I wanted to adopt a child?” When the social worker asked why not, D’s reply was “Because she has a father”. Asked by the social worker about what she thought of adopting a child who had a surviving parent, D told the social worker that “it’s what he [the father] wants; not me; he did all the paperwork about the adoption.” I further accept the evidence of the social worker as set out in the Annex A report: “She also said about the adoption that: ‘If I knew it was gonna be like this; I would not have done it. They can have an interview with F’s dad as well; they think I have planned it; to bring F here; to adopt her; I am doing a favour; to help the family; it was the dad who came up with the idea of adoption; not me.’”

119. The foregoing views of D recorded in the written evidence were apparent during the course of her oral evidence. In describing her position in the process in Nigeria, D told the court “The only thing I know is when I went to Nigeria I saw [the documents], I had nothing to do with it at all.” With respect to the adoption, D told the court “it’s what he [the father] wants, not me” and “I don’t have to be adopting F, it is the father that made that suggestion, if I want to adopt a child I am not going to go for one with a father, I can do surrogacy, I can do anything. I am just helping.” This caused the court to ask D whether she actually wanted to adopt F, to which she replied “I am caring for F and that is all I am doing. I am beginning to regret ever helping the man. If the father wants me to adopt her I am prepared to adopt her and to keep caring for her. That is what African women do.” Even in re-examination by Ms Allman, D would only go as far as saying “I do want to adopt her, for her to be able to stay, because that is what she wants, for a better life and I am quite happy to help.” I accept the account of the social worker in the second Annex A report that “D told me her reason for applying for an Adoption Order for F is to secure her immigration status.” In this context, a further exchange during cross-examination concerned D’s feelings after F was granted a child-family visa in 2021: “Why do I have to be happy about her staying, I have a lawyer. If it is not possible to stay, I have to take her back. That lawyer didn’t tell me that it was not recognised in the UK, that is why I got a lawyer to ask it was possible...I am trying to help, it is not my intention to adopt F, it just happens. She says she does not want to go back so that is OK.”

120. It is surely axiomatic that it is not in a child’s best interests to be adopted by a person who is, at best, equivocal about whether they wish the adoption to take place. The impression given by D’s evidence was that she was disengaged from the process in Nigeria and ambiguous in her feelings with respect to her own application in this jurisdiction. I accept the evidence of the social worker in cross-examination that “I am not sure I would use the word family, I don’t get the feeling of a family, I get the feeling of D wanting to help, the words she has used herself.” The court was left with the strong impression that D is not choosing to adopt F as her daughter, but is pursuing her application reluctantly because that is the obligation placed upon her by the father and her perceived duty. There was no sense of D, as a prospective adoptive mother, claiming F as her own child, which would be the lifelong effect of granting an adoption order.

121. These concerns are amplified in my judgement by the fact that F is aware that, by adopting her, D is assisting to alleviate economic pressures on family in Nigeria, increasing the risk of placing F in a position of feeling indebted to D. In this context, and in the context of D’s equivocal attitude to adoption, I accept the evidence of the social worker that the following exchange with D takes on heightened significance: “D was aged 45 at that time and in a controlling relationship where she had come to realise, she was not loved for who she was; but instead, being used for what she could provide. The realisation dawned on her that her husband did not share the same plans for the future as she, such as building a family together. She told me that F is ‘the only one I got’ and spoke about the sense of duty in their culture that children will look after their parents / carers in their later years; either through providing practical care and/or financial support as necessary.”

122. I am further satisfied that there are concerns about D’s ability and willingness to provide F with a secure environment in which F can develop, and otherwise to meet her needs.

123. F has a need for a clear identity to enable her to exist as a separate individual and as a member of society. However, D showed a marked lack of interest in understanding and taking steps to correct the errors and inconsistencies that are apparent in the records before the court, and which continue to call into question F’s identity and legal status. I accept the evidence of the social worker that when asked about the difficulties with the documentation in Nigeria, given that D asserted that information in them is factually incorrect, she responded, “I cannot change anything, so I had to bring it back the way they gave it to me”. There was no sense in D’s evidence that she understood the disadvantages to F of simply acquiescing in the face of such asserted errors and leaving them uncorrected.

124. F has a need to understand her history and family background and to maintain contact with family. Within this context, during the course of her oral evidence, and notwithstanding that she has cared for F in this jurisdiction since 2021 and seeks to adopt her as her daughter, D struggled to recall the names of F’s asserted half siblings, telling the court that “I don’t really know a lot about the family”. Challenged about the fact that she did not appear to have any detailed knowledge about the family of the young person she is seeking to adopt, D responded, rather petulantly, “How can I know if there were any other children living in the household” and informing the court that “I don’t ask for the names, even if she speaks to them daily as I am so busy”. D also claimed not to know the names of F’s deceased siblings and appeared uncertain about the name of F’s mother.

125. The clear impression given was of a prospective adopter who has not engaged with the lived experience of the young person she is seeking to adopt. There appeared to be no interest on the part of D regarding the history, personal relationships and experiences of the young person she is seeking now to make her own daughter. Again, the common theme in her response to questions interrogating why she was not able to recall the details of F’s life was that “I got things to do, I am busy, I have got things to do”. This lack of interest was consistent with what I am satisfied is D’s equivocal attitude overall to her application for an adoption order.

126. It is not disputed that F has suffered adverse experiences, particularly if what is said about the loss of her mother and her siblings is true. For the reasons I have set out, I am satisfied that F has suffered and is at risk of suffering harm within the meaning of the 1989 Act . In this regard, I note the assessment of the social worker in the Annex A report that: “In relation to the stability of the adoptive home; it is my view that this has not been stable nor safe until recently due to the domestic violence perpetrated by [BD] towards D which we know F has witnessed on at least one known occasion, as well as the fact that F herself was injured during one such known incident...”

127. I accept the assessment of the social worker in the Annex A report that D was dismissive of the need for further emotional support for F around these experiences and that she views things rather simplistically by reiterating that F is “fine and happy”. When asked about how she has supported F’s needs through her adverse experiences, D again appeared dismissive of the idea that any help is required. When pressed about the incident of domestic abuse in February 2025 and its impact on F, which on her own account stood at the end of a long period of such abuse, D replied “She is fine now; there’s no issue anymore; we are safe; she is happy; we don’t see him anymore. She never complains that she is scared or anything like that, no”. Asked whether she had tried to talk to F about the incident in circumstances where F may be bottling up her feelings in order to protect D, D stated “There is nothing to talk about; she is happy”. I am satisfied that D has a limited ability to understand and meet F’s emotional needs arising out of the harm she has experienced.

128. These matters are thrown into further and concerning relief by the fact that, whilst F has her own bedroom, at nearly 18 years old she shares a bed with D. The Children’s Guardian appeared accepting of this situation, reporting only that F stated that this makes her feel “less alone”. Only belatedly, and through Ms LeCointe in closing submissions, did the Children’s Guardian agree that “It is concerning that they are sleeping together.” D told the social worker that she (the social worker) did not “understand as this is cultural and normal in their culture”. There is, however, no evidence before the court that it is normal in Yoruba culture for a 17 year child to share a bed with an adult. The social worker was correct to warn herself in the Annex A report that people may use references to culture as a means to shut down professional enquiry. I accept the evidence of the social worker that F’s sleeping arrangements are likely to be a manifestation of her emotional needs not being met and that this is further evidence that D is not able to meet F’s emotional needs to the standard expected of an adoptive parent.

129. Having regard to the matters set out above, I am satisfied that welfare and public policy point in the same direction in this case. Within the context of the welfare evaluation identifying the manifest difficulties and concerns set out above, affording paramount consideration to the best interests of F, and having regard to the nature and extent of non-compliance with s.83 of the 2002 Act and the applicability to this case of the special restrictions under the 2006 Act , I am satisfied that public policy requires D’s application for an adoption order to be refused.

130. I acknowledge that this puts in jeopardy F’s long term immigration position in this jurisdiction, her ability to remain living with D in the longer term and her ability to complete her studies here once commenced. Against this, I am satisfied that it would be contrary to public policy and antithetic to F’s welfare throughout her life, to grant an adoption order that has the irreversible effect of making F the legal child of a prospective adopter who cannot demonstrate that F was lawfully adopted in Nigeria (or that she is the daughter of the father or that her mother is deceased), who has not complied with the relevant domestic legislation in respect of a country on which Parliament has placed restrictions on the grounds of public policy, who I am satisfied is at best equivocal and at worst transactional in seeking to adopt F, who has not acted to protect F from harm within her household and who has a limited ability meet F’s emotional needs.

131. I am further satisfied that refusing the application for an adoption order is a justified interference in the right to respect for private and family life of F and D. Art 8 does not guarantee a right to adopt as such (see X v Belgium and the Netherlands (1975) 7 DR 75, X and Y v United Kingdom (1977) 12 DR 32, X v Netherlands (1981) 24 DR 176, Dalila Di Lazzaro v Italy (1997) 90 DR 134 and Fretté v France (2002) 38 EHRR 438 ). The interference in this case, constituted by refusing an adoption order, is in accordance with the law. It is also proportionate to the legitimate aim the court is seeking to achieve. Namely to prevent the adoption of a young person that is, on the evidence, demonstrably contrary to public policy and demonstrably not in the child’s best interests.

132. Finally, I acknowledge that my decision does not accord with the recommendation of the Children’s Guardian in this case. As I have noted at a number of points in this judgment, I have had significant reservations about the analysis of the Children’s Guardian in this case. I am satisfied that I cannot attach weight to it.

133. The Children’s Guardian did not consider the import of the inaccuracies, contradictions and unreliability of the Nigerian documentation, instead ascribing those difficulties to “unfounded speculation” by the local authority. The report of the Children’s Guardian simply takes the accounts of both D and the father at face value. With respect to the father, the Children’s Guardian concludes, without any challenge to the father on the basis of the plain discrepancies on the face of the papers, that the father’s account is “honest.” The consequence of this is that the Children’s Guardian does not factor into her analysis evidence that justifies careful consideration of the possibility of trafficking before it can confidently be discounted. It is concerning that the Children’s Guardian would dismiss these matters, apparently out of hand, and without any analysis of their consequences for F’s welfare. The Children’s Guardian likewise omits to consider the fact that Nigeria is the subject of special restrictions, the reasons for those special restrictions and the absence of any application for exemption by D.

134. Further, notwithstanding evidence that F had been exposed over a number of years to witnessing and experiencing domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour and that, at nearly 18 years old, F shares a bed with D, the Children’s Guardian confidently asserted that there were no safeguarding concerns. It does not appear to have occurred to the Children’s Guardian to query why F continues to “feel so alone” after nearly five years in the care of the person seeking to adopt her.

135. In the foregoing circumstances, it is very difficult for the court to understand how the Children’s Guardian reached the following conclusion (emphasis in the original): “Taking all these positive aspects into consideration I am unsure as to why the Local Authority are unwilling to support a consensual adoption so that F can have the permanency that her welfare requires.” CONCLUSION

136. For the reasons I have given, I dismiss D’s application for an adoption order in respect of F. I make no order as to costs. In addition, in light of the concerns of the court at the approach of the Children’s Guardian in this case, I intend to direct that a copy of this judgment be provided to the Chief Executive of Cafcass. This will enable Cafcass to consider whether steps need to be taken to ensure that, where a Children’s Guardian is appointed in proceedings involving the Restricted List, the approach of Cafcass is suitably rigorous.

137. The Secretary of State invited the court to give guidance on cases in which the country involved is the subject of special restrictions pursuant to s.9 of the 2006 Act . There are difficulties in giving “guidance” based on conclusions drawn from a single, difficult, case. As noted by Johnson J in the quote from In Re C (A Minor) (Adoption Illegality) that opens this judgment, there are also wider difficulties giving guidance in the present context. However, I would make the following broad observations: i) Children from other jurisdictions who are the subject of an application for a domestic adoption order by a resident of the British Islands are entitled to, and will be given, the same level of protection as children born in this jurisdiction. ii) In so far as a more relaxed approach to the strict requirements of intercountry adoption, and to the special restrictions controls, where the case proceeds as a domestic adoption (or an application for recognition of the foreign adoption) has been perceived by applicants, this perception is erroneous. iii) Applicants for domestic adoption orders in respect of foreign national children will, where the relevant primary and secondary statutory provisions apply, be expected to have acquainted themselves with, and to have complied with, those statutory provisions. iv) Where a country is the subject of special restrictions under the 2006 Act , applicants will be expected by the court to have acquainted themselves with, and to have complied with, the mandatory terms of those restrictions and to have sought, and been granted, an exception by the Secretary of State. v) Whilst a failure to comply with the primary or secondary legislative provisions does not by itself prevent an adoption order being made, in circumstances where the legislation has been put in place by Parliament in order to protect children from harm (and, by extension, to prevent the exploitation of women and girls in vulnerable socio-economic situations abroad), it cannot be assumed that courts will simply acquiesce in the face of non-compliance on the basis of an apparent fait accompli . Applicants cannot expect the court to grant an adoption order simply by reason of the child already being in the jurisdiction and in their care. vi) The courts will not hesitate to refuse an adoption order where, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of the child throughout his or her life, public policy requires that the application should be refused. vii) Where s.83 of the 2002 Act is engaged, in deciding whether to make an adoption order, the court will undertake a careful analysis of both public policy and welfare and determine whether public policy requires that the application should be refused, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of the child throughout his or her life. viii) Where s.83 of the 2002 Act is engaged and the country concerned is on the Restricted List, in deciding whether to make an adoption order, the court will again undertake a careful analysis of both public policy and welfare and determine whether public policy requires that the application should be refused, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of the child throughout his or her life. Considerations of public policy will include the fact that the country has been placed on the Restricted List by the Secretary of State because practices taking place in connection with the adoption of children render it contrary to public policy to further the bringing of children into the United Kingdom. ix) Where s.83 of the 2002 Act is not engaged but the country concerned is on the Restricted List, the court will undertake a careful welfare analysis, giving paramount consideration to the welfare of the child throughout his or her life. In doing so, any evidence demonstrating that the difficulties that caused the restriction to be imposed by the Secretary of State arise in the case (including, for example, inconsistences in the evidence, unreliable documentation, difficulties with confirming the identity, background and adoptability of the child, concerns regarding the integrity of the foreign process and concerns regarding actions of foreign authorities) will inform the welfare analysis.

138. Section 1(2) of the 2002 Act requires that the “paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child’s welfare, throughout his life ” (emphasis added). The court will risk not properly discharging its duty to have regard to this cardinal principle if it yields too readily to a fait accompli resting on foundations built from practices and processes antithetic to the child’s best interests, or from the mistreatment or manipulation of others. By way of example, one only has to contemplate the consequences for a child coming to know that the foundations of his or her happy family life and identity have been built from circumstances that involved the sexual exploitation, for profit, of women or girls in another country, and that the court that ratified that position disapplied legislation designed to protect against such an outcome. The same may be true for a child coming to learn that his or her family life and identity is based on deception, dishonesty and the manipulation of the court and professionals by those caring for him or her.

139. This is not to alter the principle that an adoption order may be made notwithstanding a failure to comply with the primary or secondary legislative provisions where it is in the child’s best interests to do so. Rather, it is to restate in clear terms the need for all involved in applications of this nature, including the applicants themselves, to be rigorous in seeking to maintain fidelity to the legislative safeguards put in place by Parliament to protect children in the context of cross-border adoption.