Geoffrey Bewley & Ors v John Godfrey Russell & Anor

Key words: Easement – right to park car – prescription – lost modern grant – sufficiency of use – implied permission - whether right capable of existing as easement Key cases referred to: Batchelor v. Marlow [2003] 1 WLR 764 Stenner v. Teignbridge DC [2025] UKUT 204 (LC) Viscido and others v. Raimondo [2025] UKFTT 00926 (PC) Moncrieff v. Jamieson [2007] 1 WLR 2620 Virdi v. Chana [2008] EWHC 2901 (Ch.) De Le Cuona v. Big Apple Marketing Ltd. [2017] EWHC 3783 (Ch.) Kettle v. Bloomfold [2012] EWHC 1422 (Ch.) Begley v. Taylor [2014] EWHC 1180 (Ch.) R. (Beresford) v Sunderland City Council [2004] 1 AC 889 Welford v. Graham [2017] UKUT 297 (TCC) Poste Hotels Limited v Cousins [2020] EWHC 582 (Ch) . Newnham v. Willison (1987) 56 P&CR 8 Winterburn v. Bennett [2017] 1 WLR 646 Ironside v. Cook (1978) 41 P&CR 326 Hughes v. Incumbent of the Benefice of Frampton-on-Severn [2021] UKUT 184 (LC) Introduction: the applications, parties and titles

1. By separate applications made on forms AP1 dated (respectively) 17 th April 2023 and 16 th May 2023, the Applicants (Mr. and Mrs. Bewley in the first reference; Mrs. Parvin Hudson in the second) each applied for the noting on the relevant titles of the benefit and burden of an alleged easement to park on a “parking strip” forming part of the Respondents’ title to a private roadway.

2. Mr. and Mrs. Bewley are the registered proprietors of number 4 Ewens Gardens, and have been since 28 th December 2005 (their date of purchase was 1 st December 2005). Mrs. Hudson is now the sole registered proprietor of number 3 Ewens Gardens, having originally purchased it with her now deceased husband Norman Hudson on 19 th August 1994. The Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Russell, became registered proprietors of number 5 Ewens Gardens with effect from 14 th May 2003, having purchased it on 24 th April 2003.

3. Ewens Gardens is a private road and cul-de-sac. It was first developed with the construction of five detached houses in the 1970s. The roadway itself was retained by the original developer, Warrior Development Company Limited, until it sold that title to the Respondents on 5 th February 2004 for £10,000. The Respondents were registered as its first proprietors, under title WSX 280656, with effect from 10 th May 2004.

4. Number 4 was the subject of a substantial redevelopment by its then owner, a Mr. Elliott (operating via his company Herongate Land and New Houses Limited), between 2003 and 2005. As well as expanding the footprint of the house on number 4, he obtained planning permission to build two new dwellings on additional land to the south of number 4, which were later numbered 6 and 7. Those works led to much dispute with other owners at the time, and indeed to litigation with the Respondents Mr. and Mrs. Russell.

5. It was later conceded by Mr. Elliott that the land on which numbers 6 and 7 were built did not have the benefit of a right of way over the roadway, title to which Mr. and Mrs. Russell had acquired as described above. While the Russells did not pursue their original claims for a declaration and injunction, and an express easement was later granted, their claim for “negotiation damages” (formerly known as damages in lieu) was pursued all the way to a hearing before HHJ Robin Barratt QC at Chichester County Court in 2006, at which they were awarded damages of £50,000.

6. The location of all of the above properties, and the roadway itself, is best depicted in the current filed plan of the title to number 4 (extract below). Number 3, although not numbered on that plan, is the house to the north of number 4. Older OS plans on which other title filed plans are based do not show the completed dwellings at numbers 6 and 7, which are now accessed via a gravelled ‘spur’ off the roadway, shown by dotted lines. Title plan extract showing location of properties and roadway The area over which the rights are claimed

7. The location of the alleged servient land in an easement case is usually clear and straightforward. In this case it was not, and required correction and clarification. I considered it necessary for the Applicants to amend their Statement of Case for this purpose; and for the Respondents to have permission to amend in response. In a case involving alleged parking easements, this is a matter of some importance, as will be set out further below.

8. The Applicants’ original forms ST4, containing their declarations in support of their AP1 applications made to HM Land Registry, appeared – by reference to the colouring in their accompanying plans (extracts below)– to claim rights over the whole of the roadway title. ST4 application plans

9. When HM Land Registry referred both applications to this Tribunal on 7 th October 2024, the case summaries referred to a “B13 notice and plan dated 26 th September 2023”. It later emerged, following enquiries made by this Tribunal, that there was in fact no separate Land Registry illustrative or notice plan ever produced, and that their reference simply incorporated the plans attached to the original ST4 forms.

10. Following the referrals, and the linking of the two cases, this Tribunal directed Statements of Case from the parties. The Applicants’ Statement of Case dated 15 th November 2024 began by stating, at paragraph 1, that: “This [sic] proceedings concern an application by the Applicants for a prescriptive right to park vehicles on a parking strip ("the Parking Strip") situated on a private roadway ("the Roadway") which runs through a small residential development completed in about 1974.” So from the outset, the pleaded case identified a “Parking Strip” as the alleged servient land, and distinguished that from the wider “Roadway”. The plan attached to the Statement of Case (extract below), as referred to in paragraph 3, was said to show the Roadway edged in red, although that was clearly a slip for “blue” (it was number 4 which was edged red). The Parking Strip was said to be “shown coloured yellow”. Extract from Statement of Case plan

11. As only became apparent to the Applicants by the time of the hearing (and their counsel Mr. Brilliant’s skeleton argument), the area coloured yellow in the plan above was incorrect, and not the subject of any of the disputed parking. That yellow area, it appeared to be agreed, lay to the east of the surfaced roadway, consists mostly of vegetation, and may have been the location of an intended footway beside the road which was never in fact built.

12. It was however tolerably clear from the evidence, and the Respondents’ own response to the Statement of Case, that all parties had assumed and treated the applications as relating to an area of the surfaced roadway which had (in the circumstances described further below) been marked out as parking bays in 2003. This general area, and a depiction of five rectangular bays, can in fact be seen in the second of the ST4 plans attached above; albeit that this plan (as will also be considered below) derives from the original 1974 planning process.

13. From Ms. Shiels’ (the Respondents’ counsel) skeleton argument, it was clear that one of the arguments she wished to pursue was that the rights claimed were too exclusive and “ousting” to subsist as easements, on the line of authority from Batchelor v. Marlow [2003] 1 WLR 764 onwards as recently considered by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) in Stenner v. Teignbridge DC [2025] UKUT 204 (LC) .

14. Mr. Brilliant protested that this was a new argument, previously unpleaded. I considered and decided, however, that:- i) the Applicants’ own case on the area of the alleged servient land was incorrectly pleaded, and required amendment to be made clearer. ii) the Respondents were entitled to respond to that case, given that the extent of the alleged servient land is an important factor in considering the “ouster” or exclusivity principle considered in the above cases. iii) I would therefore permit both parties to amend for these purposes. iv) I rejected, however, Mr. Brilliant’s submission that he ought now to be entitled to revert to the ST4 plan and plead easements exercisable over the entirety of the roadway title. The case had never been pursued before this Tribunal on that basis. As stated, the Applicants’ Statement of Case clearly distinguished a “Parking Strip” from the “Roadway” as a whole. Had the applications been pursued as rights to park anywhere on the whole roadway, the case – and in particular the evidence adduced – might have taken a very different course. I therefore permitted the Applicants to amend only by clarifying – and essentially correcting their previous mistake in – the identification of the “Parking Strip”. v) I considered giving both counsel permission to make further written submissions on the “ouster” principle and cases, but in the event they were both able to address me helpfully in great detail on that issue (in relation to the “Parking Strip” as it would now be confirmed) without that being necessary. The plan attached to the Applicants’ Amended Statement of Case, now correctly showing the intended “Parking Strip”, is below. Contrary to the argument advanced in the Respondents’ Amended Statement of Case in response, that is a sufficient amendment and pleading. All that had to be changed was the identification of the “Parking Strip” “shown coloured yellow” on the plan.

15. The rights claimed, as clarified by amendment, were to park vehicles anywhere on that overall “Strip” – rather than, for example, to park in just one particular space or part of it. Although no precise measurements were in evidence (or strictly necessary), the area consists of the eastern/south-eastern corner of the roadway, and is approximately five car widths and lengths in dimensions. One of the photographs below (from 2024) shows it empty, but with the 2003 bay markings just about visible. The second photograph (from 2023) shows some of the Applicants’ cars parked on it. The alleged parking strip The applicable law: prescription/lost modern grant

16. In each case the right was claimed on the basis of prescription under the 1832 Act, or ‘lost modern grant’. I summarised the principles applicable to such claims, and the state of the law (as I understood it) on “parking easements”, in a recent decision of mine to which both parties referred, Viscido and others v. Raimondo [2025] UKFTT 00926 (PC). I will not repeat that summary in full, but would further summarise it as follows. Prescription Act 1832

17. Under sections 2 and 4 of this Act, a party must establish either 20 or 40 years’ sufficient use “without interruption”. If 40 years can be established, the right is deemed to be “absolute and indefeasible, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly given or made for that purpose by deed or writing.” Those periods of years are to be periods “next before some suit or action wherein the claim or matter to which such period may relate shall have been or shall be brought into question..”, with a proviso by which interruptions acquiesced in for less than a year are to be disregarded. I took the view in Viscido that the relevant date for this purpose in proceedings before this Tribunal is that of the original application.

18. By the doctrine of ‘lost modern grant’, a fictional grant of an easement is presumed to have been made at a date in the past upon proof of 20 years’ or more of the requisite use, during any period, including those cases where the period relied upon stops short of the “next before some suit or action” date of section 4 Prescription Act 1832. Nature of use required

19. The use required to establish the right on either or both bases must have been open, exercised “as of right” (or, as was said in one case “ as if of right”), and without force, secrecy or permission. Without permission

20. Permission granted by the servient owner renders use of the way by the would-be dominant owner precarious, so that such use cannot be relied upon to establish a right. Permission may be express or implied, and it will be a question of fact in each case whether use was by express or implied permission. Mere tacit acquiescence in the use is not implied permission: indeed, acquiescence has been said to be the “central principle” underlying prescriptive acquisition of easements. It is generally accepted that there must be some “overt act” from which permission can be implied (see generally R. (Beresford) v Sunderland City Council [2004] 1 AC 889 , at [6]; Welford v. Graham [2017]; and Poste Hotels Limited v Cousins [2020] EWHC 582 (Ch) . Without force: contentious or forcible use

21. Use becomes contentious: “..once there is knowledge on the part of the person seeking to establish prescription that his user is objected to and that the use which he claims has become contentious.” [ Newnham v. Willison (1987) 56 P&CR 8, per Kerr LJ at p19]; see also R. (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council (No.2) [2010] 2 AC 70 , per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at paragraph 92.] It is not necessary for the potential servient owner either to bring proceedings or physically obstruct the way to achieve this. In Newnham v. Willison (above), the Court of Appeal held that solicitors’ correspondence over obstructions placed across the alleged way made the use contentious. A suitably prohibitive sign can also render subsequent use forcible and contentious: see Winterburn v. Bennett [2017] 1 WLR 646 . Frequency and visibility of use required

22. There is no “tariff” or scale of the required frequency of use, which will vary depending on the nature of the right asserted, and the land over which it is exercised. Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property , 9th ed. summarises the relevant principles at paragraph 27-058: “The claimant must show continuity of enjoyment. This is interpreted reasonably. In the case of rights of way it is clearly not necessary to show ceaseless user by day and night: it may be continuous although it is intermittent. User whenever circumstances require it is normally sufficient, provided the intervals are not excessive. However, merely casual or occasional user does not suffice.” Constant daily use is not required ( Hollins v. Verney (1884) 13 QBD 304 ), but the law as stated in Gale on Easements has been approved and applied by the Court of Appeal (in Ironside v. Cook (1978) 41 P&CR 326) namely:- "In those easements which require the repeated acts of man for their enjoyment, [such] as rights of way, it would appear to be sufficient if the user is of such a nature, and takes place at such intervals, as to afford an indication to the owner of the servient tenement that a right is claimed against him - an indication that would not be afforded by mere casual or occasional exercise.” See also per Upper Tribunal Judge Elizabeth Cooke in Hughes v. Incumbent of the Benefice of Frampton-on-Severn [2021] UKUT 184 (LC) , paras. 18 and 25: the use must be “of sufficient intensity or frequency to indicate that a right is being asserted” and sufficient “..to put the servient owner on notice that a right is being asserted and that he or she needs to take action.” Parking easements

23. I said in Viscido (at paragraph 31) that: “The issue of whether a “right to park” is even capable of existing as an easement has been the subject of considerable judicial and academic analysis. The “problem” giving rise to such analysis is that the act of parking of a vehicle on a specific piece of land, and having the right to do so for indefinite periods, may be regarded as equivalent to a right of exclusive possession of that land. If so, and by such possession the servient owner of that land is effectively “ousted” from themselves possessing or enjoying it, the right may be regarded as too exclusive in nature to be capable of existing merely as an easement. The person with the alleged easement may effectively be claiming a right tantamount to outright ownership or possession.”

24. I then reviewed the law, culminating in the then very recent decision of Edwin Johnson J. sitting in the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) in Stenner v. Teignbridge DC [2025] UKUT 204 (LC) , from which I note that permission for a “leapfrog” appeal directly to the Supreme Court has since been granted. My analysis was that:- (i) in Batchelor v. Marlow [2003] 1 WLR 764 , the Court of Appeal (per Tuckey LJ) held that a prescriptive right to park up to six vehicles on a strip of verge land, during weekday business hours only was too exclusive to be capable of being an easement, remains good law and binding on lower courts. The relevant test then stated and applied was whether the use in question would leave the servient owner “without any reasonable use of his land” and render his ownership of that land “illusory”. (ii) The House of Lords decision in the Scottish appeal Moncrieff v. Jamieson [2007] 1 WLR 2620 was that, on the unusual facts of that case, a right to park on nearby land was implied as a right necessarily ancillary to a right of “access” to a remote Shetland coastal dwelling. The observations of Lords Scott and Neuberger on parking easements generally in English law did not form part of that ratio, although neither of their Lordships expressly stated that Batchelor was wrongly decided. (iii) a number of subsequent High Court decisions distinguished Batchelor , and found parking easements or rights of that nature to exist on the particular facts of those cases. These included:- - Virdi v. Chana [2008] EWHC 2901 (Ch.) (HHJ Purle QC) (a right to park in a rectangular “gravelled area” only part of which lay within the servient owner’s land; on which she could not park herself; and which land she could still use to tend to an adjacent tree, repair a fence. She could also place signs or “decorative flower pots” on it, or alter its surface (paragraphs 20, 21 and 25). - De Le Cuona v. Big Apple Marketing Ltd. [2017] EWHC 3783 (Ch.) , Newey J. (right to park up to two cars in such individual parking spaces as could from time to time be designated by the landlord was effective, because it did not leave the servient owner without any reasonable use of the land. They could change the allocated spaces as they chose, on little notice; and also use them when not in used by the ‘parker’. - Kettle v. Bloomfold [2012] EWHC 1422 (Ch) (HHJ David Cooke QC) (sole “right to use” a parking space was an easement rather than a demise of the space; and did not exclude or oust the owner, because he could “do anything that a freeholder could normally do” with the land save where inconsistent with the right to park, such as pass and repass over it, repair it or lay cables or wires over or under it.) In Viscido , my personal view was that it was difficult to see why retention of the ability to use the land only for matters more akin to easements themselves in that case could still be said to preserve the servient owner’s “ownership”.

25. Begley v. Taylor [2014] EWHC 1180 (Ch.) (Amanda Tipples QC) was a case specifically relied upon by Mr. Brilliant (for the Applicants), and said to be analogous to the present case. It too involved a claim for rights to park on a private “access road” to a cul-de-sac. Batchelor was distinguished on the basis that the right claimed here was in fact a right to park anywhere on the whole “access road”, so that the use of just some parts of it for parking did not render ownership “illusory”. The defendant owners could still park on the road themselves, and had resurfaced it. Each set of claimants were, however, declared to have rights just to park “up to three cars” on the parts of the road outside their respective properties, rather than anywhere on the whole road. This was based on the evidence of use, by the claimants and their visitors, which the judge accepted (paragraphs 86 and 91).

26. In Stenner v. Teignbridge District Council [2025] UKUT 204 (LC) (Edwin Johnson J., 25 th June 2025), both this Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal held that the claimed right - to store and maintain up to six boats and other equipment, for business purposes, on part of a car park, for eight months of the year - deprived the owner of reasonable use of the lane, and so could not exist as an easement. It was confirmed that Batchelor remained good law and binding, and that the application of the “reasonable use” test was “..a fact sensitive question, which falls to be answered on the evidence in any particular case, applying the guidance to be found in the relevant case law.” (paragraph 149). The evidence

27. Each of the Applicants (Mr. and Mrs. Bewley as to number 4; and Mrs. Hudson as to number 3) has to establish that a right has arisen through sufficient use in relation to their own property, not anyone else’s. Although these were linked cases, tried together, and with common representation for the Applicants, it is therefore necessary to consider them separately. I will do so in the order in which they are named as Applicants, taking the Bewleys at number 4 first. Evidence in support of right for benefit of number 4

28. As stated above, Mr. and Mrs. Bewley purchased their property, then recently redeveloped by Mr. Elliott and his company, on 1 st December 2005 . The date of their application was 17 th April 2023 . By simple arithmetic, it is therefore apparent that they cannot establish a sufficient period of 20 years or more of use simply from their own evidence, or that of their own friends and visitors during their period of ownership.

29. It was also common ground in this case, in relation to both applications, that further use of the disputed strip was rendered “contentious” by a somewhat bizarre but unequivocal notice served by the Respondents on all residents of Ewens Gardens (including the Applicants) on or about 1 st May 2022 . This document, headed “Statutory Statement of Intent”, began by referring to a non-existent statute (“the Private Roads Act 1988 ibid 34, revised 2018 ibid 5.4”), stated that the “temporary parking bays” were to be removed “twenty eight days hence, Being 31 May 2022 A.D.”, and that “any vehicle deemed to be in breech of this notice” by parking on this area would be “deemed to be trespassing..and may be issued with formal notice of proceedings”. There was also some photographic evidence that the Respondents then briefly erected a road barrier to close the area off, although that has subsequently been removed. A small “Private road – no parking” sign was also erected, which remains there to this day.

30. Mr. Bewley provided a witness statement and gave oral evidence. He said that when they purchased number 4, the area in question was marked out as five numbered parking bays, numbered “1” to “5”. He therefore assumed that this area was available for parking, although he accepted that they had not bought the house on the understanding that it came with a separate parking space. He accepted that the driveway of the house could itself accommodate three cars, and in addition they had a garage. His evidence was that he and his family had usually owned at least three cars at all times during their ownership.

31. Following an initial dispute over their temporary storage of a caravan on their driveway, and also (he felt) because of the lingering fallout from the dispute with Mr. Elliott when carrying out the development, he and his wife had barely spoken to the Respondents in all of their time living there.

32. As to actual use of the “parking strip”, he accepted that in his own day to day use, he would generally park on his own driveway. The chief use of the parking strip would therefore be by their guests and visitors, including family and friends, although sometimes they would also park on the driveway if space was available. His witness statement was slightly vague and non-committal about the frequency of such use, merely saying that “..we and our friends and visitors all openly and without any secrecy used the Parking Strip to park vehicles”, and that such parking was “overtly visible”. It was put to Mr. Bewley in cross-examination that in his own ST4 form, accompanying the application, he had himself described the use as merely “occasional overflow parking” and “infrequent” (referring to people parking “infrequently (as we only ever used to do)”. He said that this was just “generic” wording in a “situational document”, and that the parking had in fact been “regular”.

33. Two friends of Mr. and Mrs. Bewley - Mr. Gareth Good, and Mr. Timothy Eldridge – gave evidence as to their own parking on the strip when visiting number 4 since 2005. Mr. Good said he and his wife were frequent visitors, at least twice a month and sometimes more often. They would generally park in the bay marked “4” when doing so. When asked, he though he recalled the bays being marked “5” to “1” going left to right. Mr. Eldridge had noted in his statement a number of dates derived from diary entries, between 2006 and 2021, when he and his wife came to stay overnight with the Bewleys, and when they generally parked in “bay 4”. He said there were also several additional shorter visits. Neither he nor Mr. Good said that they had ever been challenged or prevented from doing so, until the recent dispute.

34. Mr. and Mrs. Bewley did not call any evidence from any of their predecessors in title. Mr. Elliott, who owned number 4 from 2003 before developing then selling it to them in 2005, provided no evidence in this case. There was some suggestion by some witnesses (chiefly those relating to number 3 and Mrs. Hudson) that Mr. Elliott had used number 4 as some sort of “site office” during the development, but there was no direct evidence whatsoever about he or anyone on his behalf parking on the strip in that time. It was common ground, in any event, that number 4 was not being occupied as a residential dwelling during this development period.

35. Little or nothing is known about any earlier predecessors in title. No evidence was provided by them, or on their behalf. The only “old” resident who gave evidence was Ronald Croucher, who owned and lived at number 1 Ewens Gardens from about 1975 or 1976 until 1997. He was forced to correct his earlier recollection that he had lived there from “1974” when the date of the first conveyance of number 1 (14 th May 1975) was put to him, and he accepted that he had purchased a plot on which a house was then built.

36. Most of his evidence, however, was about his own parking (and that of his children from 1984) at number 1, or that of a Mr. Finnegan who he recalled living at number 5. His statement said nothing about other properties, including number 4, other than a generic statement that “this parking area was used by all residents with more than one car and any visitors to the houses within Ewens Gardens”.

37. In his oral evidence, he could not even remember the names of any owners of number 4, or how many cars they had. He was therefore unable to give any direct or clear evidence about the incidence of their parking, if any, on the strip. Discussion and conclusion on evidence in relation to number 4

38. I can deal with this relatively briefly. In short, the Applicants Mr. and Mrs. Bewley simply cannot establish a sufficient period of 20 years or more. As stated above, there is no evidence of use of the parking area, for the benefit of number 4, by any of their predecessors. Neither these Applicants, nor Mr. Croucher, even knew the names of these predecessors (save for Mr. Elliott and his company between 2003 and 2005). Still less could they give any evidence as to such people’s driving and parking.

39. Mr. Brilliant, in his closing submissions, suggested that I could nevertheless make an inference that there must have been some such prior use, generally or from Mr. Croucher’s reference to “residents” parking there. I do not consider that such an inference would be permissible or possible in this case. Number 4 has a driveway on which the parking of up to three cars is possible. It does not therefore follow that anyone who lived there had to park anywhere else. Mr. Bewley’s evidence of use during their period in ownership was specifically as to additional or overspill parking by friends and guests, because he was someone who “liked cars” and always owned at least three himself. Further, Mr. Croucher was specifically asked whether he could relate his witness statement reference to “residents” to any particular owner of number 4, and he could not. An inference of use of an area for parking, of a nature and frequency sufficient to amount to prescriptive use, cannot just be made ‘because it’s there’.

40. Further, even if there had been any evidence of prior use (actual or inferred), I would have found that the necessary continuity of use – and so the ability of the Applicants to aggregate that previous use with their own – had been broken by the substantial redevelopment of number 4 by Mr. Elliott/Herongate which took place between 2003 and 2005. In that time, the house was not in occupation as a residential dwelling. It was, it appeared to be agreed, part of a construction site. Even if there had been any evidence of use of vehicle movements and parking in this time (which there was not), it could not have amounted to use of a nature sufficient to contribute to the acquisition of a prescriptive easement to park for the benefit of number 4 as a dwelling house.

41. This being so, it is not necessary for me to decide or express a view on whether the nature and frequency of the Bewleys’ own use since 2005 would have been sufficient to establish an easement had it continued for over 20 years. Nor is it therefore necessary for me to consider the Respondents’ evidence on that issue.

42. I will consider the “ouster”/exclusivity point when considering the application by Mrs. Hudson in relation to number 3, to which I now turn. Evidence in relation to number 3: Mrs. (and previously Mr.) Hudson and others

43. The Applicant Mrs. Parvin Hudson provided a witness statement and gave oral evidence in support of her application, as did:- i) Mrs. Sara Crompton, her daughter. ii) her brother-in-law Lionel Downer (the husband of her sister Novine, who although she put her name to the witness statement jointly, did not attend to give evidence). iii) her long-time friend Mrs. Simin Behraznia-Berelian.

44. Mrs. Hudson purchased number 3 with her late husband Norman in 1994, and they were registered as its first proprietors with effect from 19 th August 1994. Her witness statement evidence, which she confirmed to be true, was that: “..My family, friends and I have continuously and routinely used the Parking Strip, the bay marked “3” and the roadway outside my house since we moved to our property in 1994 to the current time, a period of over 30 years. ..I am now a widow and live on my own. I only have one space on my drive, thus having the Parking Strip and Roadway has been essential so that I have had visitors and tradespeople such as plumbers etc. to attend to work on my house, No. 3 over the years. ..As mentioned above, my driveway was too small to accommodate more than one vehicle. My daughter and friends have therefore over the full period since 1994 regularly and continuously parked on the Parking Strip when visiting me. Until recently and since we moved into the house, I have had weekly visits from my sister and brother-in-law who have always parked their family saloon car on the Parking Strip. I have also had frequent visits by my daughter, who lives in Greater London, and her family also necessitated them parking their people carrier vehicle on the Parking Strip.”

45. In cross-examination, she said that:- i) she and her late husband Norman (whose date of death was not expressly stated, but which I take to have been within the last 10 years) had only ever owned one car in their household. ii) they, then just she, had usually parked their car on their driveway, although not in their garage, which was too small for that purpose. She did say, however, that when they owned a larger car in the past, they would “off and on” park on the strip as well. iii) she was a very sociable person, and close to her family, so there were frequent visitors to her house. When those friends and relatives came, they would generally always park on the strip, or else she would move her car off the driveway to accommodate them, then park on the strip herself. iv) in response to cross-examination over her use of words such as “occasional” and “minimal” to described the frequency of parking on the strip in her original ST1, compared to her more recent use of terms such as “frequent”, she said that this was just her choice of words, and that the parking had been as she described - namely that friends and family, and occasionally she and her husband, parked there whenever that was necessary.

46. Mrs. Sarah Crompton said that she had been visiting her mother by car (from London) at number 3 since she had been of driving age, and that this had always been at least every two months, often more. She had visited there regularly with her own children (Mrs. Hudson’s grandchildren) after their births in 2001, 2003 and 2008. She would usually stay overnight, and sometimes for longer, especially during the holidays. She said that she always parked in the “parking strip” when doing so. In cross-examination, she confirmed the detail that she remembered her children enjoying jumping over puddles in that area. She also said, however, that on occasions her mother would see them coming, then herself reverse out and park on the strip, to leave space for them to park on her driveway. She was clear that the driveway was not large enough for two vehicles to park front to back, as the second would then stick out into the roadway.

47. Mr. Lionel Downer and his wife also lived in Barnham until 2000. He said that in that time, they would visit Mrs. Hudson several times a week. They moved to Chichester in 2000, but still visited regularly after that, around twice a week. The frequency of their visits has declined, due to Covid and health reasons, to around once a week or every two weeks in recent years. His evidence was that they always drove when doing so, and would nearly always park on the strip. On the few occasions when he did not do so, he would park on the roadway instead, but never on the drive. He remembered a time before 2003 when the strip was not marked out as numbered bays, and the time after that, when there were bays and double yellow lines on the roadway (see further below).

48. Mrs. Behraznia-Berelian has known Mrs. Hudson for over 40 years, as a close friend. She went to many parties and social occasions at number 3, and also on individual visits every few weeks. She said that she too always went by car, and that when she did she would park on the strip, usually in the middle of it. She said that she did not park on the driveway or the main roadway. The Respondents’ evidence and alleged permission

49. A major part of Mrs. Hudson’s cross-examination, and the Respondents’ case in opposition to her application, was an allegation that her and her husband’s parking on the strip, particularly following the marking of bays onto it in 2003, was with the Respondents’ permission . Since the Respondents only purchased and acquired title to the roadway (including the disputed strip) on 5 th February 2004 (being registered as its first proprietors with effect from 10 th May 2004) this would clearly have to have been after that date.

50. The Respondents have owned number 5 itself since 24 th April 2003. As for the other witnesses called in support of their case, Mrs. Gillian Shaw has lived at the nearby Little Tilebarn since 2003, and Mr. Roger Osgood owned and lived at number 2 between 2009 and 2023. The Respondents and their witnesses therefore clearly cannot speak to matters, or the parking of Mrs. Hudson and her visitors, arising before those dates.

51. The circumstances of the Respondents’ purchase of the roadway were set out in the witness statement of the Second Respondent Mrs. Paula Russell. Essentially, the Respondents and other residents of Ewens Gardens, including Mr. Hudson in particular, were greatly exercised from June 2003 onwards by Mr. Elliott’s plan to redevelop number 4 and build two additional dwellings on neighbouring land; then his implementation of that plan once planning permission was obtained in October 2003. They were upset by the volume and nature of the construction traffic, and what they regarded as antisocial parking and other conduct by builders and contractors. They formed a Residents’ Association and held meetings to discuss the situation.

52. It was common ground between the parties that it was in fact Mr. Norman Hudson who first marked out numbered parking bays on the strip in about October 2003. At that time, it is not clear that any of the residents knew the then owner of this land, which was the original 1970s developer Warrior Development Company Limited. In any event no permission was asked of them for this action. Mrs. Russell accepted in cross-examination that Mr. Hudson was “at the forefront” of this, was “pro-active” and “took the lead” in this regard. There was a slight difference of evidence as to why he did this. Mrs. Russell said that it was intended to be “temporary” and to ensure that residents had somewhere to park in case their driveways were blocked. Mrs. Hudson said that it was more a case of stopping or deterring Mr. Elliott and his contractors from parking there.

53. Mr. and Mrs. Russell then, on advice and as part of their efforts to thwart or control Mr. Elliott’s development and activities, reached agreement with the owner of the roadway (Warrior Development Company Limited, via its director Brian Brooks) to purchase it for £10,000. Their aim was “to try and preserve the character of the cul de sac”, and also – as I infer from the subsequent litigation – to attempt to prevent the use of the roadway to access dwellings on additional land, which did not have the benefit of a right of way over it. I infer that the developer faced a problem of the “ Harris v. Flower ” [ (1904) 74 LJ Ch 127 ] variety, in that a right of way over land A for the benefit of land B cannot also be used to access additional land C. As summarised above, the Respondents later expressly granted a right of way, did not pursue a declaration and an injunction to restrain access, and eventually recovered £50,000 “negotiation damages”. The Respondents subsequently re-painted the marked parking bays, and painted double yellow lines on the main roadway sign; to all of which Mrs. Russell referred as a “road management plan”.

54. Mrs. Russell accepted, in cross-examination, that it was “quite possible” that Mr. and Mrs. Hudson had parked on the strip prior to 2003. She could not know about that. As stated, she also accepted that Mr. Norman Hudson had taken the lead and marked out the parking bays in this area in 2003, before she and her husband acquired the land in 2004 and then re-painted the bays. Subject to an issue over its frequency, nor could she realistically dispute that there had been some parking by Mr. and Mrs. Hudson and their guests after 2003 and 2004 when the bays were marked out. Permission?

55. The central element of the Respondents’ case on such later parking, however, was that it was with permission . This is an issue on which they bore the burden of proof: of establishing either an oral or written grant of express permission, or an “overt act” from which permission could be implied – beyond mere acquiescence or toleration.

56. In their statement of case, this was pleaded as follows: “The Respondents created designated, numbered parking bays within the Turning Circle for each property and granted permission to the residents to park in this area” In response to a Tribunal order requesting further information as to their case, they stated: “The Respondents repeat that all use between 2004 and May 2022 [when they said the “permission” was revoked] was with the permission of the Respondents.”

57. Mrs. Hudson denied that either she or her husband had ever been given “permission” to park in this area by the Respondents, since they had always done so, and continued doing so after Mr. Hudson marked the bays out in 2003. Mrs. Russell’s witness statement did not give any details or particulars of a specific grant of permission, to Mr. and Mrs. Hudson or anyone else. Although she later said in her statement “As I have tried to explain in this statement, any parking in the turning circle was only ever with our permission...” (paragraph 30), nothing in the earlier paragraphs of her statement actually gives any such explanation or detail. There were only references to the meetings at which they told residents of the purchase of the roadway (paragraph 12), then of their “road management” measures and recommendations, of which she says only that these were “..relayed back to the other residents in a meeting and they were all in favour of us putting these measures into place as we would then be able to effectively manage the situation for the benefit of everyone.” (paragraph 13).

58. In oral evidence, under cross-examination, Mrs. Russell claimed for the first time that permission was given “verbally at a meeting”, but could not state the date of any such meeting, or any words used. She accepted that there was no reference to any prior “permission” in any letter, meeting minutes or other document, including the 2022 “Statutory Statement of Intent” notice, which did not speak of withdrawing any previously granted permission.

59. As to other witnesses called by the Respondents, Mrs. Gillian Shaw, the owner of the nearby ‘Little Tilebarn’ (which appears to have been the original gatehouse to Colonel Ewens’ land), vigorously supported the Respondents’ opposition to the rights claimed. Although she was initially somewhat reticent about this when cross-examined, I consider that she was clearly the principal author of the 2022 “Statutory Statement of Intent” notice, including the reference to a non-existent Act of Parliament, which she claimed derived from a book on private roads which she had read. She had previously been actively involved in the management of another private road, the adjacent Downview Road. She openly admitted in evidence that she had encouraged the Respondents to serve the notice and prevent parking on the roadway, because she was “absolutely incensed” that the Ewens Gardens residents had failed to agree on the formation of a management association and contributions to the maintenance of the roadway. She said that she advised the Respondents that if she were them, “I’d take away everything” (meaning the marked bays and anyone parking in them).

60. As to her evidence of the use of the strip for parking, she claimed never to have seen Mrs. Hudson or her visitors parking there, on the basis of having walked around there from time to time (although the area is not immediately adjacent to her house). When it was put to her that Mrs. Hudson and her other witnesses had given evidence the previous day of such use, she ‘doubled down’ and branded them all liars: “I didn’t believe a word of it”.

61. Mr. Roger Osgood owned and lived at number 2 between 2009 and 2023. His evidence, written and oral, was to the effect that he “rarely” saw people parking on the strip, and that he had noticed Mrs. Hudson and her visitors parking there “only on odd occasions”. Findings of fact on number 3/Mrs. Hudson

62. I found Mrs. Hudson and each of her witnesses – Mrs. Crompton, Mr. Downer and Mrs. Behraznia-Berelian – to be honest witnesses, doing their best to recall and explain relevant events. Although some effort was made by Ms. Shiels to suggest that their evidence was “exaggerated”, inconsistent or even the product of collusion (subconsciously or otherwise), I do not consider that I could seriously find any of these witnesses to be dishonest, or that there was never any parking in the area in question.

63. I place little weight on the contrary evidence of Mrs. Shaw, who I consider was a highly partisan witness with something of a ‘bee in her bonnet’ about this and the previous private roadway with which she was involved. In any event, I do not consider that she could have been observing the use of the strip constantly so as to form an accurate overall view as to its use. The same is true, to some extent, of Mr. Osgood. He at least accepted that there had been some such use, unlike Mrs. Shaw’s flat denial. But in a case where no-one is alleging constant or daily use, his observations from number 2 of only occasional use are consistent with the actual evidence of the Applicants. I consider that the same applies to the Respondents themselves, in the person of Mrs. Russell, who gave oral evidence. People with their own working and family lives to lead do not spend seven days a week watching their neighbours’ vehicle movements. Their impressions of only rare or very occasional use are likely to derive from the occasions when they actually remember seeing a vehicle, rather than any more detailed or comprehensive survey. The real issue, as I will consider below, is as to the legal implications of the following findings of fact which I make.

64. I find that between 1994 to 2003, when the strip was not marked with any bays, it was used as follows:- i) on a few occasions in most weeks - particularly by Mr. Downer in the earlier years, then increasingly by Mrs. Crompton and her family – as, effectively, “guest parking” for one car, for friends and family visiting number 3. Friends such as Mrs. Behraznia-Berelian would also park there when visiting. They would park wherever space on it was available. ii) Mr. and Mrs. Hudson themselves chiefly parked their car on their driveway, but (I find) occasionally parked their car on the strip too, either when wishing to accommodate visitors on their driveway, or when it was convenient for them to park there themselves.

65. I find that Mr. Hudson’s act in 2003, in marking out numbered bays on this area, was not some wholly new idea or departure i.e. creating a new parking area where none had existed before. It was intended to preserve, against the use and intrusion of the builders and contractors at number 4, an area which was already in use, certainly by number 3.

66. When the Respondents purchased the roadway, then repainted the bays in 2004, I am not satisfied that there was ever any express verbal grant of permission to Mr. and Mrs. Hudson to park in the bays, as Mrs. Russell’s case eventually became in the witness box. I found her evidence vague and unsatisfactory on this issue. I am not satisfied that anything amounting to such a grant was said, and it was certainly never written. The very most which can be said of the Respondents’ actions in this regard is once they acquired the roadway, they encouraged the continuation of what was already an existing practice (parking in the bays) by repainting the bays, and painting yellow lines to show where people should not park.

67. After 2004, I find that the use continued largely as before, albeit with declining frequency in the case of Mr. and Mrs. Downer. I am satisfied that Mrs. Crompton and her family parked in this strip – usually, but not always, in the bay marked and numbered “3” – when visiting her mother. I find that similar use was made, although less frequently, by other social visitors such as Mrs. Behraznia-Berelian.

68. This continued largely unchanged until the service of the “Statutory Statement of Intent” in May 2022, and the Respondents clearly making it known that they did not wish to allow any parking in this area. Legal implications of findings

69. These findings of fact give rise to three legal issues to be decided:- i) was such use of a nature, frequency and duration so as to be capable of giving rise to a prescriptive right? Given the issuing of the notice in May 2022, it is accepted by the Applicants that they must rely in this regard on the doctrine of ‘lost modern grant’, and so establish any period of 20 years or more prior to that date. ii) despite the absence of any express grant of permission, can permission be implied from the above facts and circumstances of the case? iii) finally, is the right as claimed by the Applicant Mrs. Hudson capable of existing as an easement, having regard to the case law on ‘ouster’ and exclusivity discussed above? i) Frequency, regularity and period

70. I summarised the relevant law at paragraph 22 above. As stated, there is no “tariff” or scale above which use must be established. Daily use is not required. There may be periods of days or weeks when no use is made at all. In deciding on which side of the line – of continuous as opposed to occasional use of an easement of this type – evidence of use falls, I consider that the key factor is regularity over total frequency.

71. I consider that there was sufficiently regular use in this case, for a period of over 20 years. It was not daily or even very frequent use. Most of it was in fact made on behalf of Mrs. Hudson as the would-be dominant owner, by her visitors and licensees, rather than by her and her late husband personally. When used, it was generally limited to one additional vehicle. I heard no evidence on behalf of Mrs. Hudson of the simultaneous parking of multiple vehicles in this area. This was nevertheless a regular and habitual practice, particularly by her close relatives (her sister and brother-in-law the Downers, and her daughter Mrs. Crompton and family). I am also satisfied that tradespeople and contractors will from time to time have parked there. Subject to the further issues below, the use relied upon is therefore in principle capable of supporting an inference of lost modern grant. ii) Implied permission?

72. The finding of sufficient use, for a sufficient period, gives rise to an evidential presumption in favour of the Applicant that such use was without permission: see Gale on Easements, paragraph 4-115. As stated, the burden is then on the Respondents to adduce evidence of permission, or acts from which permission can be implied. As also stated, something more than mere acquiescence, toleration or inactivity is required before such an implication can be made. Some “overt act” of the servient owner will usually be required as the basis for this.

73. Both counsel made submissions on whether the Respondents’ re-painting of the bays, and “road management scheme” announced in 2004, could amount to implied permission to park. Ms. Shiels said that I could imply permission from this “active encouragement” to park in the marked bays. Mr. Brilliant relied on the summary of the law in Gale on Easements at paragraph 4-139, citing the opinion of Lord Scott of Foscote in R (Beresford) v Sunderland CC [2004] 1 AC 889 . Gale summarises the outcome in that case as follows: “Encouragement of the user by the owner of the servient tenement did not necessarily signify an implied licence or permission and, accordingly, although the owner had encouraged the user in that case that amounted to a case of acquiescence and not a case of implied licence or permission.” Lord Scott said, at paragraph 50, as follows: “The positive encouragement to the public to enjoy the recreational facilities of the sports arena constituted, in particular, by the provision of the benches, seems to me not to undermine but rather to reinforce the impression of members of the public that their use was as of right.” (in the context of a town and village green application requiring 20 or more years’ use “as of right”).

74. Gale also cites examples where permission was implied, such as an Australian case Maio v. City of Stirling (No. 2) [2016] WASCA 45, in which it was a condition of planning permission on the servient tenement that the owners of the dominant tenement be allowed to park on the servient tenement, so that when they did so following implementation of the planning permission, they were doing so in accordance with that condition and not “as of right”. The imposition of a charge or other conditions in return for parking or other use might also be a basis for implied permission.

75. In this case, I do not consider that there is evidence of anything other than mere encouragement by the Respondents, of what was by then an existing practice. Mr. Hudson had first marked out the bays in 2003. As I have found, he, Mrs. Hudson and more often their guests had parked there before. Mr. Hudson was “in the forefront” of the opposition to Mr. Elliott’s development at that time. The Respondents’ acquisition of title to the roadway was a further part of what was a communal effort to thwart or at least ‘police’ the development. The double yellow lines, and the re -marking of the bays, were a further part. The purpose and implication of these acts was not to “permit” the Hudsons or others to do what they were already doing, but to prevent Mr. Elliott’s builders and contractors from doing the same. It seems that this may have been effective in the short term, although in the longer term the development was completed, and access for the new dwellings granted; subject only to the eventual £50,000 damages award. After that, there was little or no evidence of anything else from which “permission” to carry on parking in this area could be implied. On my findings, it simply carried on as before.

76. This being so, I find that the Respondents cannot establish any express or implied permission for this use. iii) Can the right exist as an easement?

77. This brings me to the final issue, and one which was properly defined by the amendments for which I gave permission. As set out above, both sets of Applicants’ applications were for rights to park anywhere on a “Parking Strip”, now correctly identified and coloured yellow by the amendment. It was never their pleaded case that they each claimed a right to park just in one single space e.g. the spaces formerly marked 3 or 4 (although those markings appear now to have faded away somewhat).

78. The first issue is therefore on which side of the “ Batchelor v. Marlow ” and Stenner (and other cases) line such a right falls. Would such a right “oust” the servient owner by leaving them with no reasonable use of that land, rendering their ownership of it “illusory”?

79. Although previous decisions of this Tribunal are not binding on it, least of all decisions which happen to have been made by the same judge as is now hearing the immediate case, both parties referred in detail to my own recent decision in Viscido v. Raimondo [2025] UKFTT 00926 (PC), discussed above. Although in that case both sets of Applicants were unsuccessful on the facts (in that I found there to have been insufficient use), I also held that the rights claimed in that case would have been too exclusive to constitute easements. Those claimed rights, however, were “single space” parking easements, and in fact slightly less even than a full single space – part of the areas parked on lay within the titles to the Applicants’ properties adjacent to their rear garages. They were, as I found, effectively claiming an exclusive right to use very small parts of the Respondents’ much larger lane – immediately adjacent to their own land - as extensions of their curtilage. My view was that if, as every higher Court and Tribunal kept saying, Batchelor v. Marlow was still good law, it must have some core and irreducible content – and if this was not a case to which it applied, what could be?

80. The applicants in Viscido had not, for example, framed their applications as being for rights to park anywhere on the Respondents’ lane, of which the parts next to their garages might often be the most convenient and frequently used. It was these ‘half spaces’ or nothing. I noted that Lord Neuberger, in Moncrieff v. Jamieson , was clearly of the view that “…the grant of a right to park a single vehicle anywhere on a servient tenement which is large enough to hold, say, twenty vehicles, must be capable of being a servitude or an easement. In such a case, there is no specific place where the vehicle is to be parked, so that there is no specific area from which the servient owner can be said to be excluded.” (paragraph 137). He reserved his opinion on whether “the right to park a vehicle in a one-vehicle space can be an easement” (144).

81. Batchelor itself involved the claim for a right to park “ up to six ” vehicles on a strip which could only accommodate six vehicles. Even if just confined to weekday business hours, that was held to be too exclusive to be capable of existing as an easement.

82. Mr. Brilliant referred to, and placed some reliance upon, the decision of Amanda Tipples QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court judge) in Begley v. Taylor [2014] EWHC 1180 (Ch.) , for both its factual similarities to the present case, and the rights found to exist. In that case, two sets of claimants claimed (amongst other issues, including rights of way and interference with them) rights to park on what was referred to as an “Access Road”, a private road leading to their properties in a cul-de-sac.

83. This aspect of the case was considered from paragraph 81 onwards of the decision. Both sets of claimants had claimed rights to park on the whole of the Access Road, but the judge declared rights to exist commensurate with the use she found to have been made by each set of claimants. Although “the servient tenement is, of course, the whole of the Access Road” (paragraph 87), the rights declared to exist were in each case the “right to park up to three cars on the Access Road adjacent to their property” (paragraphs 88 and 91), in locations referable to the evidence of actual use.

84. The significance of the whole of the Access Road being the originally identified servient tenement was, however, that Batchelor v. Marlow could be (once again) distinguished, on the basis that even with both sets of claimants parking on parts of it, the servient owners use of the Access Road as a whole had not been rendered “illusory”. They had resurfaced it, and could still also drive and park on it, in particular on the area outside their own house (paragraph 87). Discussion

85. I consider that the right claimed by the Applicant Mrs. Hudson, and which would otherwise arise from the findings I have made above, is capable of existing as an easement, on the basis that it is:- i) a right to park a single vehicle; and ii) to do so on any available space on the strip as now identified, not exclusively in one space (whether the one formerly marked “3” or otherwise).

86. By analogy with Begley , and in contrast to the facts and decision in Batchelor , a right to park only one vehicle on a strip capable of taking five does not deprive the Respondents as owners of any reasonable use of their land, or render their ownership of it “illusory”. Not only do the Respondents own the whole of the road – and so have the power to surface, paint and do any other works to it – they could also (if they chose to do so) themselves park on any part of the strip not then in use by the owner and visitors of number 3. The fact that they may not want to do so is irrelevant. By extension from Virdi v. Chana and the other cases mentioned, they could also (if they chose to do so) decorate parts of the strip with plants or other objects.

87. The Respondents’ stated objection that this strip area is part of a “turning circle” essential for the vehicular movements of others is not a proposition for which permission for any expert evidence was sought or (therefore) granted. It may be a statement of the obvious that if someone parked on the main section of roadway itself, or right in the middle of it, that would obstruct the use of others. It is not obvious, and there is in fact no evidence to suggest, that the parking of one vehicle on this strip would interfere to any significant extent with anyone’s else’s rights to manoeuvre vehicles. Although this was otherwise irrelevant to the Applicants’ claims for rights arising from subsequent prescriptive use, it is at least of some significance that the original 1974 planning permission for construction of the five dwellings in Ewens Gardens clearly earmarked this strip as a parking area for vehicles. It was also, of course, marked out at such by Mr. Hudson in 2003. That tends to confirm that it is at least capable of such use, and was originally contemplated as such a parking area.

88. I do not consider that the fact that a large proportion of the use relied upon by Mrs. Hudson to establish the easement claimed consisted of parking in the bay marked “3” necessarily confines her to claiming an easement just to park in that space , and so potentially invoking the Batchelor/Stenner “single space” problem. There were, as I have found, at least nine years of use before any bays were marked out at all. In those years, Mr. and Mrs. Hudson and their visitors would have parked on any part of the strip. After that time, it is true that most (if not all) of the parking was in space 3, but when the period of use is looked at overall, it is of the whole of the strip. An applicant for a prescriptive easement is entitled to frame their claim with reference to a wider area than just those parts in which (for example) they can be proved actually to have set foot on or driven their wheels over most frequently. The findings and outcomes in Begley can be explained on the facts of that case – namely that both sets of claimants had in fact, in the whole period relied upon, only ever parked on the parts of the access road outside their houses.

89. On the Applicants’ statement of case as now corrected and amended (although it was always clear that the rights claimed were to park on the whole of a “Parking Strip”, albeit one that had been incorrectly drawn on the plan), I therefore conclude that a right to park a single additional vehicle anywhere on that strip is capable of being an easement. Conclusion and directions

90. I am therefore satisfied that Mrs. Hudson, as owner of number 3, has established such a right, and will direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to her application. I shall impose a condition to that direction under rule 40(3)(a) of the Tribunal rules that an entry be made on the respective titles to confirm that the right extends to the parking of a single vehicle only.

91. For the reasons and on the findings already stated, the Applicants Mr. and Mrs. Bewley cannot establish a similar right for the benefit of number 4. I will therefore direct the Chief Land Registrar to cancel their application.

92. Any representations on liability for the costs of these proceedings, from the date of the reference to this Tribunal (7 th October 2024) should be made by the date stated in the order. Judge Ewan Paton Dated this 22 nd December 2025 By Order of The Tribunal