Glen Heaton, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Justice

Introduction

1. This is a claim for judicial review brought by Glen Heaton [“the Claimant”] against a review decision of the Probation Service, as overseen by the Secretary of State for Justice [“the Defendant”], as to the terms of one of his licence conditions which were imposed upon him following his early release from a custodial sentence. Procedural background

2. The claim was originally received in the Administrative Court on 4 th August 2025. The sealed claim form was not validly served. A further claim form was issued and sealed on 11 th September 2025 and then validly served on the Defendant.

3. On 15 th September 2025 the Claimant filed an application for urgent consideration that was dated 12 th September 2025.

4. The application for urgent consideration was considered by Upper Tribunal Judge Church (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) on 22 nd September 2025. His order, sealed the following day, directed that there be a “rolled up” hearing and he made case management directions. His decision was predicated on the basis that this “should permit the proceedings to be dealt with relatively swiftly and represent an efficient use of judicial time.”

5. On 28 th October 2025 the Defendant filed an Acknowledgment of Service, Detailed Grounds of Resistance and a witness statement from Lynda Marsh of that same date and which produced a number of documentary exhibits. Lynda Marsh is the Head of Service of North Kent Probation Delivery Unit. She is the person that made the decision under review and her witness statement explains her decision making. Factual background and the decision under review

6. The Claimant was born on 5 th December 1980. He is 45 years of age. He has a long-term partner and they have three daughters. The youngest daughter is 9 years of age. His partner and their daughters live in a property in Hoo in Kent.

7. The Claimant has a number of previous convictions. It is the last of those which is relevant to this claim. It relates to events that took place on 26 th October 2020 when the Claimant was involved in a fatal road traffic collision. At just after 6pm that evening the Claimant was driving a Peugeot motor vehicle at speed on Chattenden Lane when he struck a pedestrian, Brian Durden, as he was walking on a pedestrian crossing. The collision caused him to suffer a catastrophic head injury and be thrown some 60 metres. He was killed instantly.

8. The Claimant provided a negative breath test for alcohol at the scene and at the Police Station. However, he provided a blood-sample which tested positive for Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC-7) with a reading of 7 micrograms per litre of blood which is over the specified limit.

9. Following a lengthy Police investigation, on 13 th April 2022 the Claimant was charged with the offence of causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 . His first appearance at the Medway Magistrates’ Court was on 25 th May 2022 and he was granted unconditional bail. His case was sent to the Maidstone Crown Court and he originally pleaded not guilty.

10. However, on 21 st February 2023 the Claimant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving, following an indication of sentence having been given in accordance with procedure set out in R v Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim 888 ; [2005] 1 WLR 2532 . Again, the Claimant remained on unconditional bail pending sentence.

11. On 30 th May 2023 the Claimant was sentenced to 50-months imprisonment.

12. Before being released on licence the issue of a proposed exclusion zone condition was raised by the Claimant’s partner who contacted the then instructed solicitors to understand why this was necessary. This led, on 30 th May 2025, the Claimant to send a Pre-Action Protocol letter to the Probation Service.

13. On 26 th June 2025 the Claimant was released from prison on licence at the half-way point of his custodial sentence, with the remainder of the sentence to be served on licence. The licence expiry date is 29 th July 2027. The licence conditions include a number of conditions, one of which is relevant to this claim which was “Not to enter the area as defined in the attached map without the prior approval of your supervising officer.” That area included both his family home in Hoo and the street on which the sister of the deceased lives. Those two properties are two roads apart.

14. As a result of the exclusion zone the Claimant has been living, since his early release, with his sister in law in Chatham. This is therefore outside of the exclusion but relatively close.

15. On 29 th July 2025 following a full review by Lynda Marsh, the Defendant confirmed that the exclusion zone would remain in its entirety. This is the decision that is the subject matter of this claim.

16. The Review decision itself is four pages long. It refers to a number of the relevant authorities. It sets out at paragraph 4.1 the material that Lynda Marsh considered and it makes clear that she was asked to consider if the exclusion zone remained necessary and proportionate or whether the risk it seeks to address can be managed in a less intrusive way. The decision itself is set out in the following terms: “In reaching this decision, I have reviewed relevant policies, case law, and material in determining whether the exclusion zone currently in force is genuinely necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances or whether the risk to the victim’s family could be managed in a less intrusive way, including whether there are any potential compromises. Mr Heaton requests that he be permitted to return to his family home with his wife and children which is located in the residential area closest to the victim’s family. The victim’s family’s position is that the exclusion zone should not be amended. I have assessed that the Article 8 factors in favour of this position are as follows: The extended family live in the areas of the exclusion zone and support the immediate family of the victim. Children of the family attend school in the area, and the victim’s sister lives very close to the family home of Mr Heaton. Where the victim and the offender both have equal rights of access to the same type of location, the victim’s rights are considered paramount. One example of this may be where they would otherwise live in close proximity to each other, and an exclusion zone has been placed on the area to permit the victim to go about their day to day lives without fear of confrontation. On the basis of the above, I have considered whether there are any appropriate compromises by which Mr. Heaton’s risk could be managed in a less intrusive way. As Mr Heaton has requested to live in the family home, which (as above) is in very close proximity to the residence of the victim’s sister, there is no way that the risks of psychological harm to the family of the victim arising from contact with Mr. Heaton (whether intentional or unintentional) could be managed in a less intrusive way. In consideration of the above relevant factors, I have therefore concluded that the current exclusion zone licence condition remains necessary and proportionate in the circumstances. Accordingly, my decision is that the exclusion zone licence condition currently applicable should not be varied.”

17. One of the documents considered by Lynda Marsh was a Victim Contact Report dated 24 th July 2023. This set out the impact of the death and the pain felt by the family of the deceased and which was considered to be persisting. It made clear that the deceased’s sister lived only two roads away from the Claimant’s home and she did not want to see him walk past her house. The document states that she is bedbound and only goes out in a wheelchair. Other relatives were concerned about encountering the Claimant when they visit the deceased’s sister to look after her. It is clear from that document that the sister is reliant on both her son and daughter in law for their day to day needs.

18. Lynda Marsh’s witness statement in these proceedings also sets out the basis for her decision. The material part of that witness statement is in the following terms [§§9 – 12, 15 ]: “When Mr Heaton requested a review of the licence condition, I was provided with a review template to assist me in ensuring that the outcome of that review would be set out in a clear format, addressing all relevant factors. I understand that the same has been used in other reviews of exclusion zone licence conditions. As the finalised review confirms, the original case documents were reviewed, in addition to other documents including the CPS pack, the exclusion zone licence condition, and requests from the victim’s family. My intention in carrying out the review was to consider the matter afresh (as if a new request from the victim’s family, via the VLO, for an exclusion zone licence condition had been made), taking into consideration Mr Heaton’s rationale for his request (including any representations). I adopted this approach in order to carry out the review with an open mind so as to ensure that all licence conditions were necessary and proportionate. In carrying out my review, I discussed the exclusion zone licence condition with Nick Doyle, the Senior Probation Officer for the Victim Liaison Officer, Kayleigh Edwards, and Mollie Johnson, the previous probation practitioner to Mr Heaton’s current officer, Saran Leech, in meetings which took place on 24th July 2025. The licence conditions were initially put in place by the previous probation practitioner for Mr Heaton’s application for release on temporary licence from custody. On 4th June 2025, the Effective Proposal Framework tool was used in considering the licence conditions. This is a digital tool used by Probation Practitioners at pre sentence stage and as part of pre-release planning. It is used to identify requirements, licence conditions and interventions for individuals based on their risk and need profile. The Claimant’s current officer was also provided with the views of the victim’s family and her knowledge of the original matter via the CPS documents when making her decision as to which licence conditions should be imposed. …. As my review set out, having considered the VLO’s concerns and the proximity of the victim’s family and Claimant (particularly the victim’s sister, who resides two streets away from the Claimant’s family home), I concluded that the balance of these Article 8 rights was in favour of maintaining the exclusion zone licence condition and there was no less intrusive alternative which would sufficiently manage the risk of harm to the victim’s family if the exclusion zone was to be lifted.” Events since the decision under challenge

19. During a subsequent consultation with the Senior Probation Officer for the Victim Liaison Team on 13 th October 2025, Lynda Marsh enquired about visits made by family members to the sister of the deceased. These enquiries further confirmed that the victim’s sister has severe medical needs; she requires a carer to assist her in leaving her home, as she uses a wheelchair. Her son and daughter, who live in the Medway Towns area, regularly visit her at her home (which, as set out above, is only two streets away from that of the Claimant). Due to her physical limitations, the Claimant’s sister is unable to travel independently to see them outside the exclusion zone. Lynda Marsh addressed this issue in her witness statement stating [§18]: “I understand that the Claimant has suggested that the poor health of the victim’s sister means the likelihood of unintentional contact with the victim’s family inside the exclusion zone is reduced. I do not agree with this suggestion. My view is that the medical needs of the victim’s sister mean that the presence of the victim’s family in the exclusion zone is unavoidable and that, given the close proximity of the victim’s sister’s home to that of the Claimant, the risk of contact is in no way reduced.”

20. Relatively shortly before the hearing before me a request was made by the Claimant for a travel corridor to be allowed within the existing exclusion zone. That was considered by Lynda Marsh and led to discussions with the family of the deceased. Those discussions revealed that the day to day chores of caring for the deceased’s sister, who lives very close to the Claimant’s home, mean that family members frequently have to visit locations such as the pharmacy and Medical Centre. In addition, a friend of the deceased’s sister lives very close to the Claimant’s home. The position was summarised in the following way by the VLO “I do feel that the risk of any contact with Mr Heaton is high due to it being such a small village., it’s not a town where you can be unseen ….. Regarding Psychological harm in my view this is very high, the whole family have been greatly impacted by the incident”.

21. Lynda Marsh’s assessment was “having considered of (sic) the updated assessments from the VLO in respect of both the risk of unintentional contact and the high risk of psychological harm in the event of such contact, we ultimately concluded that the proposed variation of the licence would not be appropriate and that the current exclusion licence condition remains both necessary and proportionate at this time.”

22. Lynda Marsh therefore decided as a result of that further information not to allow the proposed variation. That is not a decision that is the subject of any public law challenge. I will return to what relevance the information obtained after the decision under review does have and does not have to my considerations. Grounds of judicial review

23. There are five grounds of challenge namely: (1) The exclusion zone disproportionately affects the Claimant’s Article 8 ECHR rights; (2) The Probation Service’s Licence Conditions Policy Framework [“the Framework”] has not been applied when considering whether the exclusion zone is necessary and/or proportionate such that it is procedurally unfair; (3) The Framework has not been applied appropriately in that the effect of the exclusion zone on the Claimant has not been balanced against victim views such that it is procedurally unfair; (4) The Defendant has not complied with its duty of inquiry in that it has not sought to ascertain the effect of the exclusion zone on the Claimant and /or his family or sought to seek information regarding alternative conditions or a reduction in the exclusion zone (5) The decision to impose the exclusion zone was irrational in the Wednesbury sense Legal framework

24. Sections 244 and 243A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 [“CJA”] govern automatic early release for offenders serving determinate sentences to be followed by licence in the community.

25. Section 250 of the CJA provides, so far as is relevant, in respect of conditions of that licence: 250 Licence conditions (1) In this section— (a) “the standard conditions” means such conditions as may be prescribed for the purposes of this section as standard conditions, and (b) “prescribed” means prescribed by the Secretary of State by order. ….. (4) Any licence under this Chapter in respect of a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment …. (a)must include the standard conditions, … (b)may include— (i) any condition authorised by section 62 , 64 or 64A of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 or section 28 of the Offender Management Act 2007 , and (ii) such other conditions of a kind prescribed by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this paragraph as the Secretary of State may for the time being specify in the licence. …. (8) In exercising his powers to prescribe standard conditions or the other conditions referred to in subsection (4)(b)(ii), the Secretary of State must have regard to the following purposes of the supervision of offenders while on licence under this Chapter— (a) the protection of the public, (b) the prevention of re-offending, and (c) securing the successful re-integration of the prisoner into the community.

26. Article 7 of the Criminal Justice (Sentencing) (Licence Conditions) Order 2015 provides details of other types of licence conditions: Other types of licence conditions

7. —(1) The conditions in paragraph (2) are the kinds of condition that may be included in an offender’s licence in accordance with section 250(4) (b)(ii) of the Act . (2) A condition concerning– (a) residence at a specified place; (b) restriction of residency; (c) making or maintaining contact with a person; (d) participation in, or co-operation with, a programme or set of activities; (e) possession, ownership, control or inspection of specified items or documents; (f) disclosure of information; (g) a curfew arrangement; (h) freedom of movement; (i) supervision in the community by the supervising officer, or other responsible officer, or organisation; (j) restriction of specified conduct or specified acts. (2A) A search condition, meaning a condition requiring a terrorist offender to submit to a search of their person under section 43 C of the Terrorism Act 2000 . (3) For the purpose of this article, “curfew arrangement” means an arrangement under which an offender is required to remain at a specified place for a specified period of time which is not an arrangement contained in a curfew condition imposed by virtue of section 250(5) of the Act .

27. Article 8 of ECHR provides as follows: Article 8: Right to privacy

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Case law on the approach of the Court to decisions of the Probation Service in respect of licence conditions

28. In R (Craven) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 850 the High Court considered the terms of a life licence following the offender’s release from custody. One of the conditions of that licence was an exclusion zone. As originally imposed it had prohibited him from the whole of the Metropolitan areas of Newcastle and North Tyneside but shortly before the hearing a smaller exclusion zone was proposed. The important observation of Stanley Burton J, in so far as Article 8 of the ECHR was concerned, was as follows [§§31, 38, 39]: “ I consider that the imposition of an exclusion zone on the movements of a convicted murderer, in order to minimise the risk of accidental contact between him and the family of his victim, should be considered as capable of being necessary in a democratic society. A democratic society should be sensitive to the emotional harm caused to victims of crime, particularly of the most serious of crimes, to their anxieties and concerns, and to the risks of emotional or psychological harm in the event of an encounter between convicted murderer and the family of his victim …. So far as the right to a family life of Mr Craven’s family is concerned one must bear in mind that family life is bound to be affected by the conviction of a son for murder Their right to a family life was affected by the sentence of imprisonment passed on their son. The interference with their family life was justified under Article 8.2 Article 8.2 may justify further interference with it. after release from prison on licence of the son of the family …… in my judgement it is right that the Secretary of State should give weight to the concerns and anxieties of the family of Miss Laing …… It is necessary to make a broad assessment of the competing interests involved in their respective values.”

29. In R (Carman) v Secretary of State for Justice [2004] EWHC 2400 the High Court was considering a challenge to the terms of licence imposed following a conviction for sexual offences. Moses J made the following general observation, having referred to Craven and stating that that authority was no warrant whatever for challenges to the imposition or content of licence conditions [§32, 33]: “The probation service work hard enough as it is in seeking to protect the public while in the frontline of an effective and humane criminal justice system designed to reduce the risk of re-offending. They deserve the protection of this court from spurious time-consuming and expensive challenges. The court should be astute to prevent such challenges at the permission stage. The licence conditions and assessment of risks to the public, on which they are based, are matters of fine judgement for those in the prison and probation service experienced in such matters not for the courts. The courts must be steadfastly astute not to interfere save in the most exceptional case”

30. In R (Bentham) v The Governor of HMP USK and Prescoed and Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 2469 (Admin) the High Court considered a licence condition that prohibited the Claimant from entering the area of Monmouth Town without the prior approval of his supervising officer. The Claimant had been convicted of an offence of causing death by dangerous driving. The judicial review claim was an Article 8 EHCR challenge. In his judgment Wyn Williams J concluded that the approach of Stanley Burton J in Craven applied equally in a non-life licence situation as in a life licence case. The Claimant’s family home was in Monmouth and was occupied by his mother and maternal grandparents. The facts are important in Bentham in that the Judge accepted the Claimant’s evidence that he wished to return home to care for his grandparents. The Court also concluded that there was no chance of an encounter between the Claimant and the victim’s family provided that he was prevented from entering Monmouth Town Centre and its immediate environs, except for his family home the Court. It is notable that although the Judge found prohibiting Bentham visiting to care for his family was disproportionate, the Judge found that it was not disproportionate to prohibit him from living in his former home during the licence period. This is indicative of the highly fact sensitive nature of these cases.

31. In R (ZX) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWCA Civ 155 the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from a judicial review claim that related to the imposition of licence conditions. The Claimant had pleaded guilty to two terrorism related offences and received three years imprisonment. He was subsequently released on licence. One of the conditions imposed on his licence precluded him from having contact with his children, save as directed by the Probation Service and Local Children's Services. At first instance Kerr J refused the application for permission to bring judicial review at an oral hearing. Lord Justice Davis in giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing the appeal from the Administrative Court stated [§32]: “…..at all relevant times the appellant was subject to a sentence of imprisonment. That he had been the subject of early release on licence, pursuant to the statutory provisions, cannot and does not replace that. The actions and decisions of the NPS have to be viewed in that context as Mr Manknell neatly put it, release on licence is not an alternative to liberty; it is an alternative to remaining in prison”

32. Lord Justice Davis endorsed the observations of Moses J in the judgment of Carman (see above) and then observed [§47]: “It is indeed likely to be an exceptional case where a challenge to the imposition of a licence condition, or conditions, is to be the subject of the grant of permission to apply for judicial review.”

33. In R (Begley) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWHC 2714 (Admin) the Court was again considering an exclusion zone that was part of licence conditions. In that case the Claimant had been convicted of manslaughter and received a six year sentence. Upon release he wanted to move back to his family home where his wife and child lived. In his judgment Kerr J made clear that the Court’s review function of a proportionality challenge was that set out by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Governors of R (SB) v Denbigh School [2007] 1 AC 100 and the standard is objective with the Court’s role being supervisory and then stated [§§60, 61]: “I wish to emphasise, however, that the review jurisdiction of the court is just that. It is not the merits based approach recommended to me by Mr Stanbury, when he suggested that the court was as well placed as the NPS to strike the balance required for the setting of licence conditions. That is contrary to the approach of Moses J in the Carman case, expressly endorsed as deserving of emphasis by Davis LJ in X, last year . It is the NPS, not the court, which is entrusted with the task of setting licence conditions for released prisoners. The margin of appreciation enjoyed by the NPS is, as Mr. Cohen rightly submits, considerable. The balancing exercise undertaken with full knowledge of the evidence gathered, including any evidence of concerns of the victim's family and any distress that may be caused in the event of an encounter with the released prisoner even if, objectively, such an encounter is quite unlikely to occur.” The Framework

34. The applicable version of the Framework that applied at the time of the decision (and which remains in force) is that which was reissued on 9 th January 2025. Paragraphs 3.19 – 3.23 of the Framework address additional licence conditions. Paragraph 3.19 addresses necessity and proportionality in the following terms: 3.19 If the COM assesses that standard conditions are not sufficient to assist the offender’s successful integration into the community, to prevent further re-offending or to ensure the protection of the public, then they may consider requesting an appropriate additional condition from the list at Annex A. This request must be based on relevant information gathered either from the offender or other stakeholders, and/or based on the relevant risk assessments in the case. Any additional licence conditions must be necessary and proportionate, meaning: • Necessary: Any licence condition requested must have been identified as a necessary way to manage a specific risk or issue posed by the offender, without limitation to the current index offence; and • Proportionate: Any licence condition must be the least intrusive means of enabling that management.

35. Paragraphs 3.26 – 3.32 of the Framework addresses the ability for victims who qualify for the Victim Contact Scheme (VCS) to have the right to make representations about licence conditions that relate to them. This is usually in coordination with the Victim Liaison Officer (VLO) assigned to that victim. Paragraphs 3.28 and 3.30 refer to exclusion zones and state: “Licence conditions concerning victims are typically limited to exclusion zones or non-contact conditions, but in principle any condition may be requested if it is considered necessary and proportionate to manage the risk posed by an offender on licence. With respect to risk, licence conditions may be imposed which are sensitive to the emotional harm caused to victims of crime (and their families), particularly to the most serious of crimes, to their anxieties and concerns, and to the risks of emotional or psychological harm in the event of a chance encounter with a particular offender on licence. Even if an offender does not pose a risk of serious physical harm to the victim, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so, appropriate conditions may be imposed so that the victim may go about their daily life without fear of coming across the offender on licence. In the context of exclusion zones, due regard must therefore be given to the offender on licence’s activity in relation to the zone balanced against the risks and rights of the victim and/or their family. For instance, where the offender on licence’s activity, such as shopping or meeting family members, can reasonably take place outside of an appropriately drawn exclusion zone, the inconvenience can be justified to prevent a chance encounter with the victim or their family which could be traumatic and re-victimise them.”

36. Paragraphs 3.33 – 3.37 of the Framework specifically addresses exclusion zones and provides practical guidance and stresses the need for clarity in their terms. Discussion

37. Analysis of the authorities referred to above relating to Article 8 ECHR challenges to licence conditions imposed by the Probation Service reveal two important matters. First that each case is highly fact sensitive and it must follow therefore that a particular exclusion zone in one case would be necessary and proportionate and yet in another case it would not be. Second that the Court accords a considerable margin of appreciation to the decision maker who is likely to be highly experienced and best placed to consider what is inevitably a difficult balancing exercise of the individual features of and competing interests in the case. That is because it is likely that the Article 8 rights of a victim or a victim’s family will be engaged just as will those of an offender and their family.

38. During the course of submissions, the advocates referred to the margin of appreciation as being a principle of deference. The word deference is capable of being misunderstood and I prefer to approach my assessment on the basis of according a margin of appreciation to the decision maker just as Kerr J did in Begley . The authorities make clear that ordinarily the Court will not grant permission to challenge a decision of the Probation Service as to the terms of the licence conditions and that it will only be an exceptional case in which they would be likely to do so (see Carman and Z X above). There is, in my judgement, good reason for that. Those tasked with the responsibility to strike a balance between competing rights and interests will have undertaken this balancing exercise on many occasions previously and will have experience of what has taken place in the past in many other cases albeit having to make a case specific decision. Further they will work and have experience of the local community and the locations and area concerned.

39. The Claimant placed significant reliance on Bentham (see above) . I understand why they did so, but it is not an answer to the instant claim. It was a case involving the same underlying offence (causing death by dangerous driving) and it related to the terms of an exclusion zone. However, as already indicated real care must be taken with what was a highly fact sensitive decision. I do not read Bentham as reflecting any important issue of principle. It is an authority which, in my judgement, very much turns on its own facts and specifically that the risk of a chance encounter was considered by the Judge to be non-existent. It is tolerably clear that that is not the position in the claim that I am determining. The proximity between the Claimant’s house and that of the deceased’s sister is a fact that cannot be ignored.

40. Turning to each of the grounds in turn, albeit that grounds 1, 2 and 3 are in reality different articulations of the same underlying complaint. Ground 1

41. The Claimant avers that the decision under review amounts to a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 ECHR rights. This is the ground upon which the greatest emphasis and focus was placed during the hearing. It is clear that the decision under review engages Article 8 of the ECHR. The Defendant has rightly, in my judgement, not sought to contend to the contrary.

42. In my judgement it is important to consider this ground firmly based on its individual facts and focusing on the information available to the decision maker at the time. The Claimant had received a 50 month sentence for committing an indictable only offence. That offence caused the death of a member of a family. The Claimant was released at the half-way point as an alternative to remaining in custody. There is nothing that prevents the Claimant from seeing his family outside of the exclusion zone nor having contact with them in a number of different ways such as by telephone including FaceTime or similar or messaging. What is of fundamental importance in this case is that the sister of the deceased lives just two roads away from the Claimant’s family home and the decision maker was aware at the time of the decision that she was visited and cared for regularly by other members of the family. The Claimant sought to place reliance on the fact that the deceased’s sister was bedbound and used a wheelchair if going outside. Given the fact that she would be visited by family to care and help her then this point does not assist the Claimant. I acknowledge that some additional details have become clear recently and that they potentially increase the risk of encounter and which were not known at the time of the decision. Those matters do not assist the Claimant in this claim and certainly not on this ground and I have ignored them when considering this ground and grounds 2 and 3.

43. During the course of argument, the Claimant placed significant weight on the fact that whilst released under investigation and then whilst on bail (and whilst he lived at his own home) there were no problems/encounters. The difficulty with that argument is that it places a primacy on there having to have been a problem in the past before an exclusion zone could be imposed. There is nothing in the Framework or in the authorities to justify such a hard edged position. What is important is the fact that the risk of an encounter is plainly not negligible in this case and it is far greater than that in Bentham.

44. What is also clear from an assessment of the decision itself and the witness statement of Lynda Marsh is that the review decision was based on a detailed consideration of a constellation of relevant documents and facts. It proceeded on an assumption that an encounter with a member of the family was possible and that it would have an impact if it occurred and that no lesser measure would address the concerns. The material before Lynda Marsh made clear that the victim’s sister was wheelchair bound and was regularly visited by the family. Therefore, what she says in paragraph 18 of her witness statement applied equally at the time of the decision as it did subsequently.

45. I have considered the correct approach to the qualified rights contained in Article 8 by reference to the five steps set out in R (Razgar) v SSHD [2004] 2 AC 368 (paragraph 17); namely: First , will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant's right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life? Second , if so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of article 8? Third , if so, is such interference in accordance with the law? Fourth , if so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others? Fifth , if so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved?

46. Plainly the answer to the first three questions is yes, and there is no issue about that in this case. The issues relate to fourth and fifth questions.

47. The interference in this case is focussed upon the rights and freedom of others (i.e. the deceased’s family). This is an entirely legitimate approach (see Craven above). In my judgement it is not arguable that the Article 8 balance was wrongly struck or put another way, in my judgement the existence of an exclusion zone which prevents the Claimant from going to and living at his family home is on these unusual facts necessary. That is the conclusion that the decision maker made. The reality is that this was a difficult balancing exercise. However, on the facts here the imposition of an exclusion zone condition is necessary for the protection of others given the possibility of an encounter and the impact that it would have were it to occur. It is also restriction which will not apply after July 2027.

48. I accept that in the decision document Lynda Marsh states “ Where the victim and the offender both have equal rights of access to the same type of location, the victim’s rights are considered paramount. One example of this may be where they would otherwise live in close proximity to each other, and an exclusion zone has been placed on the area to permit the victim to go about their day to day lives without fear of confrontation.”. It is important that the observation is not viewed in an overly granular way and alongside the decision as a whole. In my judgement the decision maker clearly struck the right balance and was right to conclude that rights of the deceased’s family were on these facts paramount.

49. Lastly, in my judgement the interference is plainly proportionate to the public end sought to be achieved and the conclusion of the decision maker that no lesser measure would achieve that end was, on these facts, correct.

50. It follows that this ground is not arguable. Grounds 2 and 3

51. In my judgement these grounds can be taken together and I have very largely addressed them with respect to ground 1. The Framework sets out an Article 8 compliant approach. Given my conclusion on ground 1, then ground 2 cannot be arguable because it must follow that the Framework was applied correctly (as it was) and there was nothing procedurally unfair about Lynda Marsh’s approach to the Framework. Similarly given my conclusion on ground 1 the suggestion that the effect of the exclusion zone has not been properly balanced against the views of the victims such that it was procedurally unfair is not arguable. The Claimant may disagree with the way the balance was exercised but it was for Lynda Marsh to conduct that balance and the way in which she did so was not arguably procedurally unfair. Ground 4

52. This ground is based on an allegation that the Defendant failed to comply with the so called Tamesid e duty of inquiry. A public body has a duty to carry out a sufficient inquiry prior to making its decision. This derives from Lord Diplock’s speech in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014 , where he said (at page 1065B): “ The question for the court is, did the Secretary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly?”.

53. As the Divisional Court made clear in R(Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [100] in relation to the [2014] EWHC 1662 (Admin) Tameside duty: “The following principles can be gleaned from the authorities: (1) The obligation upon the decision-maker is only to take such steps to inform himself as are reasonable . (2) Subject to a Wednesbury challenge, it is for the public body, and not the court to decide upon the manner and intensity of inquiry to be undertaken (R(Khatun) v Newham LBC [2005] QB 37 at paragraph [35], per Laws LJ). (3) The court should not intervene merely because it considers that further inquiries would have been sensible or desirable. It should intervene only if no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the basis of the inquiries made that it possessed the information necessary for its decision (per Neill LJ in R (Bayani)v. Kensington and Chelsea Royal LBC (1990) 22 HLR 406) (4) .The court should establish what material was before the authority and should only strike down a decision by the authority not to make further inquiries if no reasonable council possessed of that material could suppose that the inquiries they had made were sufficient (per Schiemann J in R (Costello) v Nottingham City Council (1989) 21 HLR 301; cited with approval by Laws LJ in (R(Khatun) v Newham LBC (supra) at paragraph [35]). (5) The principle that the decision-maker must call his own attention to considerations relevant to his decision, a duty which in practice may require him to consult outside bodies with a particular knowledge or involvement in the case, does not spring from a duty of procedural fairness to the applicant, but from the Secretary of State’s duty so to inform himself as to arrive at a rational conclusion (per Laws LJ in (R (London Borough of Southwark) v Secretary of State for Education (supra) at page 323D). (6) The wider the discretion conferred on the Secretary of State, the more important it must be that he has all relevant material to enable him properly to exercise it (R (Venables) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] AC 407 at 466G)”.

54. In addition, in R ( Balajigari) v SSHD [2019] EWCA 673 the Court of Appeal repeated and endorsed the content of paragraph 100 of Plantagenet Alliance in respect of the Tameside duty.

55. It is tolerably clear that the decision maker in this case did conduct significant inquires. In my judgement the Claimant does not come close to establishing that no reasonable probation officer could suppose that the inquiries made were sufficient. The amount of information which included that provided by the Claimant is made clear in the witness statement of Lynda Marsh. In particular there was extensive consultation with the VLO. Ignoring for a moment information that was subsequently obtained, my judgement is that the decision was made following all reasonable inquiries. The information about the views of the family were of long-standing. There was nothing to suggest that they would have changed in 2024 or 2025. As it transpires they had not.

56. Recently following the request for a travel corridor, further inquiries were made of the family for the deceased. As a result, some additional matters were recently identified in relation to a friend of the sister of the deceased who lives very close to the Claimant’s home as well as the locations where family members of the deceased go to regularly near to the Claimant’s home as well as attending the sister’s home. Further the family of the deceased expressed a very real concern about chance encounters. Those matters all support the necessity for the exclusion zone rather than undermine its necessity, as well as its proportionality. They could arguably have been clarified at the time of the decision. I do not regard them as being significant enough to amount to a breach of the Tameside duty. But even if they were, then in my judgement section 31 (3C)(a) and 31(3D) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 is engaged on the basis that it is at least highly likely that the outcome for the Claimant would not have been substantially different and I therefore would refuse permission on that basis as well as on the merits. Ground 5

57. This last ground alleges that the decision in this case was not one which was reasonably open to the decision maker. It is therefore a standard Wednesbury irrationality challenge. It follows from my conclusion in relation to grounds 1 – 3 that the Claimant faces an insurmountable difficulty. It was notable that this ground was not really pressed in oral argument. There is good reason why. It is not arguable. The decision maker here is highly experienced. She took into account a number of relevant and competing factors and had to make a finely balanced decision. In my judgement her conclusion was one which was reasonably open to her. Such an assessment can be made without according a considerable margin of appreciation but when that is also taken into account the Claimant’s arguments on this ground are untenable. This ground does not get close to the exceptional category that Davis LJ was referring to in Z X. Conclusion

58. For the reasons set out above none of the grounds of judicial review can succeed and I refuse permission on all grounds and the claim is dismissed.