UK case law

Ian Calderbank v The Information Commissioner

[2026] UKFTT GRC 490 · First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Information Rights · 2026

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Full judgment

On reading the written representations of the parties, the Tribunal unanimously determines that the appeal is dismissed. Reasons Introduction

1. In or about 2008, a serious road traffic accident (‘the accident’) occurred on the A6, within the area for which Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council (‘the Council’), as the highway authority, had responsibility. It appears that the accident resulted from ice forming on the carriageway. Legal proceedings followed, brought by various individuals involved in the accident. The claims were settled and the Council instructed a firm of solicitors (‘the solicitors’) to enquire into the possibility of securing some reimbursement from a utility company which had carried out work to the carriageway. As a consequence, on 1 May 2013, the solicitors sent a letter to Mr Ian Calderbank, the Appellant in these proceedings and a former employee of the Council, asking him to contact them in connection with the accident. Mr Calderbank says that he was distressed to receive this approach because it caused him to think that his personal data had been compromised.

2. Many years later, it appears that Mr Calderbank experienced renewed upset and anxiety on recalling the correspondence of May 2013 to which we have referred. It seems that these feelings prompted him to send a request for information to the Council on 5 August 2024. The five-part request included the question as to how the solicitors ‘came to be given’ his personal details and suggested that those details had been shared with the solicitors by the Council.

3. The other four parts of the request have fallen away and there is no need to say anything about them. References hereafter to ‘the request’ are confined to the part of the request directed to the means by which the solicitors came into possession of Mr Calderbank’s contact details.

4. On 16 October 2024 the Council delivered its response, by which it denied sharing Mr Calderbank’s personal data with the solicitors and refused the request, citing the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, reg 12(4)(a) (information not held at the time of the request).

5. Mr Calderbank challenged the response but, following an internal review, the Council maintained its position. It also suggested that he might benefit from contacting the solicitors direct.

6. On 13 February 2025 Mr Calderbank complained to the Commissioner about the way in which the request had been handled.

7. By a Decision Notice dated 31 July 2025 (‘the DN’) the Commissioner determined that the Council had correctly cited EIR, reg 12(4)(a).

8. By a notice of appeal dated 20 August 2025, Mr Calderbank challenged the DN. He did not offer any grounds but itemised the relief he was seeking in these terms: • Evidence that the Council have asked Forbes how they obtained my personal details. • An apology that they released my details without my consent when they could quite easily have contacted me at the outset which would not have caused me distress. • Distress even before opening the Forbes letter which continued as I did not equate the headline with my previous employment and concluded that I had become a victim of identity theft. • A donation to a charity of my choice as recompense for the time taken to establish that my actions were in no way responsible for the fatal collision. We infer that the essence of his challenge was that he disagreed with the Commissioner’s view that the information sought was not held at the time of the request.

9. The Commissioner’s response, which does very little more than repeat and rely on matters set out in the DN, was presented on 23 October 2025.

10. The dispute came before us for consideration on the papers, both parties having said that they were content for it to be determined without a hearing. We were satisfied that it was just and in keeping with the overriding objective to adopt this procedure. Applicable law

11. Relevantly, EIR, reg 5 provides: (1) Subject to … a public authority that holds environmental information shall make it available on request.

12. EIR, reg 12 includes: (1) Subject to paragraphs (2) … , a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if – (a) an exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) … , and (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. (2) A public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure. … (4) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a) a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that – (a) it does not hold that information when an applicant’s request is received;

13. In Bromley and Information Commissioner v Environment Agency EA/2006/0072, the Information Tribunal held that any question under EIR, reg 12(1) and (4)(a) is to be decided on a balance of probabilities, adding: Our task is to decide … whether the public authority is likely to be holding relevant information beyond that which has already been disclosed. We agree and direct ourselves accordingly.

14. The appeal is brought pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , s57 . The Tribunal’s powers in determining the appeal are delineated in s58 as follows: (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal consider – (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law; or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner, and in any other case the tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. Mr Calderbank’s case

15. We understand Mr Calderbank’s case to rest on the simple proposition that the Commissioner was wrong in his conclusion that the information sought was not held at the material time. The Commissioner’s case

16. The Commissioner resists the appeal, observing that the solicitors might have secured Mr Calderbank’s contact details by a variety of means. Among others, as was pointed out in the DN, para, 19, the solicitors might have identified his name from the original planning documents, which were passed to them pursuant to their instructions to act as the Council’s claims handler. Armed with the name, it would not have been a difficult matter for the solicitors, experienced claims handlers, to trace his address. Conclusions

17. We agree with the Commissioner. We find it more likely than not that the Council did not hold any recorded information within the scope of the request at any time. We find it all the more improbable that any relevant recorded information was held at the time of the request, over 11 years after the alleged data breach occurred. Disposal

18. For the reasons stated, although we accept that the appeal is sincerely meant, we dismiss it. Anthony Snelson Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Dated: 20 March 2026

Ian Calderbank v The Information Commissioner [2026] UKFTT GRC 490 — UK case law · My AI Marketing