Jonathan James White & Anor v Caroline Fromant & Anor

1. The matter that has been referred to the Tribunal is the Applicants’ application for first registration of a small parcel of land that falls between the Applicants’ and the Respondents’ registered titles, as further described below (“the Disputed Land”).

2. The Applicants are, and have been since 2007, the registered proprietors of the land known as The Cottage, Kislingbury Grange, Rothersthorpe Road, Kislingbury NN8 4AB, registered under title number NN154461 (“The Cottage”), extract from title plan below. The Disputed Land is in the crook of the southern boundary, the location of which I have approximately indicated by adding a blue arrow. The Cottage

3. The Respondents are the registered proprietors of the land known as Clarkes Lodge, Kislingbury Road, Bugbrooke NN7 3SB, registered under title number NN260134 (“the Respondents’ Land”), extract from title plan below, the Respondents’ Land being to the south of the red line. The Disputed Land I have again approximately indicated by adding a blue arrow. The Respondents’ Land is farmland. The Respondents purchased it in 2014, but previously occupied it as tenants. It has been tenanted to others since 2015. The Respondents’ Land

4. The Disputed Land is the land tinted blue on HMLR’s Notice Plan, extract below. It is a small parcel of unregistered land between The Cottage (its northern and western boundaries), the Respondents’ Land (its eastern boundary), and a track (“the Track” – its southern boundary). The Track is unregistered at this point, although it continues onto the Respondents’ Land – firstly into a triangular yard area (“the Respondents’ Yard”), and then into a field. Notice Plan

5. The Notice Plan generally defines the matter that has been referred to the Tribunal. There has, however, been some confusion as to the area of land that is the subject of these proceedings. I consider various other plans in order to clarify the position, and also to help explain the lie of the land.

6. Firstly, there is the plan below, annotated by the Applicants. It shows the Disputed Land hatched blue. It also shows another parcel of land tinted green, which can usefully be described as a fenced walkway (“the Walkway”) from the Disputed Land to a paddock (“the Paddock”). The fencing in fact begins on the Disputed Land, as indicated by the solid black line running parallel to the northern boundary of the Disputed Land on the Notice Plan. Walkway Plan

7. The following aerial photograph, from 2017, illustrates the lie of the land. I had the benefit of a site visit the afternoon before the hearing, completing a circuit from the front of the Cottage, along the Track, across the Disputed Land, and through the Stable Yard. I note there is a gate and ramp between the Disputed Land the Stable Yard. Paddock The Cottage (house) Walkway Track Leylandii Stables Stable Yard Respondents’ Yard

8. Initially, HM Land Registry was only prepared to allow the application to proceed insofar as to related to the land outlined red below. This follows the solid black lines on the OS map, excluding the Leylandii and area around. Proposed notice plan

9. However, it appears that the Applicants were able to persuade HM Land Registry to allow the application to proceed in relation to the entirety of the Disputed Land, as that is the area in respect of which notice was given, and what has been referred. This includes the Leylandii and area around. Summary

10. The Applicants aver that they have been in possession of the Disputed Land since they bought the Cottage in 2007. They also aver that they were in possession of the Walkway. However, they accept that the Walkway falls within the Respondents’ Land, and have chosen to limit their claim to the area of land that is not registered (they removed the fencing on the Respondents’ Land at the end of 2023/start of 2024). For the avoidance of doubt, the Walkway was never part of the Applicants’ application.

11. It is not in dispute that, to succeed, the Applicants must demonstrate factual possession of, and an intention to possess, the Disputed Land, for a continuous period of 12 years prior to the date of their application (6 th February 2023 – so, from at least February 2011). Their possession must have been adverse, that is, without permission of the owner, albeit the burden of showing there was such permission is on the Respondents. I will consider the relevant legal principles in further detail where appropriate below.

12. The Respondents’ case can be summarised as follows: (a) they take issue with the extent of the acts carried out on the Disputed Land; (b) they aver that they too have carried out acts on the Disputed Land; (c) they aver that any use by the Applicants was with permission; (d) they aver that any use was pursuant to a right of way; (e) they deny that the Applicants can demonstrate factual possession of or an intention to possess the Disputed Land.

13. By way of background, as is hinted at in the photograph above, the Applicants are equestrian enthusiasts. The Cottage includes the Stables, the Stable Yard and the Paddock. They also own land to the north, on which there is an arena. They enjoy riding and driving carriage horses. Many of the acts relied upon by the Applicants are equestrian in nature.

14. As well as their own evidence, the Applicants rely on the evidence of Justina Hermans, Tracy Schofield, Tamasine Thompson & Victoria Jane Dobb, all of whom share their interest in horses, and all of whom claim to have knowledge of the Disputed Land either through acting as riding/driving instructor or keeping horses at the Stables. On the same theme, they also rely on the written evidence of Reubin Underwood, farrier, albeit he did not attend trial. Additionally, they rely on the evidence of their neighbours, Catherine & David Edmondson.

15. The Respondents rely on their own evidence, and also the written evidence of Felicity Dunkley and Maureen Edmunds, but the evidence of these additional witnesses pertains to ownership rather than possession.

16. I will begin by setting out the facts, making findings where necessary, before turning to consider the legal analysis. Applicants’ acts on the Disputed Land

17. In terms of the Applicants’ acts on the Disputed Land, there is little by way of factual dispute, and in many respects is more a case of the Applicants being put to proof.

18. It is helpful to set out an overview chronologically, particularly by reference to aerial photographs, before considering some of the specific acts.

19. The Applicants purchased the Cottage in 2007. Their evidence was that their predecessors (the Pooles) told them the Disputed Land was unregistered and, as far as they knew, unclaimed, and that it was in poor condition, overgrown and generally looking neglected.

20. Mr White was challenged about this, particularly with reference to the following aerial photograph, from 2005, which he accepted showed what the land in the area was like at the time of purchase. He maintained that the vegetation was 3ft high other than on the Track, that there were trees growing through the roof of the barns, and that it looked “ sorely neglected ” and “ unused ”. It seems to me that Mr White was here describing the Respondents’ Yard rather than specifically the Disputed Land itself – only the eastern side of the Disputed Land looks overgrown. It does however support the idea that land to the east of the Disputed Land was not being used for anything other than access to the field beyond. Mr Fromant’s evidence agreed with this: he described the Respondents’ Yard as being “ overgrown ” and “ slightly ramshackle ”, and said that they “ just drove through ” it. 2005

21. The next images show the Disputed Land over the ensuing years. 2009, 2010, 2017, 2020 (a) 2009: There is still vegetation on the Respondents’ Yard. To the east of the Disputed Land is the Leylandii, with elder trees in the area to its north. There is a trailer parked on the Disputed Land (b) 2010: Clearance has taken place to the northeast of the Disputed Land, including the elder trees. The Walkway has been created. The Leylandii remains (c) 2017: Similar to the previous image. The Respondents’ Yard has also been cleared (d) 2020: Similar again

22. The following are images from HM Land Registry’s survey in 2024. They show the Walkway (the near section of fencing, next to the Leylandii, is on the Disputed Land); the woodpile visible through the fence/under the Leylandii; and the woodpile to the south/east of the Leylandii. 2024 Groundworks

23. The Applicants aver that, in 2008, they instructed contractors to undertake groundwork, filling a ditch and installing a pipe. In cross-examination, Mr White accepted what had been described as a ditch was a broken culvert. It is the hole shown to the bottom right of the photograph below. Culvert

24. Mr White’s evidence was that this was located near to, but not on, the Walkway. Its alleged position was pointed out to me on the site visit. It is also marked by the small green line on the annotated plan below. Culvert location

25. Mr Fromant did not accept there was a ditch in this area, but he did mention a culvert, and accepted the photograph showed a culvert and a dip. He also accepted that he had not been on this area before purchasing the Respondents’ Yard in 2014.

26. It is admittedly hard to gauge exactly where the culvert is based on the photograph alone. It does, however, appear to be at the edge of an overgrown area, which is consistent with it being where Mr White says it is, with the area of elder trees that can be seen on the earlier aerial images in the background. Mr White maintained his position under cross-examination. Mr Fromant did not offer any real evidence to gainsay it. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the Applicants did arrange for the culvert to be filled in 2008.

27. The Applicants also aver that they widened the ramp between the Stable Yard and the Disputed Land in 2008. Counsel for the Respondent complained that this was not an allegation raised in the Applicants’ statement of case, but I note that the photograph below, together with the explanation “ shows the concrete ramp to take the horses up to the stable yard (which the Applicants extended in 2008; new part to the right on this picture) ”, is included. I am satisfied that the Applicants did widen the ramp in 2008. Ramp The woodpile

28. The Applicants’ evidence is that, throughout their occupation of the Cottage, they have cut and stored firewood on the Disputed Land, storing it in a woodpile they established under the Leylandii. In his oral evidence, Mr White explained that they were very pleased to have a log burner, that the elders were cleared to make room, and that the woodpile was a “ significant barrier” on the eastern side of the Disputed Land. Various of their witnesses attest to the cutting and storage of wood on the Disputed Land.

29. Photographs above show the woodpile at the time of HM Land Registry’s survey in 2024. The following photographs are also from 2024 – in the first, the Leylandii is out of picture to the right, and vehicles parked on the Respondents’ Yard are in the background; the second shows the other side of the Leylandii. . Woodpile

30. In his witness statement, Mr Fromant asserted that the Applicants had “ simply added to the very long-standing woodpile ”. However, in cross-examination, it became clear that what Mr Fromant meant was that the woodpile was there when the Respondents purchased the Respondents’ Land in 2014. He said he “ certainly didn’t put it there ”, or words to that effect.

31. There is nothing to gainsay the Applicants’ evidence, and I am satisfied that they created the woodpile under the Leylandii, which was in situ from at least 2010 when the elders had been cleared, and that they used the Disputed Land for cutting firewood. The removal of the elders, trimming the Leylandii

32. I am not sure that these acts are particularly challenged, but for the avoidance of doubt I am satisfied that the Applicants have carried out these acts on the Disputed Land. The aerial images above support the Applicants’ case that the elder trees were removed in or around 2010 (that is, before the Respondents started doing work to clear the Respondents’ Yard). The photograph of the woodpile supports their case that they trimmed the Leylandii. Mowing the grass, planting flowerbeds and shrubs

33. Again, I am not sure that these acts are particularly challenged. Mr Fromant in his evidence appeared to accept that the Applicants mowed the Disputed Land, and that they made it look nice. The Applicants are a little vague as to the specifics in relation to the planting, but they do aver that they established a flowerbed at the end of the Stables (2024 photograph below), which has been continuously maintained for more than 12 years. This is consistent with the Edmondsons, who confirmed they gifted some of these plants in 2013. Flowerbed Equestrian activities

34. The Applicants and their witnesses all gave evidence about the use of the Disputed Land for various equestrian activities. It is worth noting that Ms Hermans, Ms Schofield, Ms Thompson & Ms Dobb all claim to have knowledge of the Disputed Land from at least 2009, and that Ms Thompson & Ms Dobb claim to use the Disputed Land themselves twice daily, from 2014 and 2016 respectively. The Applicants themselves say they use it on a daily basis.

35. The evidence is that the Disputed Land is used as follows: (a) as an access route from the Stables to the Paddock and the Track; (b) to mount horses using a mounting block that was kept there for that purpose; (c) to mount the carriage when driving; (d) to feed horses that need to be separate from the others; (e) to keep wheelbarrows on their way to/from a muck heap; (f) as a place to receive equestrian deliveries, such as hay; (g) as a place for the farriers to park and create shoes when visiting the horses (every six weeks); (h) as a place to park horse trailers (albeit this from approximately 2008-2012 rather than constant).

36. Counsel for the Respondents submits that the Applicants should only be able to rely on acts that were specifically pleaded in the statement of case. This would exclude, for example, parking. However, with one exception, they are all mentioned in the witness statements. I am satisfied that the Respondents had sufficient notice of the acts that were being relied upon. Moreover, it seems to me that this submission comes too late – it should have been raised at the start of the hearing, rather than in closing, after the witnesses have given evidence and have been cross-examined on the points.

37. The exception is feeding the horses. This was something that came out in cross-examination. The Respondents are entitled to challenge the reliability of evidence that is mentioned for the first time at the hearing, but I do not accept that it should be excluded altogether.

38. In relation to the parking in particular, Counsel for the Respondents points out that Mr Underwood (the farrier) did not attend the final hearing and so his evidence has not been tested. It is right that his evidence would not be very persuasive on its own, but his is not the only statement to mention the parking – it is corroborated by Ms Thompson and Ms Dobb.

39. Counsel also submits that I should treat the evidence of the Applicants and their witnesses with care, particularly because of the use of legalese in their written statements, and a tendency to argue points rather than sticking to the evidence. There is some truth in these observations, but I do not consider that this undermines the credibility or the reliability of the evidence that was given, particularly as it forms a clear body of consistent evidence against no evidence in rebuttal. Insofar as there is some criticism, the witnesses would not be the first to misunderstand the process of giving evidence.

40. Overall, the evidence of the Applicants and their witnesses paints a consistent and detailed picture of the way in which the Disputed Land was used for equestrian purposes. It is also consistent with the changes made to the Disputed Land by widening the ramp to the Stable Yard and creating the Walkway (and installing roadstone – see below). There is no reason to gainsay it, and I accept their evidence of equestrian use. I particularly note that many of the acts occur on a daily basis, when the horses are being cared for, if not more frequently. Later acts

41. The Applicants aver that they instructed the laying of roadstone in 2015 to improve the surface and to facilitate easier access. It was put to Mr White that this was barely visible at the site visit, to which he explained that it tends to sink, and grass grows over it, but it still acts to stabilise the land. There is no reason to gainsay this, and I am satisfied that it did happen.

42. They have also more recently (2021) erected temporary fencing along the southern boundary. This is not in dispute, but comes too late to be of any importance. Respondents’ acts on the Disputed Land

43. One strand of the Respondents’ case is that the Applicants have not had exclusive possession of the Disputed Land because the Respondents themselves have been using it. I pause to note that there is a difference between whether the Disputed Land is accessible and whether it has actually been accessed. I say this because Mr Fromant’s evidence of his own use was rather more limited orally than in writing – his statement gave the impression that he used/accessed the Disputed Land with some regularity, but it transpires that is not the case – and I suspect this may be due to an eagerness to press home the point that the Disputed Land is accessible.

44. In his witness statement, Mr Fromant says he has parked on the Disputed Land. However, it became apparent during Mr Fromant’s cross-examination that the parking mentioned in his witness statement was a one-off incident in 2025, undertaken essentially to show that the Disputed Land had not been fenced off. This does not assist in showing that the Applicants did not have exclusive possession for 12 years prior to February 2023.

45. In his witness statement, Mr Fromant states that the Respondents added to and removed wood from the woodpile when renovations were taking place to nearby buildings in 2014/15. However, in cross-examination, Mr Fromant explained that he asked Mr White if he wanted the wood, to which he said yes, and that he later removed wood that he himself had placed on the woodpile to re-use for another building. It seems to me this presents quite a different picture to someone unilaterally accessing the woodpile. Even on the Respondents’ evidence, their “use” of the woodpile was essentially to let the Applicants have some wood, and then change their mind.

46. In his witness statement, Mr Fromant states that the Applicants “ took over ” mowing the grass. However, in cross-examination, explained that he had resowed an area of the Respondents’ Yard with high yield grass seed by mistake, and used a mower – which he described as a “ new toy ” – to cut the grass. He said he would “ scoot round the Leylandii ” onto the Disputed Land, and would also mow the verge of the Track by the Stables. His evidence was that he mowed “ on occasion ”, and he accepted that this took “ seconds ”. It seems to me the mowing described by Mr Fromant in his oral evidence may well have taken place, but not been noticed by the Applicants, given how infrequent and fleeting it was. I accept Mr Fromant’s evidence in this regard, albeit I do not accept it amounts to use of the Disputed Land in any meaningful sense. Permission

47. The Respondents aver that any acts carried out on the Disputed Land by the Applicants were with their permission. The statement of case in fact pleads that use was with their “ general agreement and consent ”. Mr Fromant’s witness statement provides some further details, inasmuch as he states the discussion about the use of the Disputed Land started around 2014, and that “ We had no issue with them using it and it was agreed that once we had resolved the issue over the ownership of the land then we would enter into a formal agreement over the usage. We were happy to agree for the Applicants to make use of the [Disputed Land] but not to take exclusive possession ”.

48. It is worth noting that this is against the backdrop of the Respondents’ belief that they are the owners of both the Disputed Land and the unregistered part of the Track, and that they purchased the Respondents’ Land in 2014 knowing that these were not part of the registered title.

49. Mr Fromant was challenged extensively in cross-examination about whether permission was given. He maintained that “ absolutely they did ”. The only detail he could offer was that he referred to a meeting on the Disputed Land or in the vicinity in which the Respondents said they were happy for the Applicants to use it, and asked them to keep it tidy. He also mentioned having a more formal agreement at a peppercorn rent, but it was not at all clear that he was saying this was something that had been communicated to the Applicants. In any event, this was not something that had previously been mentioned in the Respondents’ written case or evidence.

50. The Applicants’ evidence in this regard is that there was a brief discussion in which the Respondents told them they had recently purchased the Respondents’ Land, and that they would write to clarify the boundary. Mr White said in cross-examination that he recollected the conversation, that Mr Fromant said the land they were standing on – the Disputed Land – was not part of his title, but that this was in error, and that the Applicants would get a letter from his solicitors when it was sorted. He also said, “ I think we said we’ll wait and see what’s in the letter ”, or words to that effect. Mrs White said in cross-examination she did not know then if that meant they were going to be told to get off the land (which would be unlikely to be the case if there had been mention of peppercorn rent). No letter was forthcoming and they continued using the Disputed Land.

51. Counsel for the Respondents draws to my attention that, at one point in his cross-examination, Mr White said he did not have a recollection of being given permission. Counsel submits that this was “ carefully framed ”. I disagree. This answer came after Mr White had said on several occasions that he was not acting with permission, and after he gave his version of the meeting at which the Respondents say permission was given. It was at that point too late to “carefully frame” anything. I do not consider it detracts from Mr White’s clear evidence that permission was not given.

52. I am not satisfied that the Respondents have met the burden of demonstrating that they gave permission for the Applicants to use the Disputed Land. Their evidence is severely lacking in detail – it remains entirely unclear what words were used, and so it is impossible to assess whether what was said should properly be construed as granting permission or not. The Respondents may well have decided they were not going to take issue with the Applicants’ use of the Disputed Land, and have had every intention to formalise the position going forward, but there is no clear evidence that any grant of permission was communicated to the Applicants.

53. There is in any event a further problem with the Respondents’ case. The issue of permission arises because permission with the consent of the owner cannot be said to be adverse. For any grant of permission by the Respondents to be relevant, they must also show that they own the Disputed Land. Bearing in mind my finding above, I deal with this only briefly.

54. The Respondents’ case as to ownership, in very general terms, is that the Track and the Disputed Land have always formed part of farmland historically owned by Thomas Soden Webb. They rely on a 1909 deed between Thomas Soden Webb and William Goodridge Campion, granting a right of way over the road coloured brown for the benefit of the land coloured pink. An extract from the plan is below, alongside the Notice Plan for reference. 1909 Plan & Notice Plan

55. The Respondents aver that this shows Mr Webb owned the Track and Disputed Land, particularly as he is purportedly granting a right of way over part of the former. It also appears to be the source of the Respondents’ contention that the Disputed Land is part of a track, even though the position on the ground now is that the Track and the Disputed Land are quite separate and distinct.

56. There are several issues with this submission. Most obviously, this document is not the root of title. Even if it were, there is no evidence of the transmission of title since then. I note for completeness that the additional written statements relied upon by the Respondents are based on an assumption that the Respondents/their predecessors own the Track and the Disputed Land, but without providing any real evidence, and also that HM Land Registry has refused the Respondents’ applications for registration.

57. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the Respondents can demonstrate ownership of the Disputed Land. The question of permission then falls away. Right of way

58. A further strand of the Respondents’ case is that the acts relied upon by the Applicants are referable to a right of way granted in a 1992 conveyance between Thomas & Revene Pearson and Alan Wisbey. This is a transfer out of land that forms part of the Cottage (tinted blue on the title plan) from other land at Kislingbury Grange, and is followed by a further conveyance in relation to the remainder of the Cottage (tinted pink on the title plan) between the same parties in 1997.

59. The conveyance grants “ such a right of way as the Vendors have power to grant or convey over the road or way hatched brown on the said plan ”, extract below. 1992 Plan

60. The Respondents’ argument runs that there is a prescriptive right of way along the Track that is being conveyed for the benefit of the Cottage, and that this includes a right of way across the Disputed Land. Counsel’s point is, I think, that the right of way must be going somewhere, and that I should infer that it continues onto the Disputed Land, allowing the owner to access this part of the Cottage from the east.

61. There are again several issues with this submission. Most obviously, the brown hatching stops at eastern end of the land being conveyed, and so does not reach the Disputed Land. The right of way could simply be allowing the owner to gain access to the land conveyed at the southeast corner. There is no obvious reason why a right of way for the Cottage would continue beyond that point, especially given that only the land tinted blue and not the land tinted pink was being conveyed. There is no evidence of the features on the ground at that time (gates etc) to assist the Respondents in this regard. The Track continued, giving access to the Respondents’ Yard and the field, but that does not mean that the right of way for the Cottage did. There is also the fact that the Track is an obvious right of way, but the Disputed Land much less so.

62. Alternatively, Counsel argues that the Applicants’ predecessors in any event enjoyed a right of way over the Disputed Land, even if not pursuant to the 1992 conveyance. This appears to be on the basis that the Applicants understood there was access at the back of the Cottage, and accepted that the earlier aerial images show the grass worn away. I am not satisfied that this is sufficient evidence on which I could base such a finding.

63. I am not satisfied that the Respondents can demonstrate the Cottage has the benefit of a right of way over the Disputed Land.

64. In any event, in my judgment, the acts relied upon by the Applicants go beyond exercising rights of way, as further discussed below. Legal analysis Principles

65. Having outlined the relevant facts, I can now turn to the legal analysis. There is no dispute as to the relevant principles, which I outline below.

66. Factual possession “ signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and [exclusive] possession… The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed… Everything must depend on the particular circumstance, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so" [Slade J in Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452 at 470-1, cited with approval in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] UKHL 30 ].

67. An intention to possess is “ an intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title… so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow” [Slade J in Powell at 471-2, cited with approval in Pye ].

68. The Applicants must show both an actual subjective intention and a manifestation of that intention by unequivocal actions.

69. The evidence of factual possession will often be sufficient to demonstrate the intention to possess, but this will not always be so: “ It is in cases where the acts in relation to the land of a person claiming title by adverse possession are equivocal and are open to more than one interpretation that those acts will be insufficient to establish the intention to possess ” [Lord Hutton in Pye at paragraph 76].

70. In those cases, an applicant must make it “ perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can ” [Slade J in Powell at 472]; he “ should be required to adduce compelling evidence that he has the requisite [intention to possess] ” [at 476]; “ In view of the drastic results of a change of possession, however a person seeking to dispossess an owner must, in my judgment, at least make his intentions sufficiently clear so that the owner, if present at the land, would clearly appreciate that the claimant is not merely a persistent trespasser but is actually seeking to dispossess him ” [at 480].

71. It is not in dispute that, whilst enclosure is the strongest possible evidence of adverse possession, it is not indispensable.

72. Counsel for the Respondents also relies on the following commentary in Jourdan and Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, 2nd ed., at 9-106 : “ In order for a squatter’s actions unequivocally to indicate an intention to possess land, that land must be clearly demarcated from other land which the squatter does not possess ”.

73. It seems to me that this case turns on issues relating to enclosure/demarcation of the Disputed Land, which are relevant to both factual possession and the intention to possess. I address these issues collectively once I have considered other aspects of the analysis. Factual possession

74. Counsel for the Applicants makes clear that she is relying on the totality of the evidence of use as, in combination, amounting to factual possession.

75. Counsel for the Respondents raises issues with whether some of the acts relied upon are sufficient to amount to factual possession (as indeed did HM Land Registry, when proposing to limit the area of land as storage is, by itself, unlikely to be sufficient). He does, however, accept that each case turns on its own facts. As such, there is little to be gained from rehearsing all of the authorities to which he has drawn my attention.

76. It is probably right that no one act relied upon by the Applicants is on its own sufficient to amount to factual possession. However, when taken together, what they demonstrate is that Applicants have essentially “taken over” the Disputed Land, using it as an adjunct to their Stable Yard. It has effectively become subsumed within land they primarily use for equestrian purposes, forming (until the removal of the Walkway) a continuous stretch from the Stables to the Paddock.

77. It is right that the Applicants use different parts of the Disputed Land in different ways, at different times, and with differing frequency. In my judgment, this is how an occupying owner would use land of this nature – use is rarely continuous or uniform. Moreover, for the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that the Respondents (or anyone other than with the Applicants’ permission) have been using it.

78. I am satisfied that this “taking over” of the Disputed Land took place in 2010 at the latest. This is when the elders were cleared and the Walkway created. I appreciate the Walkway is not on the Disputed Land, but the first part of the fencing is, as explained above. In any event, the Walkway had the effect of creating the continuous stretch to the Paddock. Intention to possess

79. The Respondents’ primary challenge to the intention to possess (aside from the issues of enclosure/demarcation) is that the acts are equivocal, and can be attributed to other rights. Moreover, they rely on a plan drawn by Mrs White, which references a right of way, and which they say undermines her alleged intention to possess.

80. It is right that the acts include using the Disputed Land for access, and that some of the other acts, such as trimming the Leylandii and installing the roadstone, might be attributed to this. Equally, the acts include storage. There are, however, acts that go beyond this, for example mounting, feeding, creating shoes, and establishing the flowerbed. Moreover, I am considering the matter in the round. Taken together, I am satisfied that the totality of the acts is sufficient to demonstrate an intention to possess.

81. The plan drawn by Mrs White is reproduced below. It is accepted that it is from sometime around 2016-2018, and was drawn by Mrs White when the parties were discussing a land swap. The orientation is east at the top – the long narrow rectangle is the Walkway, the Leylandii to the side. At the bottom, Mrs White has labelled part of it “RoW”. Mrs White’s plan

82. The Applicants were cross-examined about this. They both said that they did not (then) understand that “RoW” usually means right of way. Mrs White could not explain it, other than to suggest that she knew the Respondents were “ very keen ” on a right of way, or words to that effect.

83. The Applicants were not very convincing in their evidence about this, particularly in not knowing what “RoW” usually means. However, I bear in mind that this is a plan that was produced in the context of negotiations regarding a land swap. Its primary purpose appears to be to give the dimensions of the Walkway and the Leylandii area. It is wholly unclear whether “RoW” is intended to signify an existing or a proposed right of way. Whilst the Applicants’ evidence was not convincing, it is perhaps not surprising that they cannot remember the detail given the passage of time. I do not accept that this plan undermines the Applicants’ avowed intention to possess.

84. The Respondents also rely on the fact that the Applicants did not include the Disputed Land as part of the land they owned on a planning application. The Applicants are not the registered proprietors of the Disputed Land. There is nothing in this. Enclosure/demarcation

85. I turn to consider the issues relating to enclosure and demarcation. It boils down to this: have the Applicants done enough, absent complete enclosure, to demonstrate both an appropriate degree of physical control of, and an intention to possess, the Disputed Land?

86. The issues relate to the eastern and southern boundaries. In relation to the eastern boundary, Counsel for the Respondents takes issue that there is no demarcation at the northern end of this boundary, where it crosses the Walkway. He asks where the line is between the land the Applicants do and do not possess.

87. It is right that there is, or was at the relevant time, no feature distinguishing between the part of the Walkway within the Disputed Land and the part within the Respondents’ Land. However, this is because, at that time, the Applicants were in possession of the whole of the Walkway. The fact that the Applicants have chosen (for whatever reason) to claim only part of the land of which they were in possession should not, in my judgment, count against them. It is not a situation where the owner is in danger of losing more land than they might reasonably expect; rather, it is less.

88. To the south of the Walkway, the woodpile both demarcates the Disputed Land, and acts as a physical barrier preventing access.

89. I have already found that the Walkway and the woodpile have been in situ since at least 2010, and so I find that this part of the boundary has been sufficiently enclosed/demarcated since that time.

90. The southern boundary is perhaps more difficult. It is open to the Track (the recent fencing comes too late to be of any real relevance).

91. I am not sure that the Respondents take issue with demarcation here, but, for the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that the southern boundary is sufficiently demarcated. The Disputed Land and the Track are distinct parcels – the Disputed Land starts where the verge of the Track ends. There may not be a line on the ground here, but the boundary is easy to identify from the surrounding features, such as the Stables and the Track itself.

92. Rather, Counsel for the Respondents submits that this boundary could easily have been fenced, and that the lack of enclosure means the Applicants cannot demonstrate an intention to possess.

93. Mr White was cross-examined about this, and explained that it was not fenced because the farrier needed access. I accept this as being a reasonable explanation. I do not accept the lack of enclosure undermines the Applicants’ avowed intention to possess.

94. In terms of the manifestation of that intention, it is important to consider this in the context of the particular circumstances of this case. The Disputed Land is a distinct parcel located to the side of the Track. Since 2010, it has led only to the Cottage and the Walkway. The Respondents, who were using the Track, showed no interest in the Respondents’ Yard until 2014, and even then showed no interest in the Disputed Land itself. The Disputed Land, in my judgment, appears to be part of the Cottage. In these circumstances, I do not consider that the absence of enclosure is fatal. Conclusion

95. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the Applicants can demonstrate both factual possession of, and an intention to possess, the Disputed Land, from at least 2010. Conclusion

96. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the Applicants have been in adverse possession of the Disputed Land for a continuous period of 12 years from 2010 at the latest. I will therefore direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to their original application dated 6 th February 2023 as if the objection of the Respondents had not been made.

97. I turn to consider costs. Ordinarily, the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party: see rule 13(1)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 and paragraph 9.1(b) of the Practice Direction. Here, that would be an order that the Respondents pay the Applicants’ costs, unless there is some good reason to make a different order. Costs are recoverable from the date the application was referred to the Tribunal, that is, 29 th August 2024.

98. Any application for costs should be sent to the Tribunal and the other side by 5pm on 8 th April 2026, and should include an estimate of the amount of costs sought. Further directions will then be given as appropriate. Dated this Wednesday 11 th March 2026 Laura D’Cruz By Order of The Tribunal