Laslo Hunyadi v District Court of Pecs (Hungary)

The Honourable Mrs Justice Eady DBE: Introduction

1. This is my judgment on the appellant's appeal pursuant to section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 (" the 2003 Act "). The appeal is against the reserved decision of District Judge Snow, dated 15 February 2025, to order the appellant's extradition to Hungary. Permission to appeal was initially refused by order of Foster J, dated 6 April 2025. Subsequently, the appellant sought to renew his application for permission, applying to admit fresh evidence. Those applications came before Cutts J on 20 June 2025, at which stage she considered the fresh evidence de bene esse . Cutts J determined the appeal should be permitted to proceed on the basis that the fresh evidence established "an arguable case that the Article 8 balance needed to be re-assessed" .

2. The full hearing of the appeal was listed before me today. The appellant has been represented by Mr George Hepburne Scott, as before the District Judge; the respondent by Ms Engineer, who did not appear below. On the day preceding the hearing further evidence was filed by the appellant, comprising 26 pages of medical records relating to the appellant's partner and a further statement from the appellant himself dated 8 October 2025. The warrant

3. The extradition order was made in respect of an arrest warrant (“AW”) issued on 26 October 2023, certified on 29 January 2024. It relates to what is alleged to have been the appellant's participation in a group robbery of a minor on 18 February 2016, in Pecs, Hungary. At the time the appellant was 21 and had no previous convictions. It is said that, during the course of the incident, threats of violence were made against the victim and one of the other assailants said he had a firearm; a watch, cash and a bus pass are alleged to have been stolen. The maximum penalty for this offence in Hungary is ten years' imprisonment.

4. The appellant was arrested and spent one month in custody on remand. He was subsequently convicted of robbery, and in 2019/2020 was notified he had received a two-year prison sentence. The appellant successfully appealed, and the case was referred back to the lower court to re-start the investigation. In 2022, the appellant received notification he was required to attend court; he instructed a solicitor to attend on his behalf and the hearing was adjourned. Thereafter the case was suspended pending the outcome of the extradition proceedings. The proceedings below and the decision of the District Judge

5. The appellant was arrested in the United Kingdom on 25 March 2025 and on his first appearance before Westminster Magistrates' Court he was released on conditional bail, upon which he has remained.

6. The extradition hearing took place before District Judge Snow on 6 February 2025. The appellant was represented by counsel and gave evidence at the hearing; his partner, Miss Veres, provided a statement, as did the appellant's mother; the district judge also had a psychologist’s report, from Dr Byrne, relating to Miss Veres, and a social worker, Ms Wood, had prepared a report pursuant to section 7 of the Children Act 1989 . Judgment was reserved and handed down on 15 February 2025. It was the appellant's case below that his extradition would be (1) oppressive by reason of passage of time, pursuant to section 14 of the 2003 Act , and/or (2) incompatible with his and his family's right to a private and family life pursuant to section 21A and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR").

7. On the evidence before him, the district judge made the following findings of fact: (i) The appellant had moved to the UK in September 2016, but he had not been under any restrictions and was not a fugitive from justice. (ii) The appellant lives in Burton-on-Trent with his partner, Miss Veres, and their daughter, who was born on 6 May 2024. (iii) The appellant was granted settled status in 2019; he works in a warehouse five days a week and is the main breadwinner for his family. (iv) The appellant's sister lives in Derby, with her three children. (v) Miss Veres had suffered postnatal depression but there was no up-to-date evidence showing she had continued to do so; she was no longer taking medication and did not have the same level of dependence on the appellant as previously. (vi) Miss Veres did not have family in the UK, but was able to cope with caring for their daughter and social services were aware of the position and would make the appropriate referrals if that became necessary. (vii) The appellant's mother (who is 68 and also lives in Burton-on-Trent) suffers from a mental illness and the appellant provides a significant amount of care for her, although there was an absence of evidence as to the nature and degree of her ill health; other agencies (psychiatric services and social care services) were also involved and could provide care for the appellant's mother if necessary, as could the appellant's sister. (viii) Neither Miss Veres nor the appellant's mother spoke English.

8. The district judge first considered whether the appellant's extradition would be oppressive by reason of passage of time for the purposes of section 14 of the 2003 Act , duly directing himself as to the test for injustice and oppression as described by Lord Diplock in Kakis v Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 , at 782H and to the guidance in the relevant case law. He noted that there was no suggestion that it would be unjust to order the appellant's surrender and observed that it was appropriate to first address the case under section 21 A of the 2003 Act , given that the test for oppression was higher than that to be applied under Article 8 of the ECHR. As the District Judge observed at paragraph 42: "… if it is proportionate with the [appellant's] rights to order his surrender, it cannot, on the facts of this case, be oppressive to do so."

9. Turning then to the question of whether extradition would be compatible with Article 8, the District Judge considered the following factors weighed in favour of extradition: the strong public interest in the UK honouring its international extradition obligations and in discouraging persons seeing it as a state willing to accept fugitives from justice; the need to accord confidence and respect to decisions of an issuing judicial authority; the independence of prosecutorial decisions; and the fact that the accusation in this case involved a group robbery where the victim was a minor. On the other side of the balance, the District Judge found there were factors that weighed against extradition, as follows: the fact that the appellant had lived in the UK since September 2016 and had no convictions in this jurisdiction; that the offending in issue occurred in February 2016; and the impact of extradition on the appellant's daughter, partner and mother.

10. The District Judge directed himself in accordance with the principles derived from Norris v Government of the USA (No.2) [2010] UKSC 9 , Poland v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) , and HH v Italy [2012] UKSC 25 , which relates to the rights of dependent children. He gave "substantial weight" to the interests of the appellant's daughter, but permissibly took into account that this was not a sole carer case, and the child would continue to live with her mother, who was better equipped to provide care than she had been previously, and had been able to cope with the difficulties arising from the appellant's absence when he was at work or providing care to his mother. The District Judge had regard to the fact that the children's services were ready to intervene if that became necessary and also noted that the benefit system would be available to Miss Veres, which would help with the loss of the appellant's income. Similarly, although giving weight to the appellant's caring responsibilities to his mother, the District Judge found that adequate alternative arrangements could be made through other family members, along with psychiatric and/or social care services. Taking all these matters into account, but also having regard to the seriousness of the accusation, the District Judge was satisfied that it was not incompatible with Article 8 ECHR to order the appellant's extradition. Further, having regard to the factors specified in section 21 A(3) of the 2003 Act – that is the seriousness of the conduct alleged to constitute the extradition offence, the likely penalty if the appellant was found guilty, and the possibility of the relevant foreign authorities taking measures that would be less coercive than the extradition of the appellant – the District Judge concluded that it would not be disproportionate to the Article 8 rights of the appellant or his family to order his surrender. The fresh evidence

11. In support of this appeal, reliance is placed on fresh evidence as follows: (i) statements from the appellant of 25 April, 16 June, and 8 October 2025; (ii) a statement from Miss Veres of 23 April 2025; (iii) a further/addendum report of the psychologist Dr Byrne, dated 23 May 2025; and (iv) medical records relating to Miss Veres, dating back to the birth of her daughter.

12. The statements from the appellant and Miss Veres provide updating information, explaining how Miss Veres' depression has worsened since the order for the appellant's extradition such that she is now taking medication again, although she would like to try alternative treatments. Miss Veres expresses her fear of what would happen if the appellant is extradited and says she is completely dependent upon him and does not know how she would be able to look after their daughter by herself. In the statements from April 2025, the appellant and Miss Veres explained that earlier that month Miss Veres had found she was pregnant again, which they had both been delighted about. Sadly, however, at the end of May 2025 they lost the baby and are currently awaiting a further medical consultation as to what might have caused this, the doctors having presently advised there may be a biological issue (although the appellant is concerned that the difficulty might be related to stress and depression regarding the extradition proceedings). The appellant's most recent statement refers to Miss Veres having a cancer screening appointment later this month, but there was no evidence before me to suggest that this is other than a standard screening appointment or that there is any particular concern that she has cancer. The appellant has also explained that his mother has recently begun to rent a flat with his younger brother, Tamas, who lives very close to the appellant. He says that his mother's mental health needs have not improved and that Tamas has his own mental health issues and is not capable of looking after their mother. Miss Veres cooks for her in-laws, and the appellant also visits daily to help, and to ensure his mother takes her medication.

13. As for Dr Byrne's additional report, this again confirms Miss Veres's dependency upon the appellant (in particular given her limited English language skills), and she states her belief that Miss Veres would meet the criteria for a diagnosis of recurrent depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder, pointing to her history of postnatal depression and her further and more acute period of depression and anxiety precipitated by the order for the appellant's extradition. Dr Byrne records that Miss Veres is currently prescribed antidepressant medication by her GP and says her ill health means she places even more reliance on the appellant in the provision of basic care for their daughter: while Miss Veres is able to care for the child when the appellant is at work, he will then take on the caring responsibilities and complete the household chores Miss Veres has been unable to do. Dr Byrne concludes: "With regards to the impact of [the appellant's] extradition my opinion remains the same as my previous assessment; were [the appellant] to be extradited to Hungary, this would have a significant adverse effect on Miss Veres's mental health causing an exacerbation of her current distress and therefore increasing the risk of poor outcomes for her and their baby … This is supported by the evidence that Miss Veres' mental health has significantly deteriorated since [the appellant's] extradition has been ordered."

14. It is the appellant's case that the fresh evidence demonstrates the situation has changed since the District Judge's decision such that the impact of extradition would now be exceptionally severe, in particular on Miss Veres, their child, and the appellant's mother.

15. To the extent the new evidence provides an update, the respondent accepts it could not have been obtained before the judgment under appeal. It says, however, that this evidence cannot be said to be decisive. In respect of Miss Veres, it is observed that the medical records, (i) could have been adduced below; and (ii) do not fully corroborate what has been said. At highest, the respondent says the further evidence suggests that, while part of the reason for Miss Veres' depression/anxiety may have changed and it confirms that she has resumed taking antidepressant medication, the overall position, as Dr Byrne has stated, was essentially unchanged. As for the appellant's mother, there was no medical evidence, records from social services or material from other agencies that would provide confirmation that the appellant's presence was critical to her care. The appeal and the appellant's submissions in support

16. The appellant pursues his appeal on two grounds: (1) that section 14 of the 2003 Act ought to have been applied in his favour; (2) that his extradition would constitute a disproportionate interference with his and his family's right to respect for their private and family lives contrary to article 8 ECHR.

17. The appellant emphasises that, since the time of the alleged offence in February 2016 (when he was only 21), he has undergone multiple profound life changes: he has moved to the UK and worked throughout; he has been granted settled status, and has committed no offences in this jurisdiction; he has established a home in the UK with his long-term partner, had a child, and built up a lawful, productive life for himself and his family, which extradition would effectively destroy. These are matters that, it is argued, ought to have been very carefully considered and weighed by the District Judge, giving anxious consideration to the section 14 argument as to the oppressive nature of extradition in these circumstances. Applying the test laid down in Kakis , the appellant contends that the District Judge was wrong not to return to give express consideration to this point and to find that section 14 was to be applied in his favour.

18. As for the balancing exercise required under section 21 A and article 8, the appellant emphasises he was not a fugitive from justice, submitting the District Judge erred in giving this “little weight” when it ought to have been given considerable weight in this context. It is the appellant's case that this and other factors far outweighed the public interest in extradition. In particular, the appellant will lose his job and the family will lose its livelihood. There is evidence of the difficulties his non-English-speaking partner and mother will suffer, and the appellant's absence will impact upon his young child: Dr Byrne opining that his extradition would increase "the risk of poor outcomes for [Miss Veres] and their baby" and the social worker stating that the child will "suffer significant disruption" . The appellant contends that the District Judge wrongly reduced the weight to be attached to the impact of extradition on Miss Veres and the appellant's mother. This was a case where, standing back, it was apparent that the article 8 question ought to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong, and crucial factors should have been weighed differently: (i) the very long delay of nine years since the offence was allegedly committed; (ii) the profound impact of extradition upon the appellant's partner and daughter; (iii) the profound impact of extradition upon the appellant's mother; and (iv) the loss of the appellant's job. In the circumstances, the appeal should be allowed. Analysis and conclusions

19. First considering ground (1), it is correct that the District Judge did not expressly return to the question of oppression, but as acknowledged at paragraph 20 of the appellant's skeleton argument, given the rejection of the case under section 21 A and article 8, it is inherent in the District Judge's reasoning that he rejected the argument under section 14 of the 2003 Act . It was not wrong for the District Judge to first consider proportionality for article 8 purposes; as the appellant accepts there was a significant overlap in considerations relevant to section 14 and article 8.

20. Adopting the same approach, I therefore turn to ground (2). As is common ground before me, the test on appeal is whether the decision of the District Judge was wrong (see Love v USA [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin) ). Where reliance is placed on fresh evidence that could not have been obtained with reasonable due diligence below, the question is whether it would be determinative (see Hungary v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin) ). Where circumstances have changed, I must undertake the balancing exercise afresh, albeit doing so on the basis of the facts as found by the District Judge.

21. The appellant says the District Judge erred in his approach: this was not a fugitive case and it was therefore wrong to only give little weight to the passage of time; the impact upon the appellant's partner, child and mother was underplayed; and no account was taken of the impact on the appellant's work and the life he had built up in the UK. It is further said that the fresh evidence not only confirms the case presented to the District Judge but demonstrates that the updated position is now such that the impact of extradition would be exceptionally severe.

22. I do not agree that the District Judge could be said to have erred in his overall evaluation. Having regard to the matters specified at section 21 A(3) of the 2003 Act , the Judge was entitled to take the view that less weight was to be afforded to the passage of time in this case. The alleged offence has a number of aggravating features: it is said to involve a group threatening violence against a solitary juvenile, robbing him of items of obvious value to him and warning him that one of the group had a firearm. While time has passed, that is largely explicable by reason of the court processes: the appellant has built his life in the UK in the knowledge that those proceedings remain extant; it is not oppressive to follow a legal process, and the impact on the appellant has to be balanced against the seriousness of the offending in issue and the importance of affording confidence and respect to decisions of an issuing judicial authority and to the independence of prosecutorial decisions.

23. Moreover, in relation to the District Judge's decision in respect of article 8 in this case, I do not accept the appellant's characterisation of the reasoning provided. It is apparent that the consequences of extradition on the appellant's family, in particular on his partner and young daughter, were very much at the forefront of the District Judge's mind, but he was entitled to find that these did not amount to the kind of exceptional circumstances as would outweigh the very weighty public interest attaching to the factors that pointed in favour of extradition. As the Supreme Court stated in Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23 at §43: "Cases in which submissions founded on Article 8 ECHR may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. It is most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life. Even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an Article 8 ECHR ‘defence’ will have any prospect of success."

24. I have carefully considered the fresh evidence in this case but am satisfied that does not take matters any further. Dr Byrne is careful in what she says in her report, acknowledging that the reliability of what is recorded regarding Miss Veres must be a matter for the court, and that she is not an expert on the risk factors for young children of postnatal (or other forms of) depression. Ultimately, I find the evidence before me is largely the same as that before the District Judge: Miss Veres is suffering from depression and anxiety; this was formerly attributed to postnatal depression but is now seen as linked to the extradition proceedings. The only real change is that Miss Veres has resumed taking antidepressants, but this was already part of the relevant factual context and can also be seen to be attributable to the particular stress that would naturally arise around extradition hearings and decisions (and possibly following the experience of losing a pregnancy).

25. Having regard to all the evidence available – and thus taking full account of the fresh evidence now adduced – in undertaking the balancing exercise afresh, I am led to the same conclusion as the District Judge. The impact in this case is the sad but not uncommon consequence of extradition (and indeed domestic imprisonment); this is not a sole carer case and, if the appellant is extradited, his young child will be left with her mother (the appellant's partner), who will no doubt find her position very difficult but who has shown herself able to cope with her childcare obligations while the appellant is at work (five days a week, 6.00 am to 2.00 pm) or undertaking caring responsibilities for his mother. To the extent Miss Veres experiences particular difficulties and is not assisted by other family members (notwithstanding the fact the appellant's sister does not live far away and his younger brother is very near), it is apparent that children's services are aware of the situation and will be able to provide support. Similarly, if the appellant's mother is unable to look after herself and cannot be cared for by other family members (although I have no independent corroboration of what is said in this regard), other services exist whereby care can be provided. I accept the family will lose its main breadwinner and the appellant will lose the job he presently has; Miss Veres will, however, be able to claim benefits, and the appellant's past employment records suggest he will be able to obtain work in future.

26. I do not minimise for one moment the anxiety the appellant and his family will presently be experiencing, but I ultimately find that the various matters identified in terms of the impact of extradition in this case are not to be characterised as exceptionally severe. Giving primary focus to the interests of the appellant's young child, I am satisfied that this is not a case where there is a risk she will be left without loving parental and family support. Miss Veres attests to the joy she feels about being a mother, and it is apparent from the reports provided that she derives strength from her connection with her child. Furthermore, while appreciating the difficulties they will face, the appellant's partner and their daughter will be entitled to state support (financial and otherwise). I know that, from the perspective of the appellant and his partner, it will be difficult to see how the balance could possibly fall on the side of extradition in this case. However, having regard to the weighty public interest in the UK adhering to its treaty obligations and ensuring that it is not seen as a safe haven for those alleged to have committed crimes abroad, I am unable to say this is a case where there is such an exceptionally severe impact on family life as to outweigh those factors. Weighing up the factors taken into account by the District Judge and those disclosed by the fresh evidence, I reach the conclusion that the public interest in extraditing the appellant to face re-trial in respect of a serious alleged offence outweighs the article 8 rights of the appellant and his family.

27. Returning, then, to section 14 , the test for oppression is a very high bar, going beyond mere or ordinary hardship. Given the conclusions reached on the proportionality assessment under article 8, I do not consider the District Judge erred in concluding that the appellant had not shown that his extradition would meet the very high threshold to amount to oppression, and I am not persuaded the fresh evidence relied on changes this assessment.

28. For all the reasons provided, I therefore dismiss this appeal. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected]