Maciej Ratajczak v Regional Court in Poznan, Poland

Mr Justice Sweeting:

1. This is a renewed application by Maciej Ratajczak (the “Applicant”) for permission to appeal against the decision of District Judge Turnock, made on 6 September 2024, ordering his extradition to Poland.

2. On 5 December 2024, Sheldon J refused permission to appeal on the papers.

3. On 13 January 2025, the Applicant applied to amend his grounds of appeal and to stay the case behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23 (as now reported).

4. On 11 December 2024, the Applicant had also applied to adduce fresh evidence in the form of an addendum proof of evidence, dated 3 October 2024.

5. On 13 March 2025, Foster J refused the application to adduce fresh evidence and stayed the application for permission to appeal until the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Andrysiewicz .

6. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Andrysiewicz on 11 June 2025. The Applicant and Respondent subsequently filed updated submissions.

7. The Applicant’s surrender is sought pursuant to an Arrest Warrant (“AW”) issued on 26 March 2024 and certified by the National Crime Agency on 25 April 2024. This is a conviction warrant with two underlying sentences.

8. First, an aggregate custodial sentence of one year and four months, following conviction on 5 February 2007, suspended for a probationary period of four years. This sentence related to 18 offences committed between October 2004 and November 2005, primarily involving possession of cannabis and ecstasy pills.

9. This sentence was activated on 1 April 2008 because the Applicant was arrested in possession of drugs during the suspension period, travelled abroad without informing his probation officer, and failed to undertake drug treatment. The Applicant was aware of his obligation to notify his probation officer of any change of address, having signed the relevant instructions on 20 March 2007. The probation officer learned of his departure through his mother, and the Applicant contacted his probation officer in February 2008 to state he had left for England. The entirety of this sentence remains to be served.

10. Second, a custodial sentence of one year, following conviction on 7 March 2007 suspended for three years, imposed for two offences of criminal damage committed on 29 October 2006, causing damage valued at PLN 2,000 and PLN 1,000 respectively.

11. This sentence was activated on 20 October 2009 due to the Applicant committing a further offence during the suspension period and failing to inform his probation officer of his departure abroad. He had been instructed about his obligation to do so on 29 October 2006. The entire sentence remains to be served.

12. The sole ground of appeal advanced by the Applicant is under Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). He submits that his extradition would constitute a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his private and family life.

13. The test for the grant of permission to appeal is whether the ground of appeal is “reasonably arguable,” as per Rule 50.17(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Rules.

14. The Applicant’s submissions heavily rely on the delay since the offences were committed and since the Polish authorities became aware of his presence in the UK. The District Judge found the delay (between 15 and 16 years until the AW was issued) to be “substantial” and “culpable,” noting that the Judicial Authority was aware of the Applicant’s location in the UK from February 2008.

15. However, the District Judge found that that the Applicant is a fugitive from justice because he intended to “deliberately put himself beyond the reach of the Judicial Authority and avoid serving the sentence”. Such a finding militates strongly against an Article 8 defence founded on delay.

16. The District Judge concluded that, notwithstanding this culpable delay, extradition would not be oppressive due to the absence of material changes to the Applicant’s personal circumstances, his lack of an established family life, and his awareness of being wanted. He was not thus “lulled into a false sense of security”.

17. The Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz stated that it is “most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life”.

18. There is in any event a high threshold to be cleared for an Article 8 defence to succeed. As Baroness Hale stated in H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25 , 1 AC 338, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz at [81]: “the public interest in extradition will outweigh the Article 8 rights of the family unless the consequences of the interference with family life will be exceptionally severe”.

19. The Applicant is a single man with no dependents. He has no stable employment or accommodation and no lawful right to remain in the United Kingdom. Whilst he has a network of friends in the UK that is not the same as a deep and established private life. In fact, the District Judge found that he had established “minimal private and family life” in the UK.

20. The District Judge found the offences, although not of the “most serious nature,” were not “trivial”. The first conviction involved possession of drugs on at least 14 separate occasions, with money received for some purchases. This was aggravated by further drug offences during the suspended sentence and his fugitive status.

21. Before me Mr Hepburne Scott argued that: “The Applicant has been remanded in custody in these extradition proceedings since April 2024... (v) The Applicant was arrested and remanded in custody in these proceedings on 24 April 2024. It is trite law that time served on remain in these proceedings will automatically be counted towards his sentence in Poland upon return. (vi) The Applicant has now served 1 year and 4 months on remand in this case. (vii) The offence re case 1 was committed first, he was convicted for it first and the sentence was activated first; It is a safe inference that this sentence will be the first in time to be served.”

22. The consequence was said to be that: “(viii) The Applicant has served the entirety of his sentence re case 1. Therefore, he only falls to be extradited in respect of case 2; this offending consists of criminal damage to 2 cars in 2006, when the Applicant was 20 years’ old. He is now 39 years’ old. There has been 16 years of culpable delay in this case. It is respectfully submitted that it is reasonably arguable that to extradite a person for a 19-year-old conviction for criminal damage to two cars in the context of a case where there has been 16 years of culpable delay, even in the context of a 12-month prison sentence, would be exceptionally severe. The circumstances of this case can properly be described as rare.”

23. Despite having some superficial logic, this argument is, in my view, flawed. As Mr Swain submitted, the Applicant is being sought in relation to all of the offences, not simply the conviction for criminal damage. The calculation of the period which he has left to serve is for the Judicial Authority and takes into account the entirety of the sentences imposed. The fact that he may have served all or part of a sentence once his time on remand is taken into account does not change that essential fact or operate to extinguish the earlier conviction or sentence. It would equally beg the question as to what the position would be if the Applicant had served less time.

24. The District Judge conducted a thorough Article 8 balancing exercise, weighing factors such as the strong public interest in extradition, the outstanding sentences (totalling two years and four months in all), the Applicant’s fugitive status, his lack of a lawful right to remain, and his minimal private life in the UK. She concluded that, despite the culpable delay, the balance did not tip against ordering extradition.

25. I consider that there is no reasonably arguable basis on which to challenge the District Judge’s overall evaluation. The facts found in relation to the Applicant’s private life, his fugitive status, and the nature of the offences, when viewed against the high public interest in extradition, mean that the interference with his Article 8 rights cannot arguably be considered “exceptionally severe.” The arguments put forward by the Applicant, including the time served on remand, do not arguably tip the balance the other way.

26. For the reasons set out above, I do not consider that the Applicant’s ground of appeal is reasonably arguable. The District Judge did not misapply legal principles, make an unreasonable finding of fact, or reach a conclusion that was irrational or perverse.

27. Permission to appeal is therefore refused. END