MKM, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Ealing

1. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: This is my Judgment following a substantive hearing of the Claimant's claim for judicial review of various decisions of the Defendant made under the Housing Act 1996 (“ the Act ”). I am giving an oral Judgment today, Friday 14 November 2025, having heard the case on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week. The desirability of there being a speedy decision from the Court on the issues that have been raised will become apparent from the summary of the facts which I am about to set out.

2. An anonymity order protecting the identity of the Claimant and her children was granted by this Court when permission was granted on 21 August 2025. It remains in force.

3. The Claimant is from Albania. She has two very young children. She has a traumatic history and is the victim of repeated sex trafficking, first in Belgium and then in the UK, specifically Manchester. She has anxiety and depression. She applied for asylum in February 2023. She was provided with asylum accommodation, pending a decision on her claim. In June 2025 her asylum claim succeeded. She was accepted as a refugee and was given leave to remain. She was then given notice that her asylum accommodation, most of which had been in the Defendant's area, would come to an end on 29 July 2025. On 30 June 2025 she approached the Defendant for homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Act . She, and those assisting her, informed the Defendant that her support network was in London, that she feared re-trafficking, and that it would damage her recovery and her psychological health if she were moved away from London.

4. In particular: (1) On 3 July 2025 a modern slavery outreach case worker from the Moving On Project, (“MOP”) wrote to the Defendant in support of the claimant's application. MOP is an outreach service for women living in London who have been affected by trafficking and modern slavery, or who are at risk of exploitation. The case worker wrote that she supported the Claimant's reasons for wanting to remain in London, referring to the support network provided by MOP itself, the Claimant's friends, therapy and counselling support, and other matters. The case worker also wrote that the Claimant was vulnerable and had overwhelming feelings of anxiety and a fear of re-exploitation if moved away from London. (2) On 9 July 2025 a MBACP specialist counsellor from the New Citizens Gateway wrote in support of the Claimant's application. He referred to details of the counselling support that had been provided to the Claimant. He described a “ vital network of support in London that the claimant had established since re-building her life, following the distressing circumstances of her trafficking .” The support services described were, in his stated view, “ integral to her sense of stability, safety and recovery .” (3) On 11 July 2025, one of the Defendant's housing officers held a 30-minute telephone interview with the Claimant herself. The Claimant explained her individual circumstances, and said that she would feel “ completely hopeless and unsafe if … moved outside of London away from my support network .” She said that she had been sex trafficked in Manchester and would be “ terrified ” to move out of London, where she had started to rebuild her life.

5. The Defendant then made three critical decisions, as follows.

6. First , on 11 July 2025, it made a formal assessment of the claimant's housing needs, set out in the form of a Housing Needs Assessment (“HNA”) and a Personalised Housing Plan (“PHP”). There is a debate about what the needs assessment really meant, to which I will return.

7. Secondly , on 23 July 2025, the Defendant made the Claimant an offer of accommodation at an address in Durham, pursuant to what is known as the relief duty; that is, the duty set out in section 189 B of the Act . The Claimant's position is that accommodation in Durham was not and is not suitable, because it is too far away from her established support network in London. She asked the Defendant to withdraw the relief duty offer or, alternatively, review it pursuant to the statutory mechanism set out in s.202 of the Act . The Defendant is currently reviewing the offer. I am told that a decision on the review is imminent and expected to be made as early as one week from today; that is, 21 November 2025.

8. Thirdly , on 28 July 2025, the Defendant offered the Claimant the very same (Durham) accommodation as “ interim ” accommodation pursuant to section 188 of the Act . That approach perhaps seems odd at first glance, given the structure and normal sequencing of decisions under Part 7, but the Claimant does not suggest in this claim that it was intrinsically illogical or irrational. The logic of what the Defendant was doing, as I understand it, was deciding that the Durham accommodation was suitable for the Claimant both generally and in discharge of its section 188 duty to provide her with accommodation pending the review of that same accommodation in a section 202 review.

9. Those are in summary the three target decisions in this case. I should mention a fourth relevant decision which was made on 1 August 2025. Following the threat of judicial review proceedings, the Defendant's Children's Services department considered the Claimant’s case under section 11 of the Children Act 2004 , and provided her and her children with temporary accommodation at an address in Uxbridge. That is where they now live.

10. The Claimant commenced this claim for judicial review on 7 August 2025. She contends that the HNA, and the offers of the Durham accommodation made respectively under section 188 and section 189 B were unlawful. On her behalf, Mr Jackson contends, in summary, that the “ red thread ” running through all three decisions is an inadequate and unlawful assessment of her needs, and an unlawful failure to grapple with whether accommodation in Durham would be suitable, given those needs. When filing the claim, the Claimant sought, via a N463 form, urgent consideration of the claim and in particular an order for an abridgment of time in which the Defendant could file and serve an Acknowledgment of Service, with the question of permission, expedition and interim relief all to be considered shortly thereafter.

11. On 21 August 2025, however, Mr John Halford DHCJ, considered the claim on the papers and granted permission. He gave directions for an expedited substantive hearing. He also made a mandatory interim order, requiring the Defendant to continue to accommodate the Claimant pending the determination of the claim. He gave liberty to apply.

12. The Defendant was taken by surprise that the Court had granted JR permission on the papers without first seeing any Acknowledgement of Service (or other substantive response to the matters raised in the claim form). A compounding but related factor was the Claimant's unfortunate failure to provide the Court with the Defendant's reply to her pre-action protocol letter, once she had received it. The Deputy Judge said in terms that he was assuming, in the circumstances, that the Defendant had not provided any reply to the pre-action letter. That turned out to be incorrect. The Claimant's solicitor has apologised to the Court for this oversight. I respectfully agree with the Defendant that in the circumstances the Deputy Judge, albeit for two quite different reasons, did not have relevant information that ought to have been before him.

13. CPR 54.13 states that “ neither the defendant nor any other person served with the claim form may apply to set aside an order giving permission to proceed ”. However, authority suggests that if there is a clean “ knock-out blow ” that has been overlooked, or a decision to grant permission without first hearing from the Defendant, the court may consider exercising a residual inherent jurisdiction to do so: see R v SS Home Department ex parte Chinoy [1991] CLY 816, and R (Webb) v Bristol City Council [2001] EWHC (Admin) 696. The Defendant did not apply to set aside. The case proceeded to a full substantive hearing. The parties filed evidence and a hearing bundle, running to several hundred pages, along with detailed skeleton arguments and a comprehensive set of authorities. The written and oral arguments of both counsel addressed issues of substance and procedure and were of very high quality throughout.

14. Mr Johnson, for the Defendant, contended in his skeleton argument that I could and should dismiss this claim “ summarily ” because the Claimant has a suitable alternative remedy. That point is no doubt the “ knock-out blow ” the Defendant would have tried to land, had it filed an Acknowledgment of Service. The argument, in essence, runs as follows. The Defendant is already reviewing the issue of the suitability of the Durham accommodation, as it is required to do pursuant to section 202 . That will necessarily require a fresh consideration of the Claimant's needs, based on the most up-to-date information. If the Claimant is dissatisfied with the Defendant's decision on that review, she can appeal to the County Court under section 204. Since in this case the accommodation is the very same physical accommodation, albeit offered pursuant to two different provisions (i.e. section 188 and section 189 B) it is open to question, says Mr Johnson, what purpose these proceedings really serve.

15. I respect and see the force of that argument, and I have been anxious to give it appropriately full consideration in light of the Defendant's lost opportunity to advance it at the permission stage. In order to explain why I did not ultimately decide to dismiss this claim on a summary basis, I need first to set out the legislative provisions that are most relevant in the case.

16. First , section 188 of the 1996 Act provides in relevant part as follows: " Interim duty to accommodate in case of apparent priority need. (1) If the local housing authority have reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless, eligible for assistance and have a priority need, they must secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation. … (1ZB) In any other case, the duty under subsection (1) comes to an end upon the later of— (a) the duty owed to the applicant under section 189 B(2) coming to an end or the authority notifying the applicant that they have decided that they do not owe the applicant a duty under that section, and (b) the authority notifying the applicant of their decision as to what other duty (if any) they owe to the applicant under the following provisions of this Part upon the duty under section 189 B(2) coming to an end. … (2A) For the purposes of this section, where the applicant requests a review under section 202(1) (h) of the authority's decision as to the suitability of accommodation offered to the applicant by way of a final accommodation offer or a final Part 6 offer (within the meaning of section 193A), the authority's duty to the applicant under section 189 B(2) is not to be taken to have come to an end under section 193A(2) until the decision on the review has been notified to the applicant. … "

13. Secondly , section 189 A: "Assessments and personalised plan (1) If the local housing authority are satisfied that an applicant is— (a) homeless or threatened with homelessness, and (b) eligible for assistance, the authority must make an assessment of the applicant's case. (2) The authority's assessment of the applicant's case must include an assessment of— (a) the circumstances that caused the applicant to become homeless or threatened with homelessness, (b) the housing needs of the applicant including, in particular, what accommodation would be suitable for the applicant and any persons with whom the applicant resides or might reasonably be expected to reside (“other relevant persons”), and (c) what support would be necessary for the applicant and any other relevant persons to be able to have and retain suitable accommodation. (3) The authority must notify the applicant, in writing, of the assessment that the authority make. … (9) Until such time as the authority consider that they owe the applicant no duty under any of the following sections of this Part, the authority must keep under review— (a) their assessment of the applicant's case, and (b) the appropriateness of any agreement reached under subsection (4) or steps recorded under subsection (6)(b) or (c). (10) If— (a) the authority's assessment of any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2) changes, or (b) the authority's assessment of the applicant's case otherwise changes such that the authority consider it appropriate to do so, the authority must notify the applicant, in writing, of how their assessment of the applicant's case has changed (whether by providing the applicant with a revised written assessment or otherwise). … "

14. Thirdly , section 189 B: " 189B Initial duty owed to all eligible persons who are homeless (1) This section applies where the local housing authority are satisfied that an applicant is— (a) homeless, and (b) eligible for assistance. (2) Unless the authority refer the application to another local housing authority in England (see section 198(A1)), the authority must take reasonable steps to help the applicant to secure that suitable accommodation becomes available for the applicant's occupation for at least— (a) 6 months, or (b) such longer period not exceeding 12 months as may be prescribed. (3) In deciding what steps they are to take, the authority must have regard to their assessment of the applicant's case under section 189 A. (4) Where the authority— (a) are satisfied that the applicant has a priority need, and (b) are not satisfied that the applicant became homeless intentionally, the duty under subsection (2) comes to an end at the end of the period of 56 days beginning with the day the authority are first satisfied as mentioned in subsection (1). … (9) The duty under subsection (2) can also be brought to an end under— (a) section 193A … or (b) sections 193B and 193C … "

15. Fourthly , section 193A: " 193A Consequences of refusal of final accommodation offer or final Part 6 offer at the initial relief stage "(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply where— (a) a local housing authority owe a duty to an applicant under section 189 B(2), and (b) the applicant, having been informed of the consequences of refusal and of the applicant's right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses— (i) a final accommodation offer, or (ii) a final Part 6 offer. (2) The authority's duty to the applicant under section 189 B(2) comes to an end. (3) Section 193 (the main housing duty) does not apply. (4) An offer is a “final accommodation offer” if— (a) it is an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy made by a private landlord to the applicant in relation to any accommodation which is, or may become, available for the applicant's occupation, (b) it is made, with the approval of the authority, in pursuance of arrangements made by the authority in the discharge of their duty under section 189 B(2), and (c) the tenancy being offered is a fixed term tenancy (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Housing Act 1988 ) for a period of at least 6 months. … (6) The authority may not approve a final accommodation offer, or make a final Part 6 offer, unless they are satisfied that the accommodation is suitable for the applicant and that subsection (7) does not apply. … "

16. Fifthly , section 202 : " Right to request review of decision. "(1) An applicant has the right to request a review of— … (ba) any decision of a local housing authority— (i) as to the steps they are to take under subsection (2) of section 189 B, or … (f) any decision of a local housing authority as to the suitability of accommodation offered to him in discharge of their duty under any of the provisions mentioned in paragraph (b) or (e) or as to the suitability of accommodation offered to him as mentioned in section 193(7) … (h) any decision of a local housing authority as to the suitability of accommodation offered to the applicant by way of a final accommodation offer or a final Part 6 offer (within the meaning of section 193A or 193C)…"

17. And finally, section 204: " Right of appeal to county court on point of law. "(1) If an applicant who has requested a review under section 202 — (a) is dissatisfied with the decision on the review … he may appeal to the county court on any point of law arising from the decision or, as the case may be, the original decision. … (3) On appeal the court may make such order confirming, quashing or varying the decision as it thinks fit."

18. My conclusions as to whether this claim should fail because of a suitable alternative remedy are as follows. As a preliminary point, I consider that I am entitled to consider the alternative remedy point afresh, even though it has already been considered at the permission stage: R (Islam) v SS Home Department [2016] EWHC 2491 (Admin) per Sir Stephen Silber sitting as a High Court judge, at paragraphs 19-26. I accept that the starting point is that in relation to a complaint that the final offer of accommodation in Durham is unsuitable, there plainly is a suitable alternative remedy, in the form of a right to a review followed by an appeal to the County Court. That is not in dispute, and it is entirely clear from the words of section 202 . It is also appropriate to recognise that, given the remedy set out in section 202 , challenges to decisions of local housing authorities relating to homelessness will “ usually ” need to be pursued under that provision, and not by way of judicial review: see R (Ahamed) v Haringey LBC [2024] PTSR 205 . In this case, further, the issues that arise in relation to the respective section 188 and section 189 B offers of accommodation are very similar. The accommodation offered is the very same. The Claimant's objection is essentially the same, that is, location. And the Defendant will need to look again, on review, at the whole question of suitability, including location, in any event.

19. However, I have concluded that despite all of those points, it would not be right for me to exercise my discretion to bar this claim on grounds of alternative remedy. This is for the following three reasons.

20. First , the case the Claimant advances in these proceedings includes the proposition that the Defendant's approach to the question of providing her with interim accommodation in Durham under section 188 was unlawful. In the absence of a judicial review claim, she might have been forced to choose between moving to Durham pending a review of the section 189 B decision, or becoming street homeless with two very small children. The Defendant accepts that a section 202 review does not apply to a section 188 decision. It follows that judicial review was and is the only direct way in which the lawfulness of the section 188 decision could be tested. Judicial review was also, as Mr Jackson reminded me, the only route to interim relief. The Claimant's application for interim relief was successful in this case and there has been no application to discharge or vary it. On the facts of this case, I cannot accept the Defendant's contention that the JR claim has been, or is, materially pointless.

21. Secondly , there is an important question in this case about whether the section 189 A assessment carried out was lawful. There is no right under section 202 to a review of a section 189 A assessment per se . There have been several decisions of this court in which judicial review of such an assessment has been entertained. A recent example is R (AA) v LB Waltham Forest [2025] EWHC 1625 (Admin). If the public law points that the Claimant seeks to make about the Defendant's approach to assessing her housing needs have merit, it seems to me at the very least desirable that the Defendant should have this Court's guidance on those points as soon as possible, so that they can be taken into account before making any further decisions in her case. Indeed, it seemed to me at the close of argument, given what I was told about a relatively imminent review decision, that if such guidance were to be useful, it ought ideally to be provided quickly, hence my decision to give an oral Judgment today.

22. Thirdly , it would not in my view be efficient or in the interests of justice for me to bar the claim at this very late stage. I accept that permission was granted in a manner that was procedurally unfortunate, as I have already explained. But the Defendant could potentially have applied to set aside that decision. It could alternatively have asked for the issue of alternative remedy to be determined as a preliminary issue (as occurred in R (Ammori) v SS Home Department [2025] EWHC 2013 (Admin)). In the highly unusual circumstances of this case, the matter has now been fully argued over two days with substantial costs having been incurred by both sides. It would not be a good use of public money for this Court simply to bar the claim on the grounds that there is an alternative remedy. Similar considerations apply to those which persuaded this Court not to refuse permission on alternative remedy grounds following a rolled-up hearing in R (Sambotin) v Brent CC [2017] EWHC 1190 (Admin) per Wyn Williams J at paragraphs 19-20.

23. The question of what remedy to grant, should any element of the claim succeed, may raise different considerations but, having rejected the contention that I should dismiss the claim on a summary basis, I next need to consider the substance of the claim that has been advanced. I turn next to that topic. Ground 1

24. Ground 1 is that the Defendant failed to assess the claimant's “ housing needs ”, contrary to its obligations in section 189 A of the Act . In the recent case of R (AN v LB Barking & Dagenham) [2025] EWHC 2265 (Admin), Mr Alan Bates DHCJ set out at paragraph 59 a summary of the relevant principles relating to section 189 A assessments, as follows: "The principles developed in the case law relating to section 189 A HA 1996 , which are relevant to this case, were not in dispute between the parties. (a) The initial assessment duty under section 189 A(2) HA 1996 entails a duty to take reasonable steps of enquiry so as to enable the housing authority to identify or assess housing needs ( UO v LB Redbridge [2023] EWHC 1355 (Admin); [2023] HLR 39 ( UO No 1 ) at paragraph 59 per Lane J (the headnote to the report in the Housing Law Reports incorrectly attributes the judgment to Ritchie J)). (b) The HNA must address the needs that provide the 'nuts and bolts' for any offer of accommodation. The assessment does not need to be an exhaustive list of housing needs, but it does need to identify the housing applicant's key accommodation needs ( R (ZK v LB Havering [2022] EWHC 1854 (Admin); [2022] HLR 47 ( ZK ) per Dr Susie Alegre sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court at §§17 and 42, citing R (S v Waltham Forest LBC [2016] HLR 41 per Cheema-Grubb J at §92). (c) Whilst section 189 A(2) HA 1996 sets out requirements for the issues an HNA must cover, it does not require a particular level of detail or format for addressing these points. The issues do not need to be covered in forensic detail ( ZK at §44). (d) Describing an applicant's 'wishes' in relation to their housing situation is not an assessment of their housing needs. The HNA must make clear what a claimant needs as distinct from what would be 'nice to have' ( ZK at §42; XY v LB Haringey [2019] EWHC 2276 (Admin) ( XY ) per Clive Sheldon KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge (as he then was) at §§56-62; R (YR v LB Lambeth) [2022] EWHC 2813 (Admin) [2023] HLR 16; YR per Paul Bowen KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court at §83). (e) The HNA must be sufficiently reasoned to demonstrate that the authority has considered the statutory matters in section 189 A(2) and sections 205 -210 HA 1996 , and section 11(2) CA 2004 ( YR at §88(1)-88(3); UO No 1 at §62). (f) The HNA and the PHP can both be set out within a single document, or as two separate documents, or by way of several documents that are to be read in conjunction with each other ( XY at §54, ZK at §39, R (SK) v Windsor & Maidenhead RLBC [2024] EWHC 158 (Admin); [2024] HLR 23 ( SK ) at §§38-40. Housing officers can be expected to read all of an applicant's housing file in order to be fully acquainted with their needs. (g) The review duty under section 189 A(9) HA 1996 requires that the housing authority keep the HNA and PHP under review. This duty requires the authority to consider afresh the section 189 A criteria by reference to the same statutory relevant factors in light of any new information ( UO No 1 at §64). (h) The court should adopt a commonsense approach when reviewing HNAs. The question is what a reasonable and sensible housing officer would understand an applicant's needs to be from reviewing the housing file ( XY at §62; ZK at §42). (i) Assessments under part 7 of the HA 1996 will be unlawful where they are Wednesbury unreasonable ( UO No 1 at §§56 and 74)." Both counsel commended and invited me to adopt that helpful analysis of the law. I gratefully do so.

25. In this case, the relevant parts of the 11 July 2025 HNA stated: " You attended the local authority and a personal assessment of your current housing circumstances was undertaken by [a housing officer] on 11 July 2025 because you have a housing need and approached the authority for assistance. As part of the assessment the local authority has taken into account: The circumstances causing your homelessness; the housing needs of your household; the type of accommodation your household requires; any support needs you or your household need to secure and retain accommodation … Applicant said she was a victim of sexual traffic since September 2021 until January 2022, when she arrived in the UK. Applicant said she was trafficked in Belgium for a period of four months … Applicant said her [first] child is a result of rape from when she was trafficked … Applicant does not want to move out of London because she was trafficked in Manchester … Applicant said the individuals who trafficked her in Belgium brought her to Manchester. Housing needs - Applicant said she wants a 1-bedroom or 2-bedroom. Applicant does not want to move out of London because, she says, that is where she was trafficked. Within the housing needs of your household assessment we have established that you are currently in need of alternative accommodation. You are a single mother of two dependent children. We discussed that you would need to consider that the location of the accommodation may not be in Ealing, due to the high cost of accommodation in the Borough of Ealing. Therefore, I have recommended that you consider expanding your search for accommodation by considering your affordability. I have informed you that the likelihood of obtaining a council property is extremely difficult, given the scarcity of the current availability of social housing. Therefore, this could mean that you are likely to wait many years on the waiting list … "

26. I am in no doubt that the HNA in this case was unlawful. It failed to address or assess one of the claimant's key housing needs. On the established principles, it was not sufficient for the Defendant to record that the Claimant “ does not want ” to move out of London because of her trafficking history. The critical question, given the undisputed background and what had been communicated to the Defendant about it by the Claimant and those supporting her, was whether that “ want ” amounted to a “ need ”, or whether there was some other location-based “ need ”, such as accommodation reasonably close to the existing support network in London. Nor was it sufficient in this regard to advise the Claimant (no doubt correctly) that accommodation in Ealing was scarce and that she would need to consider accommodation further afield. In my judgment, the duty in the legislation to “ assess ” an applicant's housing “ needs ” called in this case for an evaluation of the Claimant's particular circumstances, and an assessment of whether she had a relevant location-based need; for example, to be housed within the borough, or within London, or within a reasonable distance of her existing support network.

27. Mr Johnson did not seek to argue before me that a section 189 A(2)(b) housing need cannot include a need that relates to location. Nor did he suggest that the “ nuts and bolts ” of a person's housing needs (see e.g. AN , above, §59(b)) cannot include a location-based need. His primary argument was that the HNA in this case impliedly did contain an assessment of the Claimant's location needs. He first submitted that the commonsense meaning of the HNA was that the Defendant had assessed that she had no needs relating to location at all. I put to him whether, on that logic, the HNA should be taken as meaning that the Claimant could appropriately be accommodated in Manchester, the very place to which she had been trafficked. He then contended for a more subtle implied meaning: namely, that the assessment must have been that she had no need to live in London, noting that she was being advised to widen her search for accommodation on affordability grounds.

28. I am unable to accept that it is possible or realistic to find any assessment of the Claimant's location needs in the HNA. As Mr Jackson acutely pointed out, a necessary implication argument (or an appeal to a commonsense construction) is difficult to maintain where the party advancing it has proposed two quite different meanings during oral argument at the substantive hearing. There is also a mismatch between the asserted implied meaning ultimately put forward (that is, no need assessed by the Defendant to be accommodated in London ) and the express language in the HNA itself ( advice to the effect that the Claimant should consider accommodation outside of Ealing ). In this case, the material before the Defendant as at the date of the HNA was sufficient to trigger an obligation to assess whether the Claimant had any key, or critical, location-based needs. The HNA did not involve any, or any proper, assessment of those needs, and it is accordingly unlawful for that simple reason. Needs and wishes are conceptually different. Parliament's use of the phrase “ assessment of … the housing needs of the application ” in section 189 A(2)(b) could not have been clearer.

29. If I am wrong about the proper interpretation of the HNA, then the question that arises is this: whether the implied assessment in the HNA, that the claimant had no location needs at all, or no need to be accommodated in, or within a reasonable distance of, London would have been lawful. In my judgment it would not have been. (1) It may well have been rational for the Defendant to conclude, following due consideration, that the Claimant did not in fact “ need ” to be accommodated in the London Borough of Ealing. But that is not the same as saying that she has no location-related needs at all, or that she does not need to live in (or within a reasonable distance of) London and her existing support network. (2) It would in my judgment have been irrational to conclude that the Claimant had no location-related needs at all. It would not, for example, have been rational to offer her accommodation in Manchester, the very place where she had been trafficked and abused. I understood Mr Johnson to accept this. (3) In relation to the possibility of being accommodated in or near London, there is no indication in the evidence that the Defendant had regard either to the desirability of maintaining the claimant's access to her existing support network, or to the risks of re-trafficking. These were plainly relevant considerations, and they ought to have been considered as part of the section 189 A process.

30. I have not lost sight of the points that Mr Johnson made to me relating to the severe shortage of housing faced by public authorities in the current climate and the cost of that housing. Nothing in my analysis is intended to be understood as suggesting that the Claimant was necessarily entitled to be offered accommodation within or near Ealing, or even within or near London. Those are questions for the public authority. But the Claimant was entitled to a lawful decision assessing her housing needs so that these could be balanced against, or placed within the context of, any resource considerations at the next stage of the analysis. She did not receive one.

31. Mr Johnson also submitted that the level of detail and/or perfection to be expected in an HNA has to be realistic, taking account of the stage at which it is completed and that, in this case, the HNA was a “ very early ” document. Even assuming the correctness of those propositions (which Mr Jackson disputed), they do not in my judgment assist him. A lawful decision addressing the Claimant's housing needs did not need to be detailed or sophisticated, still less perfect. It did have to assess and record her key housing needs. Further, any material errors or omissions in the HNA which arose from the early stage of the process or the urgency in which it was drafted, could and should have been corrected. The Defendant was perfectly entitled to revise the HNA pursuant to its continuing obligation to keep the assessment under review: see section 189 A(9). It has not at any stage done so.

32. Finally, Mr Johnson submitted that a fair reader would need to look, not only at the HNA document itself, but also at other documents on the housing file and, in particular, the two letters to which I referred in the introductory passage of this Judgment (see at paragraph 4), in order to understand the Defendant's overall assessment. He sought to rely on what was said in R (XY) v LB Haringey [2019] EWHC 2276 (Admin) per Clive Sheldon KC (as he then was) at §54. I am unable to accept this submission. The written assessment that the authority makes under section 189 A needs to be read fairly using common sense. Nowhere does the HNA in this case suggest that the Claimant's needs are to be, or have been, assessed by reference to the 3 July and 9 July letters. The reality is that the HNA does not engage with, still less accept, the points made in those letters, insofar as they relate to the Claimant’s needs. I cannot accept that the Defendant, upon whom the assessment duty lies, can demonstrate that it complied with that duty simply by referring to the fact that written submissions made on the Claimant's behalf were kept on file, having not been accepted. Conflating a submission with an assessment is, I am afraid, no more coherent or sustainable than conflating a wish with a need. Ground 1 succeeds. Ground 2

33. Ground 2 is that the final accommodation offer made pursuant to the relief duty in section 189 B was unlawful. The final accommodation offer, having identified the Durham address, stated as follows: "In making this offer, we have taken full account of your housing needs, based on the most up-to-date information available to us … The council considers this offer of accommodation to be suitable for you and your household. In reaching its decision that this is a suitable offer of accommodation to discharge our duty to you, the council have fully considered: "(1) the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation: England) Order 2012 and specifically all the statutory requirements in part 1 which cover the suitability of location of accommodation and part 2, which sets out the circumstances in which accommodation is not to be regarded as suitable for a person; (2) that the property is suitable in relation to existing suitability requirements that relate to space and arrangement; (3) any other subjective matters and issues that relate to your circumstances and that of any other household members obtained by the council from our investigation of your application; (4) that the accommodation is affordable, having fully considered the cost of the rent and any other expenditure relating to the property compared to the income available to you with or without benefits, and specifically the outgoings which are needed for you to feed and clothe yourself and your household, heat the property, plus any other expenditure that we are satisfied is essential to meet the ordinary necessities of life, plus all other reasonable living expenses; (5) all existing legislation, statutory guidance and case law relating to making suitable offers of accommodation, and specifically chapter 7 of the Homelessness Code of Guidance."

34. Given the relatively short period between the HNA (11 July) and the section 189 B offer (23 July), the clear purpose of the HNA exercise (which was to inform future decisions on suitable accommodation and to avoid the Claimant and her children from becoming street homeless), and the contents of both documents, I consider it to be clear that the section 189 B offer was based on the legally flawed HNA. For that simple reason, the section 189 B offer of accommodation was itself legally flawed. The relevant distinction here is between an offer which is “ based on ” an unlawful HNA and one which is not: see Norton v Haringey LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 746 per Lewison LJ at paragraphs 28-31.

35. The Claimant raised other, alternative, complaints about the section 189 B offer letter as part of Ground 2. She contended that the Defendant needed, in particular, to engage further with her support workers to acquire and consider further information about her support needs, and that the Defendant could not show that it was not “ reasonably practicable ” to accommodate her in Ealing, or as close as possible to Ealing, contrary to section 208 and to the Defendant's own code. The Defendant contended in response that what was done in this case was legally sufficient; that the support workers' views were on file and were taken into account and, finally, that nothing closer to London was in fact available on 23 July 2025. I do not consider that I need to resolve these further issues in order to uphold Ground 2. I do not think it is helpful for me to try and do so on a premise which I have just rejected, that is, that the offer was otherwise lawful and based on a lawful assessment of need. Had the HNA correctly assessed the Claimant's needs, the offer might well have been different.

36. The Defendant's final point about “ nothing closer ” was, unhelpfully, only made clear, on instructions, during Mr Johnson's oral submissions on Day 2 of the substantive hearing. It was not pleaded in the Defendant's Detailed Grounds. I would have been very hesitant about allowing the Defendant to rely on that new point, based on a factual matter that ought properly to have been set out clearly in a witness statement, and in a statement of case filed in accordance with the rules.

37. Ground 2 succeeds. Ground 3

38. Ground 3 is that the 28 July 2025 interim offer of accommodation was similarly unlawful. This offer letter stated as follows: " You approached the council on 1 July 2025 with a request for assistance in obtaining accommodation as a person who is homeless. We have taken a homelessness application from you, undertaken a housing needs assessment, and devised a personal housing plan. On 23 July 2025, we made you a final offer of accommodation under the relief duty, in discharge of all our duties under part 7, Housing Act 1996 . You have now requested a review under section 202(1) (h) of the decision that the final offer was suitable. The relief duty ( section 189 B) therefore continues until the conclusion of the section 202 review. Moreover, as we have decided that you have a priority need for assistance, the council is subject to the interim duty to accommodate, pending the conclusion of the review, and the end of the relief duty. We have decided to discharge our duty by making you an offer of accommodation at the [Durham] address under section 188(2) (a), which we consider to be suitable. The consequences of refusing this offer would mean that the council will no longer owe you an interim duty to provide accommodation pending the conclusion of the review of the suitability of the final offer of accommodation at [the Durham address]. In re-offering the said accommodation … as accommodation pending review of a final offer at relief stage - section 188(2) (a), we are mindful of the representations made by Sophie Earnshaw (solicitor, Strategic Litigation Team, Shelter) in all of her emails of 24.07.25 with attachments and information from those supporting you, and our response to the same."

39. I should add that shortly before this decision was made, the Defendant had on 24 July 2025 emailed the Claimant's solicitor, expressing the view that the Claimant would not be unsupported in Durham in relation to trafficking support, because there were “ GP services ” which could direct her to such support.

40. On 30 July 2025, shortly after the section 188 offer had been made, the Defendant - having been challenged to identify any specific trafficking support available in Durham - gave details of two Durham-based organisations that could assist. Unfortunately, it overlooked the fact that the first of those organisations operates from Durham in North Carolina, and the second is based in Durham, Ontario. Once these errors were pointed out, the Defendant then provided internet links to some organisations to Durham in the UK (including the police and the local council), but did not attempt to explain how they might be in a position to provide anything equivalent to the actual trafficking support that the Claimant had been receiving in London.

41. In my Judgment, the section 188 offer was unlawful, primarily because it was, again, based on the unlawful HNA which the Defendant had carried out. It specifically referred to the HNA, and consistently with the approach taken in the HNA, there was no reference either in the offer or in any of the relevant correspondence to any need that the Claimant might have to access her existing support network in London or to avoid living in any particular areas of the country. The section 188 offer was, in the circumstances, vitiated by the Defendant's failure to assess the claimant's key needs in a lawful manner.

42. In deference to the parties’ comprehensive submissions, I should say that I would have concluded that the offer was also unlawful in any event, in that there was no, or no rational, consideration of whether the Claimant would have access to adequate trafficking support if she were to move to Durham, or whether even an interruption in her existing support, if she did this, would have adverse consequences for her, as the evidence put forward on her behalf had strongly maintained. Most of the Defendant's consideration of this issue was retrospective, that is, after the offer had already been made. Such efforts as were made after the event were superficial, as the Durham location error I have described (at paragraph 40 above) vividly demonstrates. I have no doubt that errors can easily and understandably be made in this area of work, and that the task of the Defendant's housing officers can be extremely time-pressured and difficult. However, I am driven to accept Mr Jackson's submission that the analysis of the possible availability of trafficking support in this case was cobbled together rather too quickly and after the event, and that it plainly failed to consider the relevant considerations. Ground 3 also succeeds. Relief

43. Anticipating that the issue of relief may not be straightforward, but conscious of the need for an urgent decision resolving this claim, I invited both counsel at the substantive hearing to address me in some detail on the question of relief. I am very grateful for their assistance. My conclusions are as follows.

44. First , I consider that the appropriate relief for Ground 1 is a declaration, rather than a quashing order. Quashing the HNA or the July plan would in my judgment be over-broad and unnecessary. There is material in the HNA and the July plan which is lawful and unobjectionable. Further, as was noted in AN at paragraph 155, the duties in section 189 A are dynamic ones, requiring review and update as and when appropriate. The fundamental defect that has been identified in these proceedings relates to the Defendant's failure to assess the Claimant’s location-related housing needs. The most appropriate remedy addressing that defect is in my judgment a declaration, rather than a quashing order of the particular document in which other relevant needs were lawfully assessed. I propose, therefore, to make a declaration that the Defendant failed, in the HNA or otherwise, to assess the Claimant's housing needs as required by section 189 A, for the reasons set out in this judgment.

45. Secondly , and in relation to section 189 B, I am again unpersuaded that a quashing order is necessary or appropriate. The Claimant does have an alternative remedy, that is, the right to a review which is ongoing, and then an appeal to the county court. Whilst, as I explained earlier, this was not a good and sufficient reason to bar the claim entirely, it is still a factor which falls to be considered at the relief stage. I have accepted the essential logic of the Claimant's contention that the offer was unlawful because it was based on an unlawful HNA, but there seems to me to be little practical utility in quashing it, and on the contrary good reason to uphold the general principle relating to alternative remedies. In its review decision, the Defendant will need to consider far more information than was available on 23 and 28 July, including written representations from the Claimant and her skilful and experienced advisors. There will need to have been a reassessment in some form of the Claimant's needs, so that any accommodation decision can properly consider and reflect them; and there will need to be adequate reasons: see section 203(4). If the Claimant is dissatisfied, she can appeal directly to the County Court. If, on the other hand, I were to quash the section 189 B offer, that would stop the ongoing review process in its tracks because there would be nothing to review. The Claimant would essentially then go back to square one. It seems to me that the Defendant could potentially make a very similar offer, at a time of its choosing, and potentially with the sort of bare or boiler-plate reasoning that was provided in the section 189 B letter in this case, back in July. (I note that the Defendant places strong reliance before me on the proposition that it has no legal duty to provide reasons when making a section 189 B offer of accommodation.) So, again, I propose simply to declare that the section 189 B offer was unlawful, for the reasons set out in this Judgment.

46. The position with respect to the 188A offer of interim accommodation seems to me to raise different considerations. In the first place, as both counsel agreed, the section 202 review process does not, as a matter of law, apply to that decision. It follows that there is no specific remedy available from the County Court in respect of that offer, if the Defendant maintains it. Only this Court can provide the remedy. Secondly, and on a practical level, if I do not quash the offer, there is at least the potential for the Claimant's current accommodation in Uxbridge to be withdrawn, perhaps on the basis that there is an extant offer of interim accommodation in Durham, which still stands because it has never been withdrawn or quashed. However unlikely that may seem, I cannot say that it is impossible, and I am in no doubt that it would cause this vulnerable claimant wholly unnecessary further distress, which would be unjust in circumstances where the Court has just determined that the offer made on 28 July 2025 was unlawful. Thirdly, during the course of argument, Mr Johnson told me that since 1 October 2025, the Claimant has in fact been accommodated pursuant to a fresh section 188(1) offer, relating to the Uxbridge address. The email to the Claimant that he said recorded this offer is at page 321 of the bundle. I find that email far from clear. It says that the Defendant’s Housing Department has agreed to accommodate the claimant “ pending review ” pursuant to the exercise of a “ discretion ”. The language used in section 188(1) is however mandatory. There is no mention of section 188 at all in the email. It is in my Judgment unsatisfactory that there is a lack of clarity at this late stage about the interim accommodation that has actually been provided to the Claimant. It seems to me that the Court can appropriately embed Mr Johnson's clear and unambiguous submission about what has happened into its remedy, in order to resolve that lack of clarity.

47. The right course in my judgment is for the court to do the following to reflect its conclusions on Ground 3. First , quash the 28 July 2025 interim accommodation offer. Second , declare that the claimant has since 1 October 2025 been accommodated by the Defendant pursuant to section 188(1) at her current address. And third , make a mandatory order requiring the Defendant to re-state its previously unclear 1 October 2025 decision in the form of a letter to the Claimant stating that she is being accommodated at her current address pursuant to section 188 , and has been so accommodated since 1 October 2025.

48. I invite the parties to agree if possible and file a draft order disposing of this judicial review claim, ideally by 4.00 pm on Monday, 17 November 2025. If consequential matters such as costs or permission to appeal cannot be agreed, my preliminary view is that the parties should file and serve written submissions by 21 and 28 November 2025 respectively. I intend to resolve any outstanding issues without the need for a further hearing.

49. Finally, I express my thanks to both counsel who argued the case, and to Mr Millington, who appeared today in Mr Johnson’s absence. The way in which the matter was argued and prepared was commendable.

50. That concludes this Judgment. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected] Postscript: 3 December 2025

51. Following my Judgment delivered in Court on 14 November 2025, the parties provided me with written submissions on costs and permission to appeal. I allowed the Claimant a short right of reply. It is convenient for me to record how I have resolved the two outstanding issues here. Costs

52. The Claimant applied for all of her costs, on the basis that she was the successful party.

53. The Defendant contended that it should pay only 30% of the Claimant’s costs. It advanced, in summary, three points in support of that contention.

54. First , it contended that the Claimant was not the successful party (or was not wholly successful), because the Court did not ultimately quash the final accommodation offer, or grant some of the other relief that had been sought. The Defendant further contended that the Claimant’s overall position was not “ advanced ” by the litigation, e.g. by a finding that the Durham accommodation was unsuitable.

55. I reject that contention. The Claimant sought findings that three particular decisions were unlawful. She succeeded in relation to all three. The Claimant also obtained relief in relation to all three decisions. She obtained interim relief at the permission stage. The mere fact that the Court granted most but not all of the relief sought cannot, in my judgment, outweigh the fact that she successfully established that all three decisions were unlawful, and that the Court should intervene. It seems to me clear, further, that her position has materially been advanced. The Defendant must now reassess her housing needs lawfully, taking due account of relevant matters which were previously not assessed, alongside the observations of this Court, before making any fresh decisions. On any reasonable view this constitutes success.

56. Secondly , the Defendant contended that the Claimant had unreasonably failed to agree to a stay of these proceedings, pending the review of the accommodation offer. I reject that contention also. The Claimant’s stance, which was that the Court could and should resolve the claim rather than dismiss it summarily, was ultimately vindicated. It was on any view not an unreasonable stance.

57. Thirdly , the Defendant contended that the Claimant ought to have provided the Court with a copy of the authority’s response to her pre-action protocol letter, as soon as it was received. I agree with that contention. This is an omission for which the Claimant’s team has rightly apologised. I am not persuaded that it can be regarded, as Mr Jackson urges me to, as being equivalent to the Defendant’s lateness in filing its evidence or its skeleton argument. I think it appropriate and fair to make a reduction in the costs otherwise payable to the Claimant. The error was liable to and did lead to the Court making a permission decision on incomplete information, which is regrettable. Standing back and looking at the case in the round, the just and fair overall costs order in my judgment is an order for the Defendant to pay the Claimant 80% of her costs, to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed.

58. I will also make an interim payment on account, as requested, within 28 days, in the sum of 50% of the total claimed in her schedule of costs (as well as a detailed assessment of the Claimant’s publicly funded costs). 50% of the amount claimed is a reasonable proportion at the interim payment stage, in light of the discount I have made and allowing for further potential reductions on assessment (see CPR 44.2(8)). The Defendant has not resisted an interim payment in principle, but proposed a period of 56 days to make the payment, without explaining why it needs that amount of time. I consider that 28 days is reasonable. Permission to appeal

59. The Defendant has advanced a number of proposed appeal grounds. They can conveniently be grouped into three overarching points.

60. First , it is said that I was wrong not to dismiss the claim (or refuse relief), in circumstances where the Claimant had an alternative remedy.

61. Secondly , it is said that I was wrong to uphold Ground 1, given (a) the early stage of the HNA, (b) the possibility of a review of that assessment, and (c) the benevolent approach that ought to be applied by the Court to such assessments.

62. Thirdly , it is said that I was wrong in law to find that a defective section 189 A assessment “ automatically ” renders unlawful an offer made under section 189 B.

63. Having reflected on those points and the detailed way they are put in the Defendant’s written application, I am unable to see that there is a real prospect of success, nor any other compelling reason to grant permission to appeal.

64. As to the first point, I have explained why in the circumstances of this case I did not consider that the existence of a (partial) alternative remedy constituted a sufficient reason to dismiss the claim, and I have also addressed in some detail how the alternative remedy affected my conclusions on relief. I do not see how the proposed appeal engages with that reasoning or demonstrates that it was arguably wrong or unreasonable.

65. As to the second point, I was in no doubt that the s.189 A assessment in this case was unlawful because it failed to address the Claimant’s key housing needs; and I also noted that the Defendant could at any time have remedied this defective assessment by revising it, but never did. The mere fact that it was required to keep an assessment “ under constant review ” cannot, in that context, cure the assessment of its unlawfulness.

66. As to the third point, I made no such finding. I applied the “ based on ” test from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Norton , which both counsel had commended to me and which seems to me uncontroversial on orthodox principles.