Richard Sandor Frischmann v Vaxeal Holdings SA & Ors

Introduction

1. On 18 March 2026 I heard and dismissed an application made by the third defendant, Christopher Samuelson, for an order varying the order of Mr Justice Richards dated 9 January 2025. That order required the surrender of Mr Samuelson’s passport to the claimant’s solicitors, so that he could not leave the jurisdiction before complying with earlier orders of the High Court to give disclosure of his assets and to be cross-examined under CPR Part 71 on his means. The variation sought was one allowing the passport to be released temporarily to him, so that he could travel to Spain, to care for his former wife.

2. Mr Samuelson is a judgment debtor at the suit of the claimant, but has so far not paid any part of the judgment debt, even though judgment was given as long ago as 3 November 2023. He has already failed to attend two separate appointments fixed for his cross-examination. On the evidence before me, I found that he was professionally experienced in offshore trusts and companies, and connected to a number of different jurisdictions.

3. I also found that his former wife, from whom he separated in 2001, and to whom he still owes over £1 million from their divorce settlement, was seriously ill in hospital in Spain, suffering from (amongst other things) progressive breast cancer (diagnosed many years ago, and treated thereafter). Mr Samuelson said in evidence that his elder daughter, who lives in Spain with her partner, was unable to cope with looking after her mother because of her own health problems.

4. However, and strikingly, there was no evidence from either the former wife or the elder daughter about their need to have Mr Samuelson there in Spain with them, Nor was there even any evidence that that they knew he was making this application to recover his passport, let alone to the effect that they supported it. Furthermore, there was no explanation as to why his younger daughter (who lives in England) could not travel to Spain to assist their mother.

5. Both sides were represented by counsel at the hearing before me. Mr Samelson’s barrister was instructed by Advocate, and acted pro bono . His measured submissions were of great assistance to me. I gave the reasons for my dismissal of the application in an extempore judgment. Mr Samuelson now seeks to appeal my decision, and would like a transcript of the whole hearing to be provided at the public expense. I record that no application for permission to appeal was made at the hearing before me. The rule

6. CPR rule 52.14 relevantly provides “(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the lower court or the appeal court may direct, on the request of a party to the proceedings, that an official transcript of the judgment of the lower court, or of any part of the evidence or the proceedings in the lower court, be obtained at public expense for the purposes of an appeal. (2) Before making a direction under paragraph (1), the court must be satisfied that— (a) the requesting party qualifies for fee remission or is otherwise in such poor financial circumstances that the cost of obtaining a transcript would be an excessive burden; and (b) it is necessary in the interests of justice for such a transcript to be obtained.”

7. Rule 52.14(1) does not impose a duty on the court to direct that a transcript be provided at public expense. Instead, it confers a power. So, there is no entitlement to a transcript at public expense. The court has a discretion, to be exercised judicially. But the power arises only if the court is satisfied of two things: (a) a sufficient lack of means, tested in one of two ways, and (b) that the transcript is necessary “in the interests of justice”. Transcript of the entire proceedings

8. In the present case, there is simply no explanation as to why the transcript sought needs to be of “the entire proceedings”. In the usual case there is no need for such a transcript, only of the judgment. If the applicant wishes to satisfy the court of such a need, the burden lies on him or her to do so. But there is nothing said here as to why this case requires more than the judgment. Accordingly, I have no basis for being satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice for a transcript of the entire proceedings to be obtained. I must therefore refuse the application for that. Transcript of the judgment alone

9. I turn to consider the same question in relation to the more common case, that is, a request for a transcript of the judgment alone. There are cases where no transcript of the judgment below is necessary, for example because the court’s order sets out the reasons for the decision, and either no judgment was separately pronounced, or it simply repeated what the order says.

10. But usually the appellate court needs to see the judgment (or at least an agreed note of the judgment) before it can properly decide whether the judge’s decision should stand. Thus, if the sufficient lack of means is shown, it usually follows that a transcript of the judgment will be needed in the interests of justice, otherwise the appeal cannot be properly dealt with. This case

11. In the present case, Mr Samuelson has completed and signed Form EX105 (the appropriate form to request a transcript at public expense). This states that his income is extremely modest, a little under £1,000 per month, and that his monthly outgoings presently exceed his income by about £150. On its own, that would be powerful evidence of a lack of means.

12. But the problem that I face is that the very reason why the passport order was made was that Mr Samuelson, being a judgment debtor where none of the debt has been paid, has refused to attend for cross-examination on his means on two occasions, and has refused to comply with an order to disclose his assets in the meantime. The passport order was made to prevent his leaving the country and frustrating those orders. In making that order, the judge was satisfied of a sufficient risk that Mr Samuelson would otherwise do so.

13. However, if Mr Samuelson’s means are indeed as (voluntarily) set out in the form EX105, then he could long ago have given the disclosure ordered and attended the cross-examination directed, and he would now be no longer subject to the order at all. The fact that he has refused to comply with either order leads me to infer that he does have assets that he does not wish to disclose. Otherwise, his giving the information that he does on the Form EX105 would be irrational. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that rule 52.14(1)(a) is satisfied, and therefore the power to order the provision of a transcript of the judgment at the public expense does not arise. Conclusion

14. The request is refused.