Thomas Mark Roberts v The Information Commissioner

Background

1. The parties and the Tribunal agreed that this matter was suitable for determination on the papers in accordance with rule 32 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (as amended).

2. This is an appeal against Decision Notice (“DN”) IC-310420-Y4P0 of 28 th November 2024. The DN held that the respondent was correct to decide that the Public Authority was entitled to rely on s14(1) Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) to withhold the requested information. Factual background to the appeal The request

3. The Decision Notice deals with four requests made under the Freedom of Information Act by the Appellant to the public authority, Coedpoeth Community Council: 3.1. Request of 9 February 2024: “May I ask you to confirm the amount of accrued Holliday[sic] Pay for 2022-2023 that is reflected in the 2023-2024 financial reports please, as requested.” 3.2. Request of 12 February 2024 “In line with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, please could you supply me with the following information by Wednesday 13 March 2024. (20 working days) Copies of invoices to support the payments listed below: DATE PAID SUPPLIER PERIOD COVERED NET AMOUNT 28/04/2023 UTILITY WAREHOUSE MARCH 2023 407.79 28/04/2023 UTILITY WAREHOUSE MARCH 2023 3377.07 28/04/2023 OPUS CORPORATE MARCH 2023 1089.91 12/07/2023 JDHBS INTERNAL AUDIT 2022-2023 465.00 12/07/2023 WCBC 01/04/2022 – 30/09/2022 3612.84 28/04/2023 ASH WASTE MARCH 2023 144.71 28/04/2023 ASH WASTE MARCH 2023 166.42 07/06/2023 MEGA ELECTRICAL JAN-MAR 2023 3731.90 TOTAL £12995.64 DATE PAID SUPPLIER PERIOD COVERED NET AMOUNT 14/04/2023 NET WAGES MARCH 2023 7145.54 05/05/2023 PAYE MARCH 2023 1103.60 05/05/2023 EMPEES/EMPERS NIC MARCH 2023 1064.66 11/04/2023 PAYE FEBRUARY 2023 1099.20 11/04/2023 EMPEES/EMPERS NIC FEBRUARY 2023 1093.57 TOTAL £11606.57 A copy of the paper produced to document the arrears of 2022-2023 Holiday Pay that was presented by the Clerk at a meeting in May 2023. It would also be very helpful if it could be confirmed that all payments making up accrued Holiday Pay for 2022-2023 have now been paid, and confirm the total amount paid. HOLIDAY PAY ACCRUAL 15/05/2023 PART PAID, PART C/FWB HOLIDAY PAY 2022-2023 £8636.00 Confirmation that the following payments, made in April and May 2023, but relating to payroll for the period up to 31 March 2023, did go through the Community Council Bank Account on the dates indicated, or alternatively, confirm when the payments were actually made: WAGES ACCRUALS It is with regret that I have to ask for this information via a formal Freedom of Information Request. This information was originally requested in July 2023 when I attempted to exercise my rights as a member of the public to examine the books and records of Coedpoeth Community Council prior to external audit.” 3.3. Request of 13 February 2024: “In line with the legislation may I request the following information which I believe may be covered by the Freedom of Information Act: • Written, or digital copies of advice received from One Voice Wales, and/or, Audit Wales in connection with the legality, or otherwise of the 2022-2023 budget adopted in December 2022. • Written, or digital copies of advice received from Audit Wales, with regard to the treatment of accruals in the Year End Financial Statements to 31 March 2023. • Contemporaneous notes of telephone conversations in respect of the two issues above. • A copy of any communication directed to all Community Councillors explaining the advice given under 1, 2 or 3 above. • A statement that no records of any such advice are held by Coedpoeth Community Council.” 3.4. Request of 29 April 2024 “I would like to request the following information: • In connection with Wages and On-Costs paid in April 2024, but relating to hours worked in March 2024: a) Gross Wages b) Employers National Insurance and Pension contributions. (I do not request individual wages details, simply the totals, paid, in April in respect of hours worked in March 2024.) • Confirmation of the dates, and amounts, of payment of PAYE, NIC and Pension deductions made in April 2024, or due for payment in May 2024, relating to earnings for the 2023-2024 Financial Year. • Details of any Holiday Pay relating to the Financial Year 2023-2024 that may be payable in 2024-2025. I would like you to provide the information by e-mail, please. Please contact me if you need me to clarify my request.” The response

4. The Public Authority responded to the first three requests on 8 th March 2024. It gave some information and noted that parts of the requests related to information which was being prepared as part of the annual accounts and which would be published on its website in due course. It asked the Appellant to clarify which information was relevant to the 13 th February request.

5. The public authority also raised concerns about the nature of the requests, noting that it considered the multiple requests had been time consuming and vexatious.

6. It should be noted that the Appellant had been a councillor between January 2023 and February 2024. Much of the material requested had already been openly discussed at council meetings at which the Appellant had been present. Some of the material had been discussed privately between the appellant, the accountant and the clerk.

7. The Appellant requested an internal review on 18 th March 2024. The public authority conducted an internal review and, on 30 th May 2024, upheld its original position in relation to the first three requests. The public authority refused to comply with the requests on the basis that they were vexatious and relied on section 14(1) of FOIA as its basis for doing so.

8. By that time, the fourth request had been sent in. On 4 th June 2024 the public authority issued a letter under section 17(6) FOIA, to say that they would not be responding to that request. S17(6) provides that the public authority does not need to provide a notice stating reliance on s14 where: (a)the public authority is relying on a claim that section 14 applies, (b)the authority has given the applicant a notice, in relation to a previous request for information, stating that it is relying on such a claim, and (c)it would in all the circumstances be unreasonable to expect the authority to serve a further notice under subsection (5) in relation to the current request. The Decision Notice

9. In a decision notice dated 28 th November 2024, the Commissioner determined that the request was vexatious and therefore the ICO was entitled to rely on section 14(1) of FOIA. The Appeal

10. The Appellant appealed to this Tribunal on 26 th December 2024. His grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows: 10.1. The request did not meet the definition of “vexatious” as set out at paragraph 20 of the DN, which says: “ The Commissioner’s guidance suggests that if a request is not patently vexatious, the key question the public authority must ask itself is whether the request is likely to cause a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption, irritation, or distress .” The request itself was very simple, asking for invoices and records of payments. 10.2. The DN referred to a volume of correspondence, not all of which had been provided to the Respondent when it made its decision. The tone was professional and cordial on both sides. 10.3. The matter should never have required a FOI request as the information ought to have been available through other means.

11. In its response, On 4 th February 2025, the Respondent submitted that the appeal should be dismissed for the following reasons: 11.1. The Respondent stands by his decision notice; 11.2. In all the circumstances of this case, the requests were vexatious, further to the case law set out by the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner & Devon County Council [2015] EWCA Civ 454 (and which did not depart from the Upper Tribunal findings in Information Commissioner v Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) ); The Law

12. Section 1(1) of FOIA gives individuals the basic right to obtain information held by a Public Authority. (1)Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a)to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b)if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.

13. It is qualified by certain exemptions. The exemption on which this case turns is that set out in section 14(1) , which states: (1) Section 1(1) [of FOIA] does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.

14. The term “vexatious” is not defined in FOIA, but the law is clear that it is the request that must be vexatious and not the person making the request.

15. Amongst other things, the Commissioner’s guidance on section 14 FOIA states that it is designed to protect public authorities by allowing them to refuse any requests which have the potential to cause a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption, irritation or distress.

16. Section 14 must not be interpreted in a way that in effect introduces a ‘public interest’ threshold that all requestors have to pass. If no exemption is engaged, there is a right to disclosure of information held by public authorities whether or not there is any public interest in disclosure.

17. The approach to vexatiousness is set out in the case of Information Commissioner v Devon County Council & Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC ). The emphasis on protecting public authorities’ resources from unreasonable requests was acknowledged by the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield when it defined the purpose of section 14 : Section 14 …is concerned with the nature of the request and has the effect of disapplying the citizen’s right under Section 1(1)… The purpose of Section 14 … must be to protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA…’ [para 10] .

18. Also in Dransfield , the Upper Tribunal took the view that the question as to whether a request is vexatious ultimately depends upon the circumstances surrounding the request. The Tribunal placed particular emphasis on the issue of whether the request has adequate or proper justification. As the Upper Tribunal observed: There is… no magic formula – all the circumstances need to be considered in reaching what is ultimately a value judgement as to whether the request in issue is vexatious in the sense of being a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA .

19. Dransfield also considered four broad issues: (1) the burden imposed by the request (on the public authority and its staff), (2) the motive of the requester, (3) the value or serious purpose of the request and (4) any harassment or distress of and to staff. While these are not exhaustive, they are a guide to what might be held to be vexatious.

20. The Upper Tribunal case of Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner v Ashton [2018] UKUT 208 (AAC) made it clear that s14(1) FOIA can apply purely on the basis of the burden placed on the public authority, even where there was a public interest in the request being addressed and where there was a ‘reasonable foundation’ for the request.

21. We note what the Upper Tribunal said in Dr Yeong-Ah Soh v Information Commissioner and Imperial College London [2016] UKUT 0249 (AAC) at paragraphs 79-81: “79. The FTT’s reasons conclude that “at the time the requests were made they were vexatious in their content by reason of the burden on the [second respondent] ... and the distress to the second mentor ...; the benefit sought from the disclosure was [the appellant’s] private interest ... not the public interest. It was an inappropriate use of the FOIA and therefore vexatious”. From these words, I find it inescapable that, at the least, a factor in the FTT’s decision was the perceived lack of any public interest in the appellant’s request for information.

80. However, it seems to me that the real issue is whether there was a value or a serious purpose to the appellant’s request. A request can have a value or a serious purpose while serving an entirely private interest. Judge Wikeley referred to objective public interest. He later stated at paragraph 14 that “of course, a lack of apparent objective value cannot alone provide a basis for refusal under section 14 ”. He continued, “..., unless there are other factors present which raise the question of vexatiousness”.

81. It appears to me that the FTT would err in law if it considered that the request was vexatious for lacking public interest alone .” The Issues

22. Was the Commissioner correct in upholding the Public Authority’s reliance on the exemption afforded by s14(1) FOIA? The Evidence

23. The Tribunal read a bundle of 450 pages and was also provided with a supplementary bundle of 593 pages. We did not consider it necessary to go through the supplementary bundle in detail but it was illustrative of the amount of correspondence there had been between the Appellant and the public authority and between those parties and Audit Wales.

24. We note that the bundle indices were difficult to follow, as documents were not always described in a manner which identified what they were, who had produced them and when. This made it extremely difficult to identify the purpose of some of the documents being exhibited and the dates for some of the correspondence. The Decision of the Tribunal Chronology

25. In January 2023 the Appellant was co-opted to be a councillor at Coedpoeth Community Council, the Public Authority in this matter. We will refer to them throughout as “the council”.

26. On 31 st March 2023, after some internal correspondence and having attended at least one meeting at which the annual return was discussed, he sent the council a document entitled “Schedule of proposed adjustments”. This related to the figures for the financial year to 31 st March 2023 which would be presented to the auditors in order to inform the completion of the council’s annual return for the financial year 2022/23.

27. In May 2023 the Appellant met with the accountant (auditor) and the chair of the council. The bundle contains a 4-page note labelled “meeting with accountant” which appears to have been prepared in advance of that meeting. This is followed by a 3-page note, labelled “Finance Issues CCC”. It is not clear from the bundle whether these documents were shared with the council but it seems likely that they were. The documents, taken together, form a concise summary of the Appellant’s concerns.

28. On 12 th June the Appellant contacted the clerk. He cited his concerns that the council’s income projection had been “over-egged”, potentially by as much as £20,000. The issue was that accruals had not been properly accounted for in the 2023-24 budget. He also raised a query about advice received by the council from One Voice Wales regarding the legality of the budget and offered to assist with the consultation process for the annual return.

29. On 19 th June the Appellant emailed the clerk to request sight of copies of the annual return and supporting documents in advance of the next council meeting.

30. On 22 nd June the internal audit report, for the year to 31 st March 2023, was completed. It was sent to councillors the following day.

31. On 25 th June the Appellant wrote to the chair of the council to request supporting documents for five payments made in April that he considered might relate to the financial year ending 31 st March 23. He had concerns that there might be “significant errors” in the financial statements which the council was due to ratify on 29 th June.

32. The 2022/23 figures were ratified by the council in a meeting on 29 th June.

33. On 30 th June the Appellant requested that the chair give him sight of the supporting invoices and asked to inspect the books.

34. On 2 nd July that request was repeated to the clerk but widened, so that it included not only records from April to June 2023 but also the same period in the previous year.

35. On 11 th July the Appellant asked the clerk for information about the treatment of accruals of wages and holiday pay in the March 2023 accounts.

36. On 12 th July the Appellant contacted Audit Wales to ask whether a council member had the same rights as a member of the public with regard to viewing the books and prime documents of a local council. The answer was yes.

37. The same day the Appellant invited the clerk to give him access to the requested documents.

38. On 14 th July the Appellant again asked to be provided with copies of a series of documents and offered to leave £5 for copying. He requested certain bank statements, certain bank reconciliations, certain payroll reports and copies of the 8 invoices previously requested. He was specific and clear with his request.

39. There followed some correspondence about access to the requested documents and during that time the Appellant again cited his reasons for the request being his concern regarding the legality of the accounts.

40. On 23 rd July the Appellant was allowed to examine the figures. What has never been made clear in the course of these proceedings is how many of the requested documents were made available to him on that date and on subsequent dates. From the correspondence it would appear that the staff wages information, at least, was out of scope for the inspection, but the submissions and the evidence, although not explicit, tend to suggest that the invoices and other documents relating to the 2022/3 accounts were made available.

41. Later the same day the Appellant produced a schedule of potential revisions to the figures that had been adopted on 29 th June and invited the Public Authority’s comments by 4 th August, on which date he proposed to send them to Audit Wales.

42. On 24 th July the Appellant was informed that, while he could meet with the clerk the following day, he would not be provided with information relating to staff wages or anything other than “information relating to the 2022/23 financial statements”. Everything else was out of scope.

43. The Appellant met with the clerk on 25 th July and he notes that he was able to inspect only two of the requested invoices.

44. On 27 th July the Appellant emailed the clerk to confirm his opinion, which was that £76,000 worth of income had been improperly credited to the wrong financial year. He noted that, in light of his concerns, he would absent himself from the next council meeting.

45. The same day the Appellant contacted Audit Wales, sending them his schedule of proposed adjustments and highlighting the his concerns.

46. On 1 st August the council met to sign off the accounts. The Appellant absented himself from that meeting because of his concerns around financial reporting.

47. Audit Wales responded to him on 19 th December 2023. The email from Audit Wales to the Appellant was thorough. It laid out the steps that had been taken in response to his concerns and reported to him on each concern. It had audited the accounts for 2022/3 and had identified some areas in which it required improvement. With reference to staff costs and accruals, two of the Appellant’s key concerns, it found in each case that the council’s approach was “not unreasonable”. It concluded by confirming, crucially, that Audit Wales would be following up on the matters raised in its audit opinion during the 2023/4 and 2024/5 audits. Importantly, it did not require him to take any further action or provide any further information.

48. The FOI requests were made, as outlined above, between February and April 2024. Analysis

49. This case has some parallels with the Upper Tribunal case of Dransfield , which is the leading case on the issue of vexatiousness. In that case, Upper Tribunal Judge Wikeley noted, at [7]: “ Throughout these proceedings Mr Dransfield has been anxious to highlight what he regards as various failings (especially as to health and safety matters and financial controls) by Devon CC. He has also been highly critical of the work of the IC and his staff. Such concerns, whether well-founded or not, do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal. Under statute, my sole concern is whether or not the FTT’s decision discloses an error of law. ”

50. This panel is similarly restricted to dealing with the sole question of whether or not the Respondent’s decision (in this case) discloses an error of law.

51. I highlight this because the Appellant provided a series of submissions and documents, both to the Respondent during its investigation and later to the Tribunal, which tended to focus on his underlying purpose. In arguing that the requests were not vexatious, the Appellant sought to invite the Tribunal to consider their substance, i.e. to address his concerns as they related to the 2022-23 accounting period. We make it very clear that we have no jurisdiction to do so. Our decision is limited to whether or not the requests for information could be characterised as “vexatious” within the meaning of the Law. The documents and submissions did assist us in one key way: to understand the motivation and the reasons for the request. We have set out our findings on those points below.

52. In order to determine whether the Respondent was right in determining that the requests were vexatious, the panel reviewed the series of events that led to the requests being made, as well as the requests themselves. Paragraph 29 of Dransfield supports this approach, saying as it does that: “the context and history of the particular request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor. ”

53. The matters that were in issue here were the accounts of the Public Authority and the accuracy thereof. In essence, the Appellant harboured a concern that the accounts were being recorded, and therefore reported, incorrectly. Thus the community it served was being misled as to the financial health of the Public Authority and the way in which public money was being used. The principal concern was that the 2022-23 accounts had been mis-stated to the tune of £60,000, a considerable amount of money for a small community council.

54. We felt it important to note that the Appellant had, at the outset, a legitimate purpose in pursuing the course of conduct that he did. The Appellant is a retired accountant and his professional status is not disputed by the Public Authority. Indeed, the council conceded that his interventions in early meetings had been helpful. They were clear in their submissions to this tribunal that not only had they taken on board his advice and taken his comments forward to their auditors, they had also made changes to the way in which finances were reported in future reporting years. This is supported by an email from the clerk to Audit Wales on 10 th July 2023 in which she writes: “ Please be aware that we have on several occasions gone through the accounts with him, are aware that there are issues relating to processes and are dealing with them, and have answered all questions to his satisfaction at the time .”

55. We also felt it important to note that the tone of the correspondence we reviewed was polite and courteous at all times, if persistent. The tone of meetings was reported as having been more fractious. That is in dispute but we did not feel that making a finding of fact with regard to that allegation would assist us.

56. The starting point is the ICO’s own guidance on whether the request is vexatious. The guidance says: “ The key question is whether the request is likely to cause distress, disruption or irritation, without any proper or justified cause ” https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/foi/guide-to-managing-an-foi-request/vexatious-and-repeated-requests/ .

57. This was considered in the leading case of Dransfield , which sets out a four part test at paragraph 28: Such misuse of the FOIA procedure may be evidenced in a number of different ways. It may be helpful to consider the question of whether a request is truly vexatious by considering four broad issues or themes – (1) the burden (on the public authority and its staff); (2) the motive (of the requester); (3) the value or serious purpose (of the request) and (4) any harassment or distress (of and to staff). However, these four considerations and the discussion that follows are not intended to be exhaustive, nor are they meant to create an alternative formulaic check-list. It is important to remember that Parliament has expressly declined to define the term “vexatious”. Thus the observations that follow should not be taken as imposing any prescriptive and all encompassing definition upon an inherently flexible concept which can take many different forms.

58. The panel considered the four broad themes identified in Dransfield, noting that they are neither exhaustive nor prescriptive, and concluded as follows. Burden

59. The requests on the public authority were burdensome. The council serves a small village in North Wales and the paid staff consisted of a single clerk and, at various times, an administrator.

60. We do not give great weight to the submission that the request was burdensome because the council’s clerk received 122 emails over a period of 12 months. From the correspondence bundle we could see that the number of emails received included emails on topics other than those which ultimately led to the FOI requests. The panel felt that the more relevant issue was that the Appellant’s emails were somewhat persistent. It was his habit to follow up within 24 or 48 hours when a response was not received and to repeat those follow-ups.

61. In considering whether we found the requests to be burdensome, we make the following observations: 61.1. The four requests were made in close succession and they were made at a time when their substance had already been considered and discussed over several months. 61.2. The requests are repetitious and the Appellant was impatient, giving arbitrary deadlines for responses and pressing recipients for updates as noted above. 61.3. At least part of the information requested had been received (although we were not able to ascertain from the bundle precisely what had been viewed or received). Seemingly, much of the information sought had already been provided. To do so again would have constituted an entirely unnecessary burden. 61.4. We are entitled to take into account the Appellant’s behaviour prior to the FOI requests when considering the burden imposed on the Public Authority. Dransfield paragraph 29 says: the present or future burden on the public authority may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings. Thus the context and history of the particular request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor. 61.5. This case fits squarely into that pattern. In this case it was clear that the council had gone to great lengths to furnish the Appellant with much of the requested information and that by the time the requests came, the burden had already been significant. 61.6. We noted that the fee payable to the auditors increased when the Appellant became involved. While this may have been a necessary and legitimate expense for the council to have incurred, the fact of the additional cost does, in our view, support a finding that there was a burden on the Public Authority in responding to the Appellant’s request. 61.7. In its response to ICO made on 8 th October 2024 the Public Authority noted that it had been difficult to keep up with the Appellant’s communications which came through multiple media: emails to the clerk, emails to the chair and the website contact form. He sent correspondence from three separate email addresses. This made it difficult to co-ordinate and undoubtedly increased the burden on the council.

62. It is our conclusion that complying with the requests would have imposed a significant burden on the council. Value or serious purpose

63. When the requests for information were initially made of the Public Authority, there was a value to them. By this we mean that when the Appellant joined the council as a Councillor, his professional qualifications as a retired accountant were put to good use. Much of his advice to the council was accepted and acted upon. The council accepted, both in correspondence with the Appellant and in its submissions to the Tribunal, that there had been some mistakes in the way in which it recorded its financial affairs and therefore in the way in which its accounts were reported.

64. We considered the documents referred to above at paragraph 27, “Meeting with Accountant” and “Financial Issues CCC”, to be instructive. Although these appear to have pre-dated the requests by some months, they were illuminating in terms of the motive and purpose of the later requests. The tone is polite throughout. The issues identified by the Appellant are clearly set out and his findings are reasoned. We also noted that the Appellant has stated, at numerous places, that he accepts that he may have mistaken. He has not made direct accusations in those documents but suggests that mistakes “may” have been made.

65. Despite (or perhaps because of) this, it is our view that, by the time the FOI requests were made, they lacked both value and serious purpose. We asked ourselves what the Appellant expected to gain from the information he was seeking under FOIA from February to April 2024. By that time, unsatisfied with the council’s response to his concerns, he had already contacted the auditors and then Audit Wales, whose role it is to audit public authority spending in Wales. Both had responded fully.

66. The impression the panel gained was that the Appellant is a diligent man with genuinely held concerns. However, once the council’s auditors and Audit Wales were aware of his suspicions about financial mismanagement, it was their role to investigate and audit, should they deem the relevant threshold to have been met. Any information sought by the Appellant could equally have been sought by them and any responsibility or duty held by the Appellant, as a councillor or latterly as a member of the community (he resigned from the Council on 28 th February 2024), had been discharged.

67. It was not the Appellant’s role to audit the council’s accounts. Audit Wales had acknowledged their own role and reached a decision with the information available to it. The Appellant acknowledged as much in his submissions of 24 th June 2025 when he said: “ I cannot explain why Audit Wales chose not to request the evidence themselves after my communications with them in July 2023 but that was their responsibility and choice .”

68. By the time the requests were made, therefore, it is our conclusion that there was no value or serious purpose to them. Motive

69. In Dransfield , the Tribunal noted that, while FOIA is “motive blind” and there is no need to provide a reason for a request, “ the proper application of section 14 cannot side-step the question of the underlying rationale or justification for the request. What may seem an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority. Thus vexatiousness may be found where an original and entirely reasonable request leads on to a series of further requests on allied topics, where such subsequent requests become increasingly distant from the requester’s starting point.” [para 34].

70. It was our view that motive here was bound up with value and serious purpose, as is often the case. The panel did not consider that the Appellant’s motive was in any way improper. While the Tribunal took no issue with the question of motive, we found that, by the time the requests under FOIA were made, they lacked value and serious purpose, as set out above. Causing harassment or distress to staff

71. I noted above that the tone of the majority of the correspondence we saw was courteous. This is not one of those cases in which the request used intemperate or offensive language or made threats, allegations or personal remarks. We had no doubt, though, that the obsessive and repetitive nature of the correspondence prior to the FOI requests being made contributed to the clerk taking time off work, as set out in the Public Authority’s response to the ICO on 8 th October 2024.

72. An e-mail on 8 th March 2024 from the chair of the council, which was sent in response to the first three requests, said: “ As the council have already taken on board some of your suggestions to improve the procedures for our accounting methods and have acknowledged that the method we used previously was not correct, it may be reasonable to assume therefore that your continuous attempts to find fault with our records and in particular both our accountant and the Clerk, are a personal vendetta. It is also to be questioned what you hope to achieve by obtaining information, other than in an attempt to discredit the Clerk for some reason. ” This characterisation of the effect on the clerk tends to support a finding that the Appellant’s behaviour was having a distressing effect on staff. Conclusion

73. The safeguard of s14 is in place in order to ensure that public authorities may run efficiently. The right to information is significant but it is a qualified right.

74. The authorities are clear that a holistic approach is to be taken to the question of whether a request can be properly characterised as vexatious. We have taken account of the nature of the request, the number of requests and the persistence of the Appellant. Although we do not find an improper motive, we do find that the request has no reasonable foundation with no real value or purpose. Given the lack of objective purpose and lack of value to the Appellant or the public, the burden of complying would be disproportionate.

75. The fact that Audit Wales were seized of the issues and that they had already committed to reviewing the position in future audits was of significant weight in reaching this decision. We do not doubt the Appellant’s concerns were genuine and that his request, initially, was properly motivated. However, his persistence and the fact that he refused to let his requests go, despite having received a certain part of it and despite there being no further he could realistically take his campaign, persuaded us that these requests were indeed vexatious in nature.

76. For these reasons, our decision is that the appeal fails and the decision notice is upheld.