Valentin Cristian Mitroi v Bucharest Court 1st Criminal Division, Romania

Mr Justice Hilliard: Introduction

1. On 15 January 2024, the District Judge in the Westminster Magistrates’ Court ordered the extradition of Valentin Cristian Mitroi (the Appellant) pursuant to the provisions of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement 2020 (TCA) and an extradition warrant issued by the Bucharest Court (the Respondent) on 11 May 2023. The Appellant is a Romanian national, born on 14 October 1968. The warrant was certified by the National Crime Agency on 19 July 2023.

2. The warrant seeks the surrender of the Appellant to Romania for the purpose of enforcing a custodial sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The sentence was imposed in connection with offences of fraud committed between 2005-2008.

3. Romania is a category 1 territory and Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 ( the Act ) applies to these proceedings.

4. A key feature of the case is that the warrant replaces a European Arrest Warrant issued in 2017. The Appellant was discharged by the Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 15 June 2017 on the grounds that the particulars of the merged warrant were deficient and that the total sentence to be served might be longer than the sentence actually imposed for the particularised offences. The District Judge said in her judgment on 15 June 2017 that if her decision was upheld, it was almost inevitable that a further warrant would be issued.

5. The Appellant had relocated to the UK in September 2016. He had been present at his first instance trial in 2014. Although he was not present at the final appeal hearing in November 2016, he had been present at an earlier hearing in the appeal. The District Judge in 2024 was satisfied to the criminal standard that the Appellant was aware that he had been convicted and sentenced at first instance; understood that unless his appeal was successful, he would be required to serve the sentence imposed; and knew this to be the case when he relocated to the UK. The judge was satisfied that the Appellant was to be regarded as a fugitive from justice when he left Romania. There is no challenge to this finding.

6. The Appellant now appeals against the decision to order his extradition with the permission of Chamberlain J. He argues that the judge should have concluded that his extradition was barred by the passage of time pursuant to s14 of the 2003 Act and that extradition would be a disproportionate interference with his and his partner’s Article 8 ECHR rights. I am grateful to both sides for the assistance they have given. The decision of the District Judge

7. The judge summarised some of the further information transmitted by the judicial authority as follows: “(d) Criminal Decision No. 1662 of 4 November 2016 delivered by the Bucharest Court of Appeal – Second Criminal Division was the final judgment in the requested person’s case, which ordered the total sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. (e) The requested person was personally present at the trial resulting in this decision and was represented by both a lawyer of his choice and a public defender. (f) He was summoned to appear at the trial, but he was not subject to any bail conditions or prohibition on leaving Romania and he was not obliged to inform the judicial authority of his whereabouts. (g) After the total sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment became final on 4 November 2016, the requested person ‘was put out on an all-points-bulletin nationally’ by Order of the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police dated 5 December 2016. (h) Checks revealed that he had left Romania and so the 2017 EAW was issued on 17 January 2017. In March 2017 the requested person was declared an internationally wanted fugitive and an alert for him was placed on the Schengen Information System. (j) The requested person was then arrested in the UK on the EAW on 26 April 2017. The judicial authority was asked to provide further information in connection with the 2017 extradition proceedings and it duly did so on 19 June 2017. (k) On 10 April 2023, the judicial authority was informed by the Interpol National Bureau that the RP had been discharged in respect of the EAW on 15 June 2017. The British authorities had requested that a new warrant be issued under TACA. The new warrant was issued the following day, on 11 May 2023.”

8. The District Judge added this later in his judgment: “35. It is important to note here that I was provided with a copy of an email from an officer of the National Crime Agency, which states: “Having checked the discharged case, I can confirm that notification on the discharge was send (sic) to SIRENE Romania on 19/06/2017 which was the agreed channel of communication at the time. I of course cannot confirm if this was then passed from SIRENE Romania to the IJA.”

9. I note that in the further information, the judicial authority had also said that since June 2017, their court had not received any further information regarding the Appellant’s legal situation in the UK and asked the Interpol National Bureau “for support in this regard.” No date is given for that request. On 10 April 2023, the judicial authority was informed by the Interpol National Bureau that according to the reply received from Interpol Manchester, “on 15 June 2017, the surrender under the European Arrest Warrant was rejected by the British authorities.” On 10 th May 2023, the Interpol National Bureau informed the judicial authority of the request for a new warrant. The new warrant was issued on 11 May 2023.

10. The judge considered the passage of time and ss.11 and 14 of the Act in the following paragraphs: “87. Section 11 requires the court to decide whether the requested person’s extradition is barred by any of the reasons set out in subsection (1)(a)-(j) (as defined in sections 12- 19F). If the court decides any of the issues in the affirmative, it must order the requested person’s discharge.

88. Section 14 provides that extradition is barred by reasons ( sic ) of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite the requested ( sic ) by reason of the passage of time since it is alleged that they have committed the extradition offence (in an accusation case) or become unlawfully at large (in a conviction case).

89. In relation to the general principles to be applied when considering the passage of time bar in section 14 , I have considered Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 W.L.R. 779 , HL, La Torre v Italy [2007] EWHC 1370, DC, USA v Tollman [2008] EWHC 184 (Admin) , DC, Gomes v Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21 , Zengota v Circuit Court of Zielona Gora, Poland [2017] EWHC 191 (Admin) , Wisniewski, ibid., De Zorzy ( sic ) v Attorney General Appeal Court of Parts ( sic ), France [2019] EWHC 2062 (Admin) at para ( sic ) Eason v Government of the USA [2020] EWHC 604 (Admin) , DC at [27]. I direct myself as follows as to the approach to be applied: (1) In all but the most exceptional circumstances, where it has been established by the judicial authority to the criminal standard that the requested person is a fugitive, the passage of time bar will not be available to the requested person even if the requesting state has contributed significantly to the delay (Kakis and Gomes). (2) Where the passage of time bar is available, the burden of proof is on the requested person to establish on a balance of probabilities that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite them. (3) “Oppressive” within the meaning of section 14 means hardship to the accused resulting from changes that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration (see Kakis). When considering this issue: (a) the test of oppression goes beyond mere or ordinary hardship, which is a comparatively common consequence of an order for extradition and will not easily be satisfied (see Gomes at [31]). (b) Culpable delay on the part of the judicial authority is a relevant factor and may tip the balance (see Gomes at [23]-[27], La Torre at [16] and Eason at [28]). (c) Other relevant factors may include matters such as the seriousness of the offence, and the impact of extradition on other family members (see Eason at [28]). (d) Ultimately, an overall judgment on the merits is required and it is important to stay focussed on the words of the statute itself (see La Torre at [37], Tollman at [49] and Eason at [28]). (4) In conviction warrant cases, the relevant time for considering the passage of time bar runs from the date when the requested person became "unlawfully at large" (see s.14 (b)), which is when the requested person is at large in contravention of a lawful and immediate sentence of imprisonment under the applicable legal system (see Wisniewski [52] and [54]). That is an objective test, unaffected by the requested person's state of knowledge (see Wisniewski at [54]) and De Zorzy ( sic ) at [46]). (5) Serious delay by a requesting state prior to the order for the requested person's detention will not found an argument for oppression under section 14 , but may be relevant to an argument under article 8 and section 21 (see Wisniewski at [56] and De Zorzy ( sic ) at [46]).

90. For the reasons I have set out above, I am sure that when the requested person left Romania he was a fugitive from justice. I have considered whether the fact of the 2017 extradition proceedings and the period which then elapsed before the TCA warrant now before me might amount to exceptional circumstances for not applying the fugitivity principle in relation to the passage of time bar. However, I am not satisfied that the circumstances here should do so. In my judgment, those circumstances fall properly to be taken into account as part of the Article 8 balancing exercise under section 21.

91. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that any bar under section 11 arises in this case and so I am required by section 11(4) to proceed under section 20.”

11. The judge dealt at length, and appropriately so, with general principles about Article 8 rights in the context of extradition proceedings and with the submissions of the parties. He then turned to his conclusions on the Celinski balancing exercise as follows: “105. In my judgment, the factors in favour of extradition in this case are as follows: The requested person was a fugitive from justice when he left Romania in 2017. There is a constant and weighty public interest in the UK honouring its Treaty obligations. The conduct of which the requested person has been convicted was serious enough to require a very substantial sentence of five-and-a-half years’ imprisonment to be imposed. Decisions of and requests by the judicial authority of a member state should be afforded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. The UK must not be, and must not be seen to be, a safe haven willing to accept and shelter fugitives from justice including those who wish to avoid proceedings in another country.

106. Factors against extradition are as follows: The requested person and his partner have been in the UK since September 2016. Six years elapsed between the requested person’s discharge on the 2017 EAW and his arrest on the TCA warrant now before me. No offences have been committed by him whilst he has been in the UK. Both the requested person ( sic ) are settled in the UK and have stable employment and accommodation. They both have indefinite leave to remain in the UK having been granted “settled status” under the EU Settlement Scheme.

107. I remind myself that the balancing exercise required by Article 8 in extradition proceedings is intensely fact-specific. The approach I adopt is not simply to count the number of factors on either side of the balance. Each factor has a different weight (which I must determine) and so I must weigh all the factors collectively and cumulatively in order to determine where the balance lies. I also remind myself that the heightened public interest in cases of fugitivity is not a factor which will in every case outweigh the cumulation of factors against extradition. Whilst it is right that very strong counterbalancing factors will ordinarily be required, the circumstances of this case are slightly unusual (although not unique).

108. My starting point is the seriousness of the conduct of which the requested person has been convicted. The penalty imposed by the judicial authority is a significant one and this factor carries very significant weight in the balancing exercise.

109. As to fugitivity, whilst I have found to the criminal standard that the requested person was a fugitive when he left Romania in September 2016, he was arrested shortly afterwards on the 2017 EAW on 26 April 2017 and he was discharged on 15 June 2017. I do not conclude that those circumstances have the effect of bringing the requested person’s fugitivity to an end: the status quo continued, in that the requested person remained in the UK knowing that the sentence imposed by the judicial authority was final and that he was required to serve it. However, in the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the weight of the fugitivity as a public interest factor is diminished to an extent. However, in view of the explanation given in the further information and in the email from the NCA officer, I am not satisfied that there has been culpable delay on the part of the judicial authority.

110. Furthermore, the weight of some Article 8 factors pointing away from extradition will ordinarily be diminished where a requested person has built a life for themselves in the UK knowing that there were unresolved issues from their past. To an extent, that remains true in the requested person’s case. DJMC Rose anticipated that a new warrant would be issued shortly after she discharged the requested person. Thereafter, the longer that time after the discharge, the more reasonable it would be for the requested person to conclude that the Romanian authorities no longer sought his extradition. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that any diminution of weight to be attached to the weight of the requested person’s private and family circumstances is more limited than in a straightforward case of fugitivity.

111. More generally, I do consider it to be important that the requested person has not been convicted of any offences for 15 years extradition ( sic ) and he has ( sic ) been convicted of any offence in the UK. He does appear to be rehabilitated and this is very much to his credit. It is clear that both he and Ms Tale have created a positive and settled life for themselves in the UK. Equally, however, they do not have any financial or other dependants and I have not been satisfied that Ms Tale would be unable to support herself financially in the UK without the requested person. Clearly, the separation of them both as couple ( sic ) would have a real emotional impact.

112. Ultimately, taking all circumstances into account, I am satisfied that the balance falls decisively in favour of extradition in this case. In my judgment, the seriousness of the conduct for which extradition is sought weighs very heavily in the balance. I have referred to the diminished weight of fugitivity in this case, but I am satisfied that the impact of extradition for the requested person and his ( sic ) Ms Tale will be what Lord Mance described in Norris as the adverse consequences which extradition has by its nature. Even if I was wrong to have concluded that the requested person was a fugitive, I would in any event have concluded in that case that the balance fell the same way.

113. Accordingly, I am satisfied that extradition would be compatible with rights under Article 8 of the Convention in this case.” Competing submissions on appeal

12. Mr Alun Jones KC for the Appellant points to the delay of 6 years or so before the new warrant was issued and says that there is no explanation for it. He argues that the appellant did not continue to be a fugitive after he had been discharged in 2017 and says that the judge was wrong to take account of that factor when considering delay and the Article 8 balance. It would be offensive, he says, to common sense to describe him as a fugitive after 2017 and the delay was attributable to the failure of the judicial authority to issue a fresh warrant in a timely manner. He argues that the failure to do so for so long would have induced a sense of security in the Appellant. Even if he was still a fugitive, Mr Jones says that there are exceptional circumstances here which mean that the passage of time bar should apply. He relies on the personal circumstances of the Appellant and his partner who were in employment and submits that it would be oppressive to send him to serve a sentence of imprisonment when he has rehabilitated himself in the meantime. And he says that the judge came to the wrong conclusion about the Article 8 balance.

13. Ms Beatty for the Respondent says that it appears that the judicial authority did not know about the discharge of the Appellant in 2017 but that once they learned of it, they acted promptly. She says that the judge was entitled to find that culpable delay on the part of the judicial authority was not established. She says in reliance upon Wisniewski v Poland [2016] EWHC 386 that the Appellant had knowingly placed himself beyond the legal process and that that continued to be the case even though the Appellant was discharged and the warrant re-issued. She says that the need for an arrest warrant was due to the Appellant’s departure from Romania which meant that the Romanian authorities had been unable to enforce their lawful sentence. Ms Beatty argues that as a fugitive, the Appellant cannot rely on the passage of time bar in the absence of exceptional circumstances which she submits are not present here. Even if he were not still a fugitive, she submits that extradition would not be oppressive because of the passage of time. She relies upon the Article 8 balance conducted by the judge and says that all relevant factors were taken into account and that the judge came to the right conclusion. Discussion and decision

14. It is not disputed that the Appellant was a fugitive from justice when he left Romania in 2016. There was a sentence of 5 and a half years’ imprisonment which he was required to serve and which he was avoiding. The question of fugitivity is fact specific. The sentence of imprisonment had never been annulled or compromised in any way. It remains to be served. The quashing of the warrant to enforce the execution of the sentence was a different matter. In that process, nothing was said to call into question the validity of the underlying sentence. The fault was a lack of clarity in the wording of the arrest warrant. In these circumstances, the appellant remained a fugitive who sought to avoid serving the sentence of 5 and a half years’ imprisonment. The district judge came to the right conclusion.

15. The consequence was that the passage of time was not available to the Appellant as a bar to extradition unless there were exceptional circumstances – see Kakis v Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 – and he was required for the purposes of s14 to establish injustice or oppression on the balance of probabilities. No reliance was placed on injustice. The gravity of the offences is relevant to the question of oppression – see Kakis at p784.

16. In Goodyer and Gomes v Trinidad and Tobago [2009] 1 WLR 1038 at 1047, Lord Brown said: “This is an area of the law where a substantial measure of clarity and certainty is required. If an accused like Goodyer deliberately flees the jurisdiction in which he has been bailed to appear, it simply does not lie in his mouth to suggest that the requesting state should share responsibility for the ensuing delay in bringing him to justice because of some subsequent supposed fault on their part, whether this be, as in his case, losing the file, or dilatoriness, or, as will often be the case, mere inaction through pressure of work and limited resources. We would not regard any of these circumstances as breaking the chain of causation (if this be the relevant concept) with regard to the effects of the accused’s own conduct. Only a deliberate decision by the requesting state communicated to the accused not to pursue the case against him, or some other circumstance which would similarly justify a sense of security on his part notwithstanding his own flight from justice, could allow him properly to assert that the effects of further delay were not “of his choice and making.” ”

17. When quashing the warrant in 2017, the District Judge had given no cause to doubt the validity of the sentence of 5 and a half years’ imprisonment and had said that it was almost inevitable that a fresh warrant would be issued. In my judgment, that is a significant matter. The Appellant could always have sought to raise what was happening himself with the authorities. But regardless of that, there was nothing similar to a deliberate decision from the requesting state communicated to the Appellant not to pursue the case. Against that background, I am satisfied that the judge was right to find that there were no exceptional circumstances here where the Appellant’s life had, put at the lowest, been built for some time on uncertainty as to the possibility of return to serve a significant custodial term. His personal circumstances did not have an exceptional quality about them in the context of extradition cases more generally, acknowledging of course the impact of separation from his partner. And on the material before him, the judge was entitled to come to the conclusion he expressed about culpable delay on the part of the judicial authority, (whilst taking account of delay in the Article 8 balance).

18. The judgment in Zebracki v Poland [2025] EWHC 2831 (Admin) was handed down on 31 October 2025, after the argument in this case. The parties have been able to make written submissions about it. In Zebracki , there was what the judge described as a complicated procedural history. Arrest warrants were issued, discharged and re-issued. The Appellant was in the UK throughout. Initial fugitivity was conceded. Dexter Dias J held that it continued thereafter and did not end when his whereabouts became known to the requesting state. For the reasons I have given, I am also satisfied that this Appellant’s fugitivity had continued on the facts here.

19. As regards Article 8, I am satisfied that the judge correctly identified the factors for and against extradition. For the reasons I have given, he was right to put fugitivity into the balance in favour of extradition. However, he also took account for the Appellant of the fact that 6 years had passed before the new warrant was issued and concluded that the weight to be attached to fugitivity was diminished to an extent. He said that the Appellant appeared to have been rehabilitated and that he and his partner had positive and settled lives here, although they did not have dependents . He was not satisfied that Ms Tale could not support herself financially without the Appellant. He acknowledged the impact of their separation.

20. It is clear to me that the judge had the necessary regard to, amongst other factors, the impact of delay in this case. However, he found that the balance fell in favour of extradition and that the seriousness of the conduct under consideration weighed very heavily in the balance. That was inevitable where the sentence to be served was one of 5 and a half years’ imprisonment. Rehabilitation was not the only consideration. The sentence was intended to have a punitive effect when implemented.

21. When he gave the reasons for his decision on 15 April 2024, the judge did not have the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23 . The Supreme Court underlined that cases in which a submission focused on Article 8 ECHR would defeat the public interest in extradition would be rare. It was most unlikely that extradition would be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life; even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that the Article 8 “defence” would have any prospect of success.

22. This serves to confirm that the judge had approached matters correctly whilst acknowledging the adverse consequences that extradition would have upon the Appellant and his partner. He reached the correct conclusion for the reasons he gave. In those circumstances, this appeal must be dismissed.